Peter Lee and Joyce Wendy Yung, doing business 
as Fashion Accessories (Applicants) 
v. 
Segal's (Michael). Inc. (Respondent) 
Trial Division, Heald J.—Ottawa, January 25 
and 31, 1972. 
Trade Marks—Expungement—Affidavits in support of 
application—Enlargement of time for filing—Onus of 
proof—Trade Marks Act, s. 17(2)—Federal Court Rule 
3(1)(c). 
In December 1964, respondent was registered as owner 
of the trade mark "Dorce" in respect of certain wares. On 
June 17, 1969, applicants applied by originating notice of 
motion for expungement of the trade mark on the ground 
that applicants had used the trade mark in Canada in associ
ation with similar wares since April 1962. Applicants did 
not file affidavits in support of their application within the 
time allowed by the relevant rule, and at the end of 1971 
applied under Federal Court Rule 3(1)(c) for enlargement of 
the time for filing affidavits. The affidavits had not been 
filed in the time allowed because negotiations had been 
proceeding between the parties with respect to the matter 
until late in 1971 when they were broken off. 
Section 17(2) of the Trade Marks Act provides that when 
application for expungement of a trade mark is made more 
than five years after its registration on the ground of prior 
use, the applicant must establish that the person who adopt
ed the mark did so with knowledge of such prior use. 
Held, the circumstances warranted an enlargement of 
time for filing affidavits, but in view of the provisions of 
section 17(2), the affidavits must be confined to evidence in 
applicants' possession prior to expiry of five years from 
registration of the mark. 
APPLICATION. 
J. C. Singlehurst and W. R. Meredith for 
applicants. 
R. G. McClenahan for respondent. 
HEALD J.—This is an application by notice of 
motion for an order, pursuant to Rules 3(1)(c) 
and 704(3), enlarging the time for the applicants 
herein to file and serve, pursuant to Rule 
704(3), the affidavits which the applicants pro
pose to put before the Court at the trial of these 
proceedings. 
These proceedings were commenced under 
the provisions of what are now sections 57 and 
58 of the Trade Marks Act R.S.C. 1970, c. 
T-10, by an originating notice of motion dated 
and filed in the Court on June 17, 1969. The 
statement of facts accompanying said originat
ing notice of motion sets out that the respond
ent is registered owner of the trade mark 
"Dorce" under Canadian Trade Mark registra
tion number 138,403 dated December 11, 1964, 
in respect of "sweaters, suits, slacks, shirts, 
sport shirts, raincoats, rain hats, jackets, 
blouses, pants, coats, knitted T-shirts, knitted 
two piece suits, shorts." Said registration states 
that the trade mark "Dorce" was used in 
Canada by the respondent since January 2, 
1964. Applicants allege that prior to that date, 
they had used the trade mark "Dorce" in 
Canada in association with like or similar wares, 
specifically at least as early as April 17, 1962. 
Applicants also allege that the use and adoption 
of said trade mark by respondent was with full 
knowledge of the prior trade mark rights of 
applicants in said trade mark. 
Applicants then ask for expungement of 
respondent's registration on the basis of said 
prior use in Canada by the applicants, presum
ably under the provisions of sections 16 and 18 
of the Trade Marks Act. 
Rule 704(3) provides as follows: 
Rule 704. (3) Within 15 days after an originating notice 
or notice of appeal is filed, the affidavits which the appli
cant or appellant proposes to put before the Court for the 
hearing and determination of the proceedings shall be filed, 
and copies thereof shall be served within 15 days after the 
originating notice or notice of appeal is served. 
The corresponding Exchequer Court Rule 
covering the situation in 1969 was Rule 36(3) 
which stated as follows: 
Rule 36(3) Within fourteen days after an originating 
notice or notice of appeal is filed, or within such further 
time as the Court may allow (which further time may be 
sought inter alia upon the ground that an application is to be 
made for a direction that the proceedings may be heard and 
determined otherwise than summarily on evidence adduced 
by affidavit), the affidavits which the applicant or appellant 
proposes to put before the Court for the hearing and deter
mination of the proceedings shall be filed, and copies there
of shall be served within fourteen days after the originating 
notice or notice of appeal is served or within such further 
time as the Court may allow. 
The applicants did not comply with the 
requirements of Exchequer Court Rule 36(3) by 
filing the affidavits sought to be put before the 
Court within fourteen days of the filing of the 
originating notice of motion in the Court. As a 
matter of fact, no such affidavits have ever 
been filed in the Court, nor were they submitted 
to me on the argument of the motion. 
The applicants make this motion for exten
sion of time for filing such affidavits under the 
provisions of Federal Court Rule 3(c) which 
provides: 
Rule 3. (1) .. . 
(c) the Court may enlarge or abridge the time appointed 
by these Rules, or fixed by any order, for doing any act or 
taking any proceeding upon such terms, if any, as seem 
just, and any such enlargement may be ordered, although 
the application for the same is not made until after the 
expiration of the time appointed or fixed, ... 
