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Pfizer Company Limited (Appellant) v.
Deputy Minister of National Revenue for Cus toms and Excise (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J., Thurlow J. and Choquette D.J.—Montreal, November 28, 1972; Ottawa, January 12, 1973.
Customs and Excise—Evidence—Statutes—Appeal- Exemption from duty of antibiotic chemical "and its deriva- tives'—Meaning of "derivatives'—Whether decision on question of law.
Pursuant to statutory authority the Governor in Council exempted certain antibiotics, except viz. "tetracycline and its derivatives" from customs duty for a certain period. The antibiotics, oxytetracycline and chlortetracycline, are of similar molecular structure to tetracycline, but neither of these can in fact be produced from tetracycline. Salts of oxytetracycline are manufactured by appellant in Canada but neither of the others is manufactured here. At a hearing before the Tariff Board testimony of expert witnesses as to the sense in which the word "derivatives" was used in the relevant scientific field was inconclusive, and so also were standard dictionaries, but from an examination of technical works, the Board concluded that in the field of antibiotics the word "derivatives" was used in the wider sense and accordingly held that all three antibiotics were thus within the exception to the exemption. Appellant appealed to this Court. The appeal was limited to a question of law.
Held (Choquette DJ. dissenting), the test applied by the Board in determining the meaning of the word was the proper test and the Board's determination of the meaning of the word was a decision on a question of law and therefore reviewable by this Court.
Per Choquette D.J. dissenting: The word "derivatives" in the order in council was ambiguous and it should therefore be interpreted in the sense most favourable to appellant.
APPEAL from the Tariff Board. COUNSEL:
John Gomery and Jack Miller for appellant. S. Froomkin for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Martineau, Walker, Allison, Beaulieu, Phelan and MacKell, Montreal, for appellant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.
JACKETT C.J.—This is an appeal from a Dec laration of the Tariff Board under the Customs Act, R.S., 1970, c. C-40.
Three chemicals have become important in the realm of therapeutic drugs in relatively recent times, namely, oxytetracycline, chlortet- racycline and tetracycline. The similarity in the names of these drugs arises from the fact that their molecular structure is, in each case, based on four carbon rings. In practice each one is prepared without using either of the others as a commencement material. It is possible, accord ing to the evidence, to use chlortetracycline in the preparation of tetracycline but neither tetra- cycline nor oxytetracycline can be used to pre pare either of the others.
Certain salts of each of these chemicals have become of importance as therapeutic drugs.
The oxytetracycline drugs are highly competi tive with the chlortetracycline drugs. The chlor- tetracycline salts are manufactured in Canada. Salts of the other drugs are not manufactured in Canada.
The three drugs and the salts in question are antibiotics.
In the context of the above facts, the Gover nor in Council, in pursuance of statutory authority, passed an order in council exempting from customs duty antibiotics with certain exceptions, and one class of exceptions was "Tetracycline and its derivatives".
The question is whether certain salts of oxytetracycline fall within the words "Tetracy- cline and its derivatives" so as to be excluded from that exemption.
It is common ground that the salts in question are derivatives of oxytetracycline.
Assuming that the word "derivative" was used in its ordinary common meaning, in this context it would seem to me that it means something that arises or is produced (is derived) from something else, either directly or indirect ly. The result of such an interpretation here
would be that the only protection afforded to the manufacturer in Canada of chlortetracycline and its salts would be against the importation of the salts of tetracycline. Not only would there be no protection against the importation of oxytetracycline or its salts but there would be no protection against the importation of chlor- tetracycline or its salts.
It does seem improbable that it would have been intended to afford a chlortetracycline manufacturer protection against tetracycline and its salts but not against chlortetracycline itself or its salts. However, if that is the mean ing of the words used, the language must be interpreted accordingly no matter how improb able it may seem that that was what was intended.
Before the Tariff Board evidence was led as to the sense in which the word "derived" is used in the part of the world of science where these drugs are of concern. In the Board's Dec laration, there is a summary of this evidence. As neither party has challenged the accuracy of that summary, I accept it as correctly represent ing the effect of that part of the evidence.
The witnesses for the appellant were a chemi cal engineer and a chemist. They were of the view that "... the term `derivative' means that the substance is derived from something else. You have to have a biochemical or at least a chemical transformation ... to transform one substance into its derivative."
