A-711-96
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (Appellant) (Defendant)
v.
Jean-Yves Hamel and Double J. Ranch Inc. (Respondents) (Plaintiffs)
Indexed as: Hamelv. Canada (C.A.)
Court of Appeal, Desjardins, Létourneau and Noël JJ.A."Montréal, February 23 and 26, 1999.
Crown — Torts — Wrongful search and seizure of horses and vehicle by RCMP, reckless communication of information to media, public — No reasonable ground to suspect respondents' horses transporting cocaine in bodies.
Practice — Limitation of actions — Quebec civil law applicable herein — Prescription cannot be pleaded by appellant as had demonstrated intention of renouncing it — Respondents would suffer harm if appellant allowed to invoke ground of defence for first time on appeal.
Civil Code — Limitation of actions — Applying transitional provisions, instant case governed by new Code — Prescription cannot be pleaded by appellant as had demonstrated intention of renouncing it (Code, Art. 2881) — Respondents would suffer harm if appellant allowed to invoke ground of defence for first time on appeal.
The Trial Division Judge found that respondents' horses, seized by the RCMP, had been cleared through customs when the RCMP took possession of them, that the customs officers and members of the RCMP did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that these horses were transporting cocaine in their bodies, and that the leak of this information to the media, which was made public to the detriment of the respondents, could only have come from the RCMP. Accordingly, the Trial Judge awarded damages to the respondents "to compensate for interference with their reputation and for miscellaneous damage, humiliation and distress resulting from the faults committed by Her Majesty's servants". This was an appeal from that decision.
Held, the appeal should be dismissed.
With respect to the second finding, the Trial Judge correctly applied the appropriate test (reasonable grounds to suspect) and correctly assessed the facts. With respect to the third finding, it was indeed reckless for the RCM Police to have broadcast or to have allowed information so prejudicial to the respondents to be broadcast to the public at this stage, even before the appropriate comprehensive examinations of the horses had been carried out, and when there were no reasonable grounds to suspect that the Act had been or might have been contravened. There was no basis for qualified privilege since the common convenience and welfare of society did not demand that the information be publicly communicated.
The appellant raised the issue of prescription of the respondents' remedy under subsection 106(1) of the Customs Act for the first time on appeal. Extinctive prescription is a substantive right conferred on a defendant, but that claim must be made within a procedural framework which ensures it is properly and fairly exercised. The applicable law as to Crown liability in tort is the law of the province where the cause of action arose. Therefore, the case was governed by Quebec civil law principles. In light of An Act respecting the implementation of the reform of the Civil Code, proceedings herein were governed by the new Civil Code of Québec. Applying Article 2881 thereof, prescription could not be raised as a defence because the appellant had demonstrated the intention of renouncing this ground of defence. A second reason why this ground of defence could not be raised was that the respondents would suffer harm if the appellants were now allowed to invoke it. The respondents had not addressed the factual and legal dimensions of prescription at trial as the appellant had not adduced any evidence to support that ground of defence and have it approved by the Court.
There was no basis for the appellant's argument that the Trial Judge erred in law in awarding the respondent Double J. Ranch moral damages for injury to its reputation and for the humiliation and harassment it suffered. The Trial Judge, on sufficient evidence, compensated the respondent for injury to its business reputation which damaged, and for a certain time was likely to continue to damage, its business interest or goodwill in the local market.