I agree with counsel for the applicants that 
the Court has power to enlarge the time within 
which they may file their supporting affidavits 
provided the circumstances established warrant 
such an enlargement. It thus becomes necessary 
to look at these facts and circumstances. 
The history of this matter begins on January 
2, 1968, when counsel for the applicants wrote 
to the respondent alleging that respondent's 
registration of the trade mark "Dorce" in 
Canada was invalid because of prior use in 
Canada by the applicants. The letter then made 
some suggestions as to how the conflict 
between the parties could be resolved, that is, 
by assignment of respondent's registration to 
the applicants, thereafter the applicants to 
license the respondent. Respondent's solicitor 
replied to this letter under date of January 23, 
1968 and in effect denied applicant's conten
tions, re-asserted respondent's entitlement to its 
Canadian registration and concluded by sug
gesting that perhaps an arrangement could be 
worked out whereby respondent might license 
the applicants under respondent's registration. 
These letters were the first of some forty-two 
letters between counsel for the parties between 
January of 1968 and December of 1971. 
Counsel for both parties referred extensively 
to this correspondence in support of their posi
tion. Counsel for the applicants argued forceful
ly that this correspondence indicated clearly 
that throughout this entire period, negotiations 
were being pursued with a view to settlement; 
that at many times during the negotiations it 
appeared that settlement would be reached and 
therefore counsel did not concern himself with 
breach of the rule concerning filing of the 
affidavits, and that it was only after negotia
tions were broken off late in 1971, that he 
found it necessary to proceed with this motion 
for extension of time. 
Counsel for the respondent argued just as 
forcefully that the correspondence from his 
firm, and earlier from the firm first representing 
the respondent, should have made it clear to the 
applicants and their counsel that respondent 
was not retreating in any way from its registra
tion and its right to registration and that neither 
of respondent's counsel made any representa
tions or acted in such a way as to lead appli
cants' counsel to believe that he did not need to 
comply with the Rules of Court, and that appli
cants' counsel's present difficulty is of his own 
making. 
I have read the correspondence carefully and 
there is some measure of support in it for the 
contentions of both counsel. However, consid
ering the evidence in total, I am satisfied that 
during the period in question, there was negotia
tion between the parties, and if not true negotia
tion, there was most certainly communication in 
large measure. Counsel for the applicants may 
have been unrealistically optimistic in expecting 
that the conflict would be settled without the 
necessity of continuing with his expungement 
action. However, I am satisfied that he acted in 
good faith throughout. 
I agree with the statement of President Jack-
ett (as he then was) in the case of Smith, Kline 
& French Inter-American Corp. v. Micro 
Chemicals Ltd., 62 C.P.R. 245 when he said at 
page 256: 
... I think the day is almost past when the Courts are quite 
so callous as to say that one litigant is "entitled" to take 
advantage of the mistakes of another. 
In my view, this is also a case like the Smith, 
Kline and French case (supra) to the extent that 
here also, the parties had never dropped their 
cudgels. Here, as there, it seems that one of the 
parties (here the applicants) chose a particular 
line of battle strategy that now, in retrospect, 
seems to have been unwise. 
On page 259 of said judgment, President 
Jackett said: 
... There was a time when Courts would have taken a hard 
line and would not have permitted litigants to go back on 
such decisions. It is, however, in my view, more acceptable 
today to allow such mistakes to be corrected if they can be 
corrected without injustice to other parties and without 
transgressing the rule of public policy that demands that 
there be some finality to litigation. 
I agree with that general view of the way in 
which such a situation should be considered and 
I would be inclined to grant applicants' motion 
in the terms asked for if I could satisfy myself 
that such a result would not inflict prejudice 
and injustice on the respondent. However, 
respondent's counsel submits prejudice on the 
following basis: Respondent's trade mark regis
tration is dated December 11, 1964. By virtue 
of subsection (2) of section 17 of the Trade 
Marks Act' a difference is made between the 
standard of proof required in expungement 
actions according to whether said action is com
menced before or after the expiry of five years 
from the date of trade mark registration. 
In actions commenced more than five years 
after registration, in addition to all other items 
of proof required of the applicant under the 
Act, the applicant must prove additionally that 
the holder of a trade mark registration, in this 
case, the respondent, adopted the registered 
trade mark in Canada with knowledge of such 
previous use by the applicants. 
Put another way, in actions commenced 
longer than five years after registration, the 
applicant has "a higher hill to climb" than in 
actions commenced before the five year period 
has expired to the extent of the additional item 
of proof above cited. 