One of the respondent's witnesses was a medicinal-organic chemist. In his view, the method of preparation was not the factor. The Board does not, however, appear to have under stood him as expressing any opinion as to what the word "derivative" means in this context. They say that he was of the view that "... if, by reason of its chemical structure, one com pound is a derivative of another compound, it is such a derivative whether it is produced by a living organism or is produced synthetically", and that, in his opinion, "there is a distinction to be made between `derived from' and 'a deriva tive of': the first indicating a source of produc tion and the second a matter of close and appro-
priate relationship of chemical structure". The respondent's second witness was a veterinary surgeon. To him, a derivative is commonly known "as a substance of a similar class in structure". To indicate production from a source, he preferred "derived from" to "deriva- tive of" which latter expression according to him "indicates appropriate similarity of struc ture, response and use rather than of origin or source".
The Board apparently took the view that it could make no finding on the evidence of the experts as to what the word- "derivative" meant in the order in council and decided to resolve "the issue" by an examination of ordinary dic tionaries and technical dictionaries and writings.
It is of interest to note that many of the ordinary dictionaries referred to by the Board give one or more senses of the word "deriva- tive" in its application to chemical matters. One such sense is an application in this field of the ordinary sense of the word and so we find in the Oxford English Dictionary "...5. Chem. A compound obtained from another, e.g. by partial replacement." On the other hand there is anoth er, and presumably broader, sense that is differ ently expressed but of which a representative definition taken from Webster's Third New International Dictionary is:
4a: a chemical substance that is so related structurally to another substance as to be theoretically derivable from it even when not so obtainable in practice ... .
There are also alternatives to this latter sense in some of the technical dictionaries such as "The theoretical connection between the molecular structures of related organic compounds" (Hackh's), and "In organic chemistry, a com pound is considered a derivative of that hydro carbon which contains the same number of carbon atoms in the same arrangements" (Stewart).
After their review of the definitions, the Board concluded that it was clear that "deriva- tives" in chemistry and allied fields is some times used with a broader and sometimes with a narrower meaning, and that "each of these meanings may be appropriate when used in its appropriate context".
However, when the Board turned to the application of the word "derivative" in technical works in the field of antibiotics, medicine and veterinary science dealing with the "tetracy- clines", which word clearly includes all the three drugs in question and their salts, and the evidence of the experts from the fields of medi cine, chemistry and veterinary science, they concluded that "The broader meaning of "derivative" appears to be consistent with the general usage and views in the field of antibiot ics", and that "to allow only the narrower mean ing is not".
In the result, the Board found oxytetracycline to be a derivative of tetracycline within the words of the order in council.
In legal theory, as I understand the law, the general rule is that a word in a document such as a statute or order in council having the effect of law is to be given its ordinary or popular meaning according to the context' and that meaning is a question of law to be determined by the Court with the aid of dictionaries and other legitimate aids to construction, 2 but where it is found that a word has been used in such a statute or other document in the jargon or ver nacular of a particular area, part of the com munity, trade or field of learning, then it is to be given that meaning' and, in such a case, the Court may require the evidence of persons with knowledge of the sense in which the word is so used in order to determine the meaning, and, in such a case, its meaning becomes a question of fact.' It would seem, however, that, where the Court has sufficient familiarity with the words to take judicial knowledge, 5 such evidence is not necessary and the meaning of the word is a question of law for the Court.
Whether, in any particular case, the meaning of a word is a question of law or a question of fact may be of no importance where the Court that has to deal with the matter has jurisdiction in relation to questions of law and of fact. This was the situation before the Tariff Board on this appeal.
However, in this Court, the matter becomes one of importance because this Court can review a decision of the Board on a question of law but cannot review a decision by it on a question of fact.
In my view, the Board did not make a finding of fact on the evidence that the word had a sense generally accepted in the field of antibiot ics, medicine and veterinary science which was wide enough to make oxytetracycline a "deriva- tive" of tetracycline. They did not expressly make such a finding as a finding of fact. Fur thermore, if the matter was being dealt with by the Board as a question of fact, we are faced with a situation where a substantial and signifi cant part of the material relied on was material that was not placed in evidence at the hearing so that the appellant would have had an opportuni ty to answer it . 6 [I think it is highly doubtful that literature is admissible as evidence on a ques tion of fact as to usage of a word in a special domain except by way of the testimony of experts who testify that such literature is illus trative of a generally accepted usage of a word in a sense other than its ordinary meanings.]