| statutes and regulations judicially considered |
| An Act respecting the implementation of the reform of the Civil Code, S.Q. 1992, c. 57, s. 9. |
| Civil Code of Lower Canada, Arts. 2188, 2267. |
| Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Arts. 2878, 2881. |
| Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-50 (as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 21), s. 32 (as am. idem, s. 31). |
| Customs Act, R.S.C., 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 1, ss. 99(1)(e),(f), 106(1). |
| Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 183. |
| cases judicially considered |
| referred to: |
| R. v. Jacques, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312; (1996), 180 N.B.R. (2d) 161; 139 D.L.R. (4th) 223; 458 A.P.R. 161; 110 C.C.C. (3d) 1; 1 C.R. (5th) 229; 38 C.R.R. (2d) 189; 24 M.V.R. (3d) 1; 202 N.R. 49; R. v. Cahill (1992), 13 C.R. (4th) 327; 23 W.A.C. 247 (B.C.C.A.); O'Hara v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1997] 1 All ER 129 (H.L.); Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd., [1995] 3 S.C.R. 3; (1995), 126 D.L.R. (4th) 609; 26 C.C.L.T. (2d) 109; 186 N.R. 1; 85 O.A.C. 81; Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130; (1995), 126 D.L.R. (4th) 129; 25 C.C.L.T. (2d) 89; 30 C.R.R. (2d) 189; 84 O.A.C. 1; Pelletier v. R., [1970] Ex. C.R. 2; Way v. Canada et al. (1993), 63 F.T.R. 24 (F.C.T.D.); Tolofson v. Jensen; Lucas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gagnon, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022; (1994), 120 D.L.R. (4th) 289; [1995] 1 W.W.R. 609; 100 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1; 51 B.C.A.C. 241; 26 C.C.L.I. (2d) 1; 22 C.C.L.T. (2d) 173; 32 C.P.C. (3d) 141; 7 M.V.R. (3d) 202; 175 N.R. 161; 77 O.A.C. 81; 84 W.A.C. 241; Sembawang Reefer Lines (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Ship —Lina Erre— et al. (1990), 114 N.R. 270 (F.C.A.); Sandvik, A.B. v. Windsor Machine Co. (1986), 8 C.P.R. (3d) 433; 7 C.I.P.R. 232; 2 F.T.R. 81 (F.C.T.D.); W. (V.) v. S. (D.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 108; (1996), 134 D.L.R. (4th) 481; 196 N.R. 241; 19 R.F.L. (4th) 341; Équipements Lefco Inc. v. Roche Ltée, [1993] R.D.J. 234 (C.A.); The King v. Laperrière, [1946] S.C.R. 415; [1946] 3 D.L.R. 1; J.P.L. Canada Imports Ltée v. Canada (1990), 43 F.T.R. 119 (F.C.T.D.). |
| authors cited |
| Dumais, Daniel. "La prescription" dans Collection de droit, 1997-98 , vol. 6, Cowansville (Qué.): Éditions Yvon Blais, 1997. |
| Linden, Allen M. Canadian Tort Law, 4th ed., Toronto: Butterworths, 1988. |
| Martineau, Pierre. La prescription, Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1977. |
| Mew, Graeme. The Law of Limitations, Toronto: Butterworths, 1991. |
| Sopinka, John and Mark A. Gelowitz. The Conduct of an Appeal. Toronto: Butterworths, 1993. |
| Williams, J. S. Limitation of Actions in Canada, 2nd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1980. |
APPEAL from a Trial Division decision (Hamel v. Canada (Attorney General) (1996), 141 D.L.R. (4th) 357; 119 F.T.R. 81 (F.C.T.D.)) allowing the respondents' action in tort for wrongful search and seizure of the respondents' horses and vehicle and for damages for injury to the corporate respondent's reputation and consequent damage to its business interest or goodwill. Appeal dismissed.
| appearances: |
| Raymond Piché for appellant (defendant). |
| Gérald Tremblay for respondents (plaintiffs). |
| solicitors of record: |
| Deputy Attorney General of Canada for appellant (defendant). |
| Duval, Brochu,Tremblay & Associés, Repentigny, Québec, for respondents (plaintiffs). |
The following is the English version of the reasons for judgment of the court rendered by
[1]Létourneau, J.A.: We are of the view that this appeal must be dismissed.
[2]The decision of the Trial Division Judge [(1996), 141 D.L.R. (4th) 357] is based on three findings which, in our view, are supported by the evidence: first, the horses seized by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had been cleared through customs when the RCMP took possession of them; second, the customs officers and the members of the RCMP did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that the respondents' horses were transporting cocaine in their bodies; and last, that the leak of this information to the media, which was made public to the detriment of the respondents, could only have come from the RCMP because of its content, detail and the speed with which it appeared.