In this case, the five year period expired on 
December 11, 1969. The originating summons 
and statement of facts were filed on June 17, 
1969, but the supporting affidavits were not 
filed and have not been filed to this day. Coun
sel for the respondent says that the applicants 
in effect are seeking the best of two worlds. On 
the one hand, they want their action, which was 
commenced prior to the five year deadline to be 
continued so they can retain the benefit of the 
lesser burden of proof, while on the other hand, 
they want the added advantage of an additional 
two and one-half year period within which to 
discover and file possible new evidence in sup
port of their action to expunge. 
I find considerable substance in the argument 
of respondent's counsel. Proceedings of this 
kind are intended to be of a summary nature 
and are to be heard on affidavit evidence except 
in special cases where it may be desirable to 
determine certain specific issues on oral evi
dence. Respondent was entitled to know the 
case it had to meet and this could only be 
accomplished after the applicants had filed and 
served their supporting affidavits. 
As I said earlier, none of the supporting 
affidavits which the applicants seek to file were 
before the Court on the hearing of the motion 
before me. However, the material before me 
established that there are apparently three 
affidavits of Joyce Wendy Yung, one dated 
May 8, 1969, one dated October 1, 1969 and 
one dated March 13, 1971. Copies of these 
three affidavits were not sent to respondent's 
counsel until April 23, 1971. The applicants ask 
for leave to file these three affidavits and poss
ibly another completely new affidavit, not yet in 
existence, which applicants' counsel says will 
be necessary to establish the new allegations 
contained in applicants' amended statement of 
claim (amended without leave on January 20, 
1972 pursuant to Rule 421(1) because respond
ent has not yet pleaded to the original statement 
of claim.) 
It is my opinion .that if the applicants wish to 
have the benefit of the lesser burden of proof 
under section 17(2), they have to be expected to 
go to trial on the basis of the evidence in their 
possession prior to the expiry of the five year 
period, that is to say, prior to December 11, 
1969. This would mean that they would be 
entitled to file the affidavits of Joyce Wendy 
Yung dated May 8, 1969 and October 1, 1969 
only. 
President Jackett of the Exchequer Court (as 
he then was) took what I consider to be the 
proper view of Rule 36 which was the predeces
sor to the present Rule 704 in the case of Home 
Juice Co. v. Orange Maison Ltée, 52 C.P.R. 
175. At page 178, the learned President said: 
What Rule 36 contemplates is the filing in advance of the 
hearing of the affidavits that the respective parties "pro-
pose" to "put before the Court" for the hearing. In my 
view, in the ordinary course of events each of the respec
tive parties, having complied with this condition precedent 
to using such affidavits as evidence, should tender at the 
hearing such of the affidavits that he has previously filed as 
he then decides to make part of his case at the hearing. At 
that time, the opposing party can make all proper objections 
to their being admitted and the Court can, after hearing 
anything that the parties may have to say, admit each 
affidavit, in whole or in part, or reject it. 
In the case at bar, for the reasons above 
stated, I believe that applicants should only 
have leave to file the affidavits of Joyce Wendy 
Yung dated May 8, 1969 and October 1, 1969. 
Because I have not seen these affidavits, I can 
form no conclusions as to their relevance or 
their admissibility. Respondent will accordingly 
have full opportunity to make all proper objec
tions as he may be advised in the event appli
cants desire to put them before the Court at the 
trial and the trial Judge will be able to rule on 
their admissibility. 
In making this disposition of the matter, I 
have endeavoured to adhere to the principle 
enunciated in the Smith case (supra) while at 
the same time ensuring that the respondent is 
not prejudiced - by applicants' failure to comply 
with the rules over a protracted period of time. 
The applicants will have to decide whether to 
proceed to trial on the basis of the evidence 
contained in the two earlier Yung affidavits or 
whether to commence a new action and thus 
embrace the higher burden imposed by virtue of 
section 17(2) of the Trade Marks Act. 
There will be an order enlarging the time until 
February 15, 1972 for the applicants herein to 
file the affidavit of Joyce Wendy Yung dated 
May 8, 1969 and the further affidavit of Joyce 
Wendy Yung dated October 1, 1969. It is fur
ther ordered that copies of said affidavits shall 
be served on the respondent on or before 
March 1, 1972. There will be a further order 
allowing the filing of replies under subsection 
(2) of section 58 of the Trade Marks Act until 
March 15, 1972 and a further order allowing the 
respondent until April 1, 1972 to file any affida
vits which it proposes to put before the Court 
for the hearing and determination of these pro
ceedings. There will be a further order in favour 
of the respondent for the costs of this motion in 
any event of the cause. I fix those costs at one 
hundred dollars. 
17. (2) In proceedings commenced after the expiry of 
five years from the date of registration of a trade mark or 
from the 1st day of July 1954, whichever is the later, no 
registration shall be expunged or amended or held invalid on 
the ground of the previous use or making known referred to 
in subsection (1), unless it is established that the person 
who adopted the registered trade mark in Canada did so 
with knowledge of such previous use or making known. 
 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.