What the Board did, in my view, is what any ordinary court would have had to dp in the circumstances. In the absence of evidence on which they could find as a fact that there was general acceptance in a special domain of a use of the word in a sense other than its ordinary senses, they had to decide as a matter of law, with such assistance as they obtained from the facts as given in evidence, in what sense the word was being used in the context of an order in council dealing with chemicals in the field of antibiotics.' In doing so they referred to ordi nary dictionaries as any other court might have
done. They also referred to the general use of the word in the literature of the subject, which it was proper for them to do provided that they were competent adequately to appraise such usage.'
There is no dqubt in my mind that, having regard to the context, usage in the field of antibiotics was the proper test to be applied in determining the sense in which the word was used.
I have more doubt about the use of technical literature by a court consisting of non-technical persons as an aid to determining that sense. However, it is to be remembered here that the Tariff Board is a court specially created inter alia to interpret the words used in the Customs Tariff and I am of the view that that Board must be conceded the right, where it feels competent to do so, to use the literature of a technical subject as an aid to finding the sense in which words are used in connection with the subject.' Moreover, when the Board has indulged in such an exercise, while the resulting finding is a decision on a question of law that this Court has a duty to review, I am of the view that this Court should not interfere and substitute its own view so long as the Board's conclusion is one that is fairly open having regard to all the aids to construction available.
In my view, the Board's conclusion on the question involved here is one that could proper ly be reached and I am, therefore, of opinion that the appeal must be dismissed.
* * *
THURLOW J.—The question raised by this appeal is whether the Tariff Board erred in law in finding that three products imported by the appellant and known commercially as:
Terramycin Quaternary Salt TM 200; Terramycin Hydrochloride Non-Sterile; and
Calcium Di-Terramycin Micronized Non-Ster ile
fell within the meaning of the expression "tetra- cycline and its derivatives" in Schedule A of the Chemicals and Plastics Tariff Reduction Order, P.C. 1968-2334. This Order in Council was made under what is now section 12 of the Customs Tariff which authorized the Governor in Council to reduce or remove any duty appli cable under a list of tariff items including inter alia item number 92944-1, Antibiotics.
The Order in Council exempted from duty from January 1, 1969 to January 31, 1973 goods falling within item 92944-1, other than:
Penicillin and its derivatives (not including crude penicillin and semi-synthetic penicillin); and
Tetracycline and its derivatives.
The error in law alleged by the appellant is that the Tariff Board interpreted the last men tioned expression in a technical sense as refer ring to the single chemical compound known as tetracycline and all chemical substances theoretically derivable from it or with an appro priately close relation of chemical structure or similarity of numbers of carbon atoms in the same arrangement, whether, in the present state of knowledge, such compounds can be prepared or manufactured from tetracycline or not, rather than in an ordinary commercial sense embracing the antibiotic known as tetracycline in the forms in which it is marketed or produced and such other antibiotics of the class known as tetracy- clines as can be prepared or manufactured from it.
The three products imported by the appellant are all basically oxytetracycline (the word "ter- ramycin" being the appellant's brand name for it) the molecular formula and structure of which differ from tetracycline only in that a hydroxyl (OH) group is substituted for a hydrogen (H) atom at the particular point designated as 5 in the molecular structures of tetracycline and oxytetracycline as depicted in Exhibits A-9 and A-12. Oxytetracycline is not, however, pro-
duced from tetracycline nor is there any known way of producing it from tetracycline. It is made by a fermentation process in which a species of micro-organisms known as streptomyces rimo- sus is employed and it is then extracted from the fermentation broth. Oxytetracycline, there fore, would not fall within the statutory expres sion as the appellant would have it interpreted. Indeed the only commercial products to which the expression would apply at the present time in the appellant's interpretation are the hydro- chloride and phosphate salts of tetracycline.
At the hearing before the Tariff Board four witnesses gave evidence which is summarized in the Board's declaration. Two of these witnesses called by the appellant expressed the view that oxytetracycline was not a "derivative" of tetra- cycline. The other two, who were called by the respondent, expressed the contrary view. In the course of this evidence certain exhibits includ ing R-1 and R-4 were produced. On the basis of this evidence the Board concluded that:
From the foregoing summary it is clear that the expertise of the witnesses learned in this esoteric field is character ized by conflict rather than by consensus, leading to greater perplexity than the layman might expect.