Validity of the findings of the Trial Judge
[3]The appellant did not challenge the first of the Trial Judge's findings, but vigorously objected to the second. She offered two arguments in this regard, namely that the Trial Judge erred in law with respect to the test applicable to the case at bar and that the person who made the decision to stop the vehicle carrying the respondents' horses and to inspect them had reasonable grounds, within the meaning of paragraphs 99(1)(e) and (f) of the Customs Act (Act),1 to suspect that they contained goods which contravened or might contravene the Act. In order to better understand the appellant's position concerning the alleged error of law, I would add that the appellant submitted that, for all practical purposes, the Trial Judge required that she establish that her agents had reasonable grounds to believe, not simply to suspect, that the respondents might contravene the Act. In support of this argument, the appellant cited decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, the House of Lords and the British Columbia Court of Appeal as to the fundamental difference at law between the tests of belief and suspicion.2
[4]In our view, both of the appellant's arguments are unsound in fact and in law.
[5]First, nothing on the record, in the evidence or in the Trial Judge's decision indicates that the latter erred in law with respect to the test to be applied in the circumstances. On the contrary, by applying this test, he simply concluded from the evidence submitted to him that there were no reasonable grounds to suspect the Act had been or might be contravened. The Trial Judge had the benefit of hearing the witnesses appearing before him and assessing their credibility in the context of the case as a whole. In our view, it does not seem possible, or indeed reasonable, to reconsider this contentious evidence based merely on the transcripts or worse, on passages chosen by the parties, to draw conclusions different from his. We are persuaded that he properly instructed himself as to the legal principles applicable to the instant case and that we cannot nor do we wish to substitute our assessment of the facts for his.
[6]The appellant's second argument is an assertion that it was customs officer Corporal Cindy Villeneuve who made the decision to seize and inspect the horses imported by the respondents and, accordingly, that the Trial Judge should have considered whether she had reasonable grounds to suspect narcotics were being imported illegally. The appellant submits that if the Trial Judge had correctly interpreted the test applicable in the instant case and therefore objectively evaluated her state of mind, he would undoubtedly have come to the conclusion that she met both the objective and subjective components of that test. With respect, we are persuaded that this argument by the appellant is not supported by the evidence on the record and, what is more, that it fails to take into account the reality of the joint forces operation at issue.
[7]First, we do not believe it is possible to dissociate Corporal Villeneuve's state of mind when the horses were seized, from the person who supplied the information, whom she claims is the basis for her reasonable grounds to suspect contravention of the Act. According to the evidence before the Trial Judge, the operation which led to the seizure of the respondents' horses by Corporal Villeneuve was based on information provided by Daniel Paradis, a member of the RCMP, who had himself obtained the supposedly incriminating information, which was based in large part on hearsay and crude and unwarranted statements and suppositions, from an informant whom he hardly knew. The operation against the respondents was the direct result of information provided by officer Paradis of the RCMP and suffers from the same shortcomings and vagaries.
[8]The appellant made much of the fact that officer Paradis was an experienced police officer who, because of his experience, was justified in being suspicious. With respect, that is an ad hominem and circular argument, since by definition and because of their training, good police officers must be suspicious in order to be effective. That is why Parliament has established guidelines in the public interest by requiring that officers have reasonable grounds for their suspicions and that their suspicions must be objectively assessed. An officer's experience is clearly an important element which must be considered in the assessment of reasonable grounds for suspicion, but it cannot alone provide the objectivity required to exercise authority such as this.
[9]The appellant also alleges that Corporal Villeneuve's suspicions, which were based on information from the member of the RCMP, grew and were in fact confirmed when she learned, during the examination of the respondent Hamel, that the horses had been quarantined on the American side of the border at Ridge Road Farms, a business run by the wife of an American resident who was suspected by the American border police of being involved in drug trafficking in the United States. According to the appellant, this then was undoubtedly proof that Corporal Villeneuve's suspicions were correct and reasonably held.
[10]Fortunately, the Trial Judge dismissed this evidence which supposedly corroborated or confirmed Corporal Villeneuve's alleged suspicions because the evidence on the record indicated that the decision to intercept and seize the respondents' horses was made by the RCMP even before Corporal Villeneuve learned of this so-called corroborating evidence.
[11]The appellant admits this fact,3 which is corroborated in any event by the agreement made earlier in the evening between the RCMP and the St-Hyacinthe veterinary hospital to receive and examine the horses which were to be seized. In short, Corporal Villeneuve, who carried out the seizure of the horses in her capacity as customs officer, was purely and simply acting in accordance and in agreement with the decision of the RCMP, which had been taken much earlier merely on the strength of the information provided by officer Paradis, who had it from an informant.
[12]With regard to the Trial Judge's third finding, the appellant has not persuaded us that qualified privilege should attach to the circumstances surrounding the media's dissemination of the information concerning the seizure of the horses and the allegations of drug trafficking by the respondents. In our view, it was reckless to broadcast or to allow information so prejudicial to the respondents to be broadcast to the general public at this stage, even before the appropriate comprehensive examinations had been done, when there were not even any reasonable grounds to suspect that the Act had been or might be contravened. Such a broadcast exceeded the [translation] "limits of duty or interest"4 which can serve as the basis for that privilege. In other words, the common convenience and welfare of society did not demand that the information be publicly communicated under the circumstances which existed at the time that information was broadcast.5
[13]In and of themselves, our findings should suffice to dismiss the appeal. However, the appellant raised the issue of prescription of the respondent's remedy for the first time before us. She submits that under subsection 106(1) of the Act, the respondents' action should have been commenced within three months after the cause of action arose. Subsection 106(1) of the Act reads as follows:
Limitation of Actions or Proceedings
106. (1) No action or judicial proceeding shall be commenced against an officer for anything done in the performance of his duties under this or any other Act of Parliament or a person called on to assist an officer in the performance of such duties more than three months after the time when the cause of action or the subject-matter of the proceeding arose.
[14]As this ground was raised for the first time on appeal, its admissibility must first be determined. This depends both on the applicable law in the instant case and the nature of the law of limitations. We must therefore review the bases of extinctive prescription and determine if it is governed by common law or the Quebec civil law in the case at bar.
Bases and principles of extinctive prescription
[15]It is interesting to note several important similarities and some differences between the common law and Quebec civil law approaches to prescription or limitation of a legal remedy.
[16]In both legal systems, the bases for the rule concerning extinctive prescription include objectives such as public policy and the need to give people peace of mind with respect to their conduct after a certain period of time has elapsed. They also include the need to protect people from the deterioration and destruction of evidence by the passage of time and from injustice which may result from the fact that their conduct in a certain situation at a certain time could be assessed much more critically, several years later, because of different standards due to changes in cultural values, scientific knowledge, societal interests or public policy.6 In short, the protection which extinctive prescription affords a debtor is justified on the basis of functional utility and societal interests.
[17]It is also generally accepted in both systems that prescription, with the exception of what constitutes delay of forfeiture in Quebec civil law, does not extinguish a creditor's substantive rights but rather his or her remedy. G. Mew states this rule and its justification at common law as follows:7
For the most part, limitation provisions found in Canadian statutes extinguish remedies rather than substantive legal rights. Thus, one commonly finds that an action must be commenced "within and not after" the prescribed period, or that no action shall be brought to recover money in certain circumstances except within the prescribed time limit.
As a result, although a party is barred from enforcing its remedies once that time period has expired, its legal right will survive. The rationale for this approach is explained as follows:
| Extinguishing rights is not an objective of a limitations system. Rather, its objective is to force the timely litigation of disputes if there is to be litigation. |
[18]Quebec authors have made similar statements:8
[translation] Extinctive prescription, because we must differentiate between this type of prescription and forfeiture, does not extinguish the rights of the person whose action is prescribed. It merely prevents that person from enforcing the remedy prescribed by his or her inaction. Forfeiture of the remedy goes much further: it does not simply prevent the possibility of enforcing grounds of law, but also extinguishes the right itself.
[19]Of course, in practice, in the vast majority of cases but not always,9 extinctive prescription will have the effect of making the creditor's right meaningless because he or she will then have no way of enforcing it.