To resolve the issue, it is necessary to examine the relevant lexicography and orismology.
The Board then proceeded to consider the definitions of "derivative" found in twelve pub lished dictionaries and glossaries, some of which had not been referred to in the course of the hearing, and concluded that there was a preponderance in the cited works for the broad er meaning of the word. The Board also cited and considered nine other works referred to as "orismology" some of which had been referred to in the course of the hearing and some not and concluded that these works confirmed the broader interpretation. The Board concluded at page 7 of its declaration:
Beyond any apparent mere preponderance of usage for the broader meaning, it is clear from the lexicography and the orismology that "derivative" in chemistry and allied fields is sometimes used with a broader and sometimes with a narrower meaning; whatever the predominance of support, each of these meanings may be appropriate when used in its appropriate context.
Tariff item 92944 enumerates "antibiotics". Accordingly, particular importance attaches to the meanings attributed to the term "derivative" in the literature and evidence which deal with usage in the field of antibiotics, medicine and veterinary science. The British Medical Dictionary gives both the broader and the narrower meanings of derivative and Taber's Encyclopaedic Medical Dictionary defines Ter- ramycin as the "proprietary name of the oxy derivative of tetracycline"; the Grand Larousse Encyclopédique, under the caption "Pharm.", describes oxytetracycline as a deriva tive of tetracycline; the witnesses with special knowledge in the fields of medicinal chemistry and veterinary science attributed to the word "derivative" its broader meaning and deemed oxytetracycline to be a derivative of tetracycline; the American Hospital Formulary Service and Antibiotic and Chemotherapy by Garrod and O'Grady list the terracy- clines [sic] together as a group or class of antibiotics similar in chemical structure and in biological properties and uses. The broader meaning of "derivative" appears to be consis tent with the general usage and views in the field of antibiot ics; to allow only the narrower meaning is not.
Both generally and more particularly in the field most closely relevant to the item in issue, the preponderance of support for the broader meaning is such that the Board finds oxytetracycline to be a derivative of tetracycline.
As it is clear that oxytetracycline is a deriva tive of tetracycline in what has been referred to as the broader interpretation of the term "derivative", the problem raised by the appeal is whether the Tariff Board correctly interpret ed the expression "tetracycline and its deriva tives" in the Order in Council in question by giving the word "derivatives" therein such broader interpretation.
As the Board was unable to determine from the evidence of the witnesses and the exhibits produced in the course of the hearing the cor rect meaning of the word "derivatives" in the expression "tetracycline and its derivatives" it was, in my opinion, incumbent upon it to deter mine that meaning as best it could as a matter of law and (as no finding of fact as to the meaning of the word was made by the Board on that evidence) the problem appears to me to be the same for this Court, that is to say, to resolve as best it can as a matter of law the meaning of the expression in order to determine whether the Board erred in its interpretation. For this pur pose, in my opinion, it is open to the Court, as it was also open to the Board, to make use of such
knowledge as it has of the meaning of words, to consult dictionaries and glossaries and to have regard to such usage of the word "derivative" as is to be found in the exhibits in evidence if not in the other publications referred to by the Board.
In my view for the reasons that follow the conclusion of the Board as to the interpretation of the expression "tetracycline and its deriva tives" is not erroneous.
Firstly, I agree with the Chief Justice, whose reasons I have had the opportunity of reading, that it is improbable that the intention of the Governor in Council was to protect chlortetra- cycline manufacture in Canada only from tetra- cycline and tetracycline salts, when the same manufacture had to face strong competition from oxytetracycline and salts thereof which were not manufactured in Canada. I regard this as a powerful reason for rejecting the appel lant's interpretation.
Secondly, it is not disputed that the chemical known as tetracycline is not a subject of com merce. The substances that enter into commerce are the hydrochloride and the phosphate salts of tetracycline. It would be strange, therefore, if the expression "tetracycline and its derivatives" were used to refer only to salts, which would fall under the word "derivatives", rather than to refer to them by their own particular names or as "salts of tetracycline".