The procedural component of extinctive prescription
[20]There is no doubt that extinctive prescription is a substantive right conferred on a defendant, but that his claim must be made within a procedural framework which ensures it is properly and fairly exercised. In other words, beyond the issue of substantive rights, extinctive prescription includes a procedural component.10
[21]Both at common law and under the Civil Code of Québec [S.Q. 1991, c. 64], it is the defendant who must raise a plea of extinctive prescription and the court may not supply it of its own motion.11 In most Canadian common law jurisdictions, however, including the Federal Court, prescription is an affirmative defence which must be specifically pleaded and include the material facts upon which the defence is based.12 This approach stands in contrast to the one adopted by the Civil Code of Québec whereby prescription may be raised at any stage of judicial proceedings, even in appeal, unless the defendant has, in light of the circumstances, demonstrated his or her intention of renouncing it.13 However, a new argument, such as prescription, cannot be raised on appeal unless all the evidence needed to determine it is already in the record.14
[22]It is clear that the approach taken at common law whereby extinctive prescription is a defence and, therefore, the way in which this defence is exercised raise a procedural question. The conclusion is the same in Quebec civil law because of the bases and objectives of extinctive prescription as well as Articles 2878 and 2881 of the Civil Code of Québec.15
[23]The fact that pursuant to these articles a debtor may renounce prescription and the court may, in light of the circumstances, infer an intention to renounce it, combined with the fact that the court may not, of its own motion, raise the plea of prescription and that, unlike forfeiture, it is not required to declare it, illustrates the procedural component of this defence which is available to the defendant in a legal proceeding.
Application of the principles governing extinctive prescription to the circumstances of the case
[24]In the instant case, the cause of action, specifically the seizure of the horses at the Lacolle customs office and subsequent transmission of this information to the media, arose in Quebec. Consequently, the applicable law in Crown liability in tort is, as the Trial Judge stated, the law of the province where the cause of action arose.16 Moreover, section 32 [as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 31] of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act provides that, except as otherwise provided in that Act or in any other Act of Parliament, the laws relating to prescription with regard to proceedings against the Crown are those of the province in which the cause of action arose.17 Subject to the provisions and limits to the application of section 106 of the Customs Act with respect to the length of the limitation period, we are therefore governed by Quebec civil law principles rather than common law principles.
[25]The legal situation with respect to this issue is complicated by the fact that the cause of action arose in 1990 and the proceedings were brought in 1991 under the authority of the Civil Code of Lower Canada which has since been replaced by the Civil Code of Québec. The regime applicable to prescription was somewhat different under the former Code as it included short (five years or less) and long prescriptions (more than five years) as well as delays of forfeiture. Further, both short prescriptions and delays of forfeiture could be raised by the court of its own motion.18
[26]We are of the view that, in light of section 9 of Chapter I of the An Act respecting the implementation of the reform of the Civil Code,19 proceedings in the instant case are governed by the new Code, the Civil Code of Québec.
[27]This transitional provision provides that proceedings pending continue to be governed by the former legislation, except for matters concerning proof and procedure in such proceedings. In light of our findings concerning the procedural nature of the exercise of the right to extinctive prescription, it is accordingly the provisions of the new legislation which should be applied.
[28]While it is legally possible under Quebec civil law for a party to an appeal to raise prescription as a defence, we are nevertheless of the view that the appellant cannot do so in the instant case for two reasons. The first is based on Article 2881 of the Civil Code of Québec and the second on a judicial rule.
[29]First, we believe that the appellant demonstrated her intention of renouncing this ground of defence. She did in fact raise and argue a defence of prescription at trial with regard to the respondents' claim in damages for the damage to their truck. The respondents later abandoned this part of their claim. It is true that some of the allegations in the defence filed by the appellant, which were couched in very general terms, raised the possibility in law that the balance of the respondents' claim was also prescribed; however, the appellant did not adduce any material facts in support of her legal statement which justified, substantiated or supported such a ground of defence. Further, she did not argue this ground of defence at trial, which therefore gave the respondents and the Trial Judge reasonable cause to believe that she had renounced it.
[30]Second, we are satisfied that the respondents would suffer harm if the appellant were now allowed to invoke this ground of defence on appeal. The respondents could have established at trial through cross-examination or by adducing evidence that officer Paradis of the RCMP, who was at the root of the joint seizure operation, was not acting as a customs officer but as an RCMP officer. The respondents properly did not address the factual and legal dimensions of prescription as the appellant did not adduce any evidence to support her ground of defence and have it approved by the court.
The award of moral damages to the respondent Double J. Ranch Inc.
[31]The appellant argued that the Trial Judge erred in law in awarding the respondent Double J. Ranch Inc. the amount of $25,000 as moral damages for injury to its reputation and for the humiliation and harassment it suffered. She submits that a legal entity's loss of reputation can only be compensated on the basis of its loss of business.
[32]A reading of the Trial Judge's decision has persuaded us that beyond the words he used, he compensated the respondent for injury to its business reputation which damaged, and for a certain time was likely to continue to damage, its business interests or goodwill20 in the local market. He had before him evidence of a sufficient commercial loss to warrant his award to the respondent.
[33]For all of these reasons, the appeal will be dismissed with costs.
1 R.S.C., 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 1.
2 ;R. v. Jacques, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 312; R. v. Cahill (1992), 13 C.R. (4th) 327 (B.C.C.A.); O'Hara v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, [1997] 1 All ER 129 (H.L.).
3 See appellant's memorandum, at p. 20, para. 70.
4 ;Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd., [1995] 3 S.C.R. 3, at p. 29.
5 ;Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at pp. 1190 and 1193.
See also A. M. Linden, Canadian Tort Law ,4th ed., Toronto: Butterworths, 1988, at pp. 654 and 662.
6 See P. Martineau, La prescription, Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1977, at p. 241. See also G. Mew, The Law of Limitations, Toronto: Butterworths, 1991, at pp 7-8.
7 Id., at p. 35. See also J. S. Williams, Limitation of Actions in Canada, 2nd ed., Toronto: Butterworths, 1980, at p. 1.
8 D. Dumais, "La prescription", in Collection de droit , 1997-98, vol. 6, Cowansville (Que.): Éditions Yvon Blais, 1997, at p. 111.
9 See Pelletier v. R., [1970] Ex. C.R. 2; Way v. Canada et al. (1993), 63 F.T.R. 24 (F.C.T.D.) where it was held that extinctive prescription in a proceeding against a Crown servant did not protect the Crown from an action if the limitation periods were longer for actions against the Crown.
10 ;Tolofson v. Jensen; Lucas (Litigation Guardian of) v. Gagnon, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, at p. 1073.
11 Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Art. 2878.
12 G. Mew, supra, note 6, at pp. 53-55. See also rule 183 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998 [SOR/98-106] and Sembawang Reefer Lines (Bahamas) Ltd. v. Ship —Lina Erre— et al. (1990), 114 N.R. 270 (F.C.A.); and Sandvik, A.B. v. Windsor Machine Co. (1986), 8 C.P.R. (3d) 433 (F.C.T.D.).
13 Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Art. 2881.
14 J. Sopinka and M. Gelowitz, The Conduct of an Appeal, Toronto: Butterworths, 1993, at p. 51; W. (V.) c. S. (D.), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 108; Équipements Lefco Inc. v. Roche Ltée, [1993] R.D.J. 234 (C.A.).
15 Art. 2878 and 2881 read:
2878. The court may not, of its own motion, supply the plea of prescription.
However, it shall, of its own motion, declare the remedy forfeited where so provided by law. Such forfeiture is never presumed; it is effected only where it is expressly stated in the text.
. . .
2881. Prescription may be pleaded at any stage of judicial proceedings, even in appeal, unless the party who has not pleaded prescription has, in light of the circumstances, demonstrated his intention of renouncing it.
16 The King v. Laperrière, [1946] S.C.R. 415; J.P.L. Canda Imports Ltée v. Canada (1990), 43 F.T.R. 119 (F.C.T.D.).
17 R.S.C., 1985, c. C-50 (as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s. 21).
18 See for example Arts. 2188 and 2267 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada. See also P. Martineau, La prescription, supra, note 6, at pp. 356-357.
19 S.Q. 1992, c. 57.
20 A. M. Linden, La responsabilité civile délictuelle, supra, note 5, at p. 769.