Thirdly, I think that the fact that the expres sion is found (1) in an order entitled "Chemicals and Plastics Tariff Reduction Order" and (2) in a long list which uses the chemical names of a great many substances, is a strong indication that the expression here in question is to be read as a person engaged in a chemical business and having some knowledge of chemical nomencla ture would read it, though not necessarily as the most learned chemist might read it.
Fourthly, apart from any assistance obtain able from dictionaries or glossaries I would have had no difficulty in concluding not only
that the word "derivatives" is capable of a broader and different meaning from that sup ported by the appellant, i.e., substances derived or capable of being derived from the substance referred to, but that it has that broader and different meaning in the expression "tetracy- cline and its derivatives" in the Order in Council in question. In the broader or different sense as I understand it, the word is used to refer con veniently to chemical substances, the molecular structures of which include a basic named chemical structure but in which there is some substitution of elements or radicals which dif ferentiate such substances from the particular substance having the basic molecular structure. Examples of the usage of the term in this sense appeared in the patent specification under con sideration in C. H. Boehringer Sohn v. Bell Craig Limited [1962] Ex.C.R. 201 in a passage cited at page 209 as follows:
Processes for the production of morpholine derivatives are already known, whereby diethanolamines were treated e.g. by heating the temperatures to 160-180° C with 70% sulphu ric acid, in order to acquire the morpholine ring closure.
and in the specification under consideration in Société des Usines Chimiques Rhone-Poulenc et al v. Gilbert (1967) 35 Fox P.C. 174 in a passage cited at pages 189 and 190.
Further examples of usage in the same sense also appear in Exhibit R-1 in the present case in the expression defining terramycin as:
a proprietary name for the oxy derivative of tetracycline.
and in Exhibit R-4 in the sentence:
Although one of the tetracyclines may be superior to the other derivatives in specific infections or in individual patients the close similarity of the chemical, microbiological, pharmacological, and therapeutic properties of these drugs permits their discussion as a class.
To my mind the last two references also show that the term can be and is used by at least some writers as a term of sufficient precision and breadth to refer to the whole class of tetracy- clines, other than tetracycline itself, and not merely to the salts of tetracycline and such other substances as may be producible from tetracycline of which, as far as I am aware, there are none.
In this sense of the word nothing turns on whether the substance referred to as a deriva tive can or can not be made from the substance of which it is a derivative. Nor is the usage or application of the word affected by the fact that the substance can be produced from the deriva tive, as in the case of tetracycline itself, which can be produced from chlortetracycline.
Finally, the meaning of the expression, "tetra- cycline and its derivatives", appears to me to be elucidated to some extent by reference to Exhibit R-3 in which the name tetracycline was proposed for the substance which was subse quently produced and now bears that name. The name is derived from tetra, meaning four, and cycline meaning rings, and of the tetracyclines then known and contemplated, i.e. chlortetracy- cline, oxytetracycline and tetracycline, the simple name tetracycline has been given, as I understand it, to the member of the group having the most basic or rudimentary molecular structure. The names given to the other similar but different substances of the group, i.e. chlor- tetracycline and oxytetracycline (there are now several more), embrace the same name with a reference to the difference. Tetracycline is thus the group or family name and in this sense the other members of the group or family are regarded as derivatives of the basic substance which bears the unembellished family name and are referred to as such. It is not disputed that the whole family or group would have been sufficiently referred to by the expression "the tetracyclines" and, as I see it, the whole family or group is equally well referred to by the expression "tetracycline and its derivatives".
As this interpretation is not dependent on any finding of fact made by the Board and is a conclusion of law as to the meaning of the word in its context it is, in my opinion, immaterial that the Board relied in part on literary materials not referred to at the hearing before it and there is no occasion to consider the appellant's sub mission that in this respect the requirements of natural justice were not observed in those proceedings.
I would dismiss the appeal with costs.
CHOQUETTE D.J. (dissenting)—The question is whether the antibiotics imported by the appel lant (Terramycin quaternary salt TM 200, Terra- mycin hydrochloride non-sterile and calcium di- terramycin micronized non-sterile) which are derivatives of "oxytetracycline" can also be classified as derivatives of "Tetracycline" in the language of the Order in Council P.C. 1968- 2334, 20th December 1968 respecting the reduc tion of Customs duties on Chemicals and Plas tics, specially in the words "Tetracycline and its derivatives".
To solve this question, I would apply the rules stated in Craies on Statute Law, 6th Ed., in the following extracts:
(p. 162)
(1) According to their popular sense
There are two rules as to the way in which terms and expressions are to be construed when used in an Act of Parliament. The first rule is that general statutes will prima facie be presumed to use words in their popular sense .. .
(p. 163)
... In other words, as was said by Pollock B. in Grenfell v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, if a statute contains lan guage which is capable of being construed in a popular sense, such "a statute is not to be construed according to the strict or technical meaning of the language contained in it, but is to be construed in its popular sense, meaning, of course, by the words "popular sense" that sense which people conversant with the subject-matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it." But "if a word in its popular sense and read in an ordinary way is capable of two constructions, it is wise to adopt such a construction as is based on the assumption that Parliament merely intended to give so much power as was necessary for carrying out the objects of the Act and not to give any unnecessary powers." In other words the construction of the words is to be adapted to the fitness of the matter of the statute.
(p. 164)
(2) Scientific and technical language
The second rule is that if the statute is one passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction, words are used therein which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows and understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning which may differ from the ordinary or popular meaning.
It is clear from the record that everybody conversant with chemicals and tetracycline does not know and understand the word "derivative" to have the broad meaning adopted by the Tariff Board, that is "theoretical derivability, appropri ately close relation of chemical structure or similarity of number of carbon atoms in the same arrangement", instead of the natural, and also technical meaning of the word "deriva- tive", that is a compound actually obtained from another by chemical reaction.
As a matter of fact, the appellant and the respondent each called "two well-qualified wit nesses" to give their expert evidence on the technical issues involved. For the appellant, a chemical engineer and a chemist say that tetra- cycline and oxytetracycline are obtained from different micro-organisms (streptomyces aure- ofaciens and streptomyces rimosus) and that in the present state of technology, oxytetracycline cannot be produced from tetracycline. They say that "derivative" means that a substance is derived from something else.
For the respondent, a medicinal-organic chemist and a veterinary surgeon say that both products have the same basic structure, that they differ by having different groups or differ ent atoms attached to different places, that "derivative" indicates appropriate similarity of structure, response and use rather than of origin and source. They distinguished between "derivative of" and "derived from".
After summarizing the evidence of these four witnesses, the Board concludes as follows: "it is clear that the expertise of the witnesses learned in this esoteric field is characterized by conflict rather than by consensus, leading to greater perplexity than the layman might expect. To resolve the issue, it is necessary to examine the relevant lexicography and orismology" (the underlining is mine; see App. Book, p. 12).
Then, the Board goes on citing dictionaries and technical literature on the point in issue. It
also quotes the following extract of its own report on Reference 120—Chemicals, vol. 9, p. 224; "The spokesman for the company (Cyana- mid of Canada Limited, the intervenant in this appeal) said:
I would suggest that, because of their similar characteristics, all the tetracyclines be considered; that is, chlortetracycline, tetracycline itself, dimethyl chlortetracycline and oxytetra- cycline" (Transcript, Vol. 79, p. 12706).
The Board then concludes: "Both generally and more particularly in the field most closely relevant to the item in issue, the preponderance of support for the broader meaning is such that the Board finds oxytetracycline to be a deriva tive of tetracycline" (A.B. p. 17).
The Board holds therefore that the appellant's products to be derivatives of tetracycline within the meaning of the Order in Council.
I respectfully disagree with that conclusion.
First, I would set aside the above extract of the Board's report stating that the spokesman of the intervenant company suggested that all tet- racyclines be considered on account of their similar characteristics (A.B., p. 14). This sugges tion affords no evidence. Moreover, the Order in Council does not specify all the tetracyclines as suggested.
There remain the dictionaries and literature on which the Board relies to support its deci sion. Only well known and authoritative dictio naries and standard authors are admissible as guides for the legal interpretation of words or expressions. As pointed out elsewhere, a great part of the literature relied upon was not placed in evidence and cannot therefore be considered. At all events, the decision shows that not all the dictionaries and authors cited give to the word "derivative" the broader meaning stated by others and adopted by the Board. For instance, the Oxford Dictionary, Degering's Organic Chemistry, Flood and West's Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Words (and others cited below) tend to give to "derivative" the more restrictive meaning of a compound actual-
ly obtained from another by chemical reaction; that others, like Webster's, Funk & Wagnall's and four others give to the word "derivative" the broader meaning which includes "theoretical derivability, appropriately close relation of chemical structure or similarity of number of carbon atoms in the same arrangement. (A.B., p. 157).
What is important is not the preponderance of support referred to by the Board, but the fact that some well known dictionaries and authors do not give to "derivative" the broader meaning that the Board adopted. This being so, it cannot be said that everybody conversant with the sub ject of chemicals and antibiotics knows and understands the word "derivative" to have the particular meaning given to it by the Board. (Craies; supra).
The question cannot either be solved by dis tinguishing between "derivative of" and "de- rived from". The French version of the Order in Council uses the word "dérivés" for "deriva- tives", which means or surely includes "derived from". The Dictionnaire usuel Quillet et Flam- marion defines "dérivé" as follows:
[TRANSLATION] ... Chem. Matter produced from other matter through distillation.
Le petit Robert defines it as follows:
[TRANSLATION] ... Chem. Substance prepared from another substance, which retains the general structure of the original.
I find no particular help in the context of the Order in Council as to the meaning of "Tetracy- cline" (in the singular) and of its "derivatives". The document enumerates hundreds of chemi cals and plastics. It does not do so for a scientif ic purpose but for a fiscal purpose, that is the reduction of Customs duties on the products enumerated, with the exception, inter alia, of "Tetracycline and its derivatives". The Gover nor in Council must have had in mind something concrete rather than theoretical, an actual deriv- ability rather than a theoretical derivability, the latter including "appropriately close relation of
chemical structure or similarity of number of carbon atoms in the same arrangement". This meaning would lend itself to constant litigation and could lead to the conclusion that two differ ent products are the derivative of each other.
Nothing shows that the members of the Board decided from their personal experience in the field of chemicals and antibiotics. It appears on the contrary, from the argument of counsel before the Board and from the remarks of its members, that the question was considered as a serious and debatable one (Official report of proceedings, pp. 147 to 184 and pp. 184 to 223). I find particularly true the following remark from Mr. Elliott: "It is difficult. Sometimes words mean different things to different people, even in a technical field" (p. 193).
It is common ground that no known formula actually permits oxytetracycline to be produced from tetracycline; in fact, the appellant's prod ucts were not obtained from tetracycline.
It is true that tetracyclines, in the plural, means a class or a group of antibiotics which includes oxytetracycline, chlortetracycline and tetracycline, but tetracycline in the singular is a product of its own distinct from the others and from which oxytetracycline cannot actually be produced. The intention of using the singular appears not only from the word as spelled, but also from the use of "its" in the words "Tetra- cycline and its derivatives". It is also true that the singular includes the plural (Interpretation Act, s. 26(7)) so as to mean two or more units of the same product, but not to the extent of changing the meaning of a word.
I would therefore give to the word "deriva- tives" in the Order in Council P.C. 1968-2334 its natural, logical and etymological meaning,
which is also a technical meaning for that term, that is "a compound actually obtained from another by chemical reaction."
Otherwise, the most I could say is that the word "derivatives" in the Order in Council is ambiguous and its meaning uncertain. In that case it should be interpreted in the sense most favourable to the alleged debtor. There is a more cogent reason to say so. Being antibiotics, the appellant's products should be admitted-free of duties unless they are proven to fall within the exception of "Tetracycline and its deriva tives". It is here the respondent who invokes that exception, an exception to exemption. He had therefore the onus to demonstrate that the appellant's products fell within that exception. Such exception, as all others, must be strictly interpreted. So I would not give to "derivatives" the broad and theoretical meaning that the Board attributed to that word, when it is not recognized by all those conversant with chemi cals and antibiotics, but, as already said, I would give the word its natural meaning.
It pertains to the Governor in Council, not to the Board, to clarify its text so as to avoid any ambiguity or uncertainty, or to afford a better protection for chlortetracycline salts manufac tured in Canada. As the text stands now, I do not feel justified to read "Tetracycline and its derivatives" as meaning "Oxytetracycline, chlortetracycline and tetracycline and their derivatives" or as meaning "Tetracyclines (in the plural) and their derivatives". It would have been too easy to say so.
However, I appreciate the carefulness with which the Board's decision has been prepared and the interest it affords in the field of theoretical derivability. I have also considered the strong reasons given by my two colleagues in support of that decision and it is with the greatest respect for their opinion that I differ and come to the conclusion that this appeal should be allowed with costs and that the appel lant's products above described are not subject
to duty and are free goods during the period from January 1, 1969, to January 31, 1973.
1 Grey v. Pearson, (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61.
2 Bowes v. Shand, (1877) L.R. 2 A.C. 455; Great Western Railway Company v. Carpalla United China Clay Company, [1909t 1 Ch. 218; Great Western Railway v. Bater, [1922] 2 A.C. 1, per Lord Atkinson at page 12; The Township of Tisdale v. Hollinger Consolidated Gold Mines, [1933] S.C.R. 321, per Cannon J. at page 322; Edwards v. Bairstow, [1956] A.0 14, per Viscount Simon at pages 30-32, and Lord Radcliffe at pages 33-36; The Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company v. The Queen, [1961] S.C.R. 750.
3 Alexander v. Vanderzee, (1872) L.R. 7 C.P. 530; North British Railway Company v. Budhill Coal and Sandstone, [1910] A.C. 116; The Caledonian Railway Company v. The Glenboig Union Fireclay Company, [1911] A.C. 290; West ern Minerals Ltd. v. Gaumont, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 345; Jenner v. Allen West & Co., [1959] 1 W.L.R. 554.
4 Ashforth v. Redford, (1873) L.R. 9 C.P. 20; Attorney- General for the Isle of Man v. Moore, [1938] 3 All E.R. 263.
5 See Unwin v. Hanson, [1891] 2 Q.B. 115, per Lord Esher, M.R. at pages 119-20:
Now when we have to consider the construction of words such as this occurring in Acts of Parliament we must treat the question thus: If the Act is directed to dealing with matters affecting everybody generally, the words used have the meaning attached to them in the common and ordinary use of language. If the Act is one passed with reference to a particular trade, business, or transaction, and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business, or transaction, knows and understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning, though it may differ from the common or ordinary meaning of the words. For instance, the "waist" or the "skin" are well- known terms as applied to a ship, and nobody would think of their meaning the waist or the skin of a person when they are used in an Act of Parliament dealing with ships. Now dealing with the cutting of trees in the country, is there not a language which all people in the country conversant with trees know and understand? It is not a question of mere forestry, but of what persons generally living in the country know and understand by the use of a particular term with respect to the cutting of trees there. Therefore, dealing with the cutting of trees in the country, this Act of Parliament uses language which everybody conversant with the cutting of trees in the country knows and understands. I think it would be mere pedantry in the present case not to take notice of the well-known meaning which persons in the country conversant with the cutting of trees would attach to the word used in this Act of Parliament. There was evidence given at the trial of its well-known meaning, though I think that evidence was unnecessary. Two words, "lopping" and "topping", which mean different things, are used in the country with respect to the cutting of trees. The Act gives directions with respect to cutting trees near a highway to the person who
has to cut them, and to the magistrates who may order them to be cut, and uses only one of those words, namely, "lop". That word is well known in the country to mean cutting off the branches of a tree; "topping" is the cutting off its top. I think that the proper way to construe the Act, under those circumstances, is to say that it was only intended to give power to cut off the branches.
6 Compare Minister of National Revenue v. Wrights' Canadian Ropes, Ld., [1947] A.C. 109, per Lord Greene M.R. at pages 124-25.
Compare Borys v. C.P.R., [1953] A.C. 217, per Lord Porter at page 226:
In these circumstances their Lordships, with such assistance as is to be obtained from the facts as given in evidence, must form their own opinion purely as a matter of construction as to the meaning which the word 'petroleum' bears when the substance referred to is in situ in a container below ground.
$ See Camden (Marquis) v. Inland Revenue Commission ers, [1914] 1 K.B. 641, per Cozens-Hardy M.R. at pages 647 et seq:
It is for the Court to interpret the statute as best they can. In so doing the Court may no doubt assist them selves in the discharge of their duty by any literary help which they can find, including of course the consulta tion of standard authors and reference to well-known and authoritative dictionaries, which refer to the sources in which the interpretation which they give to the words of the English language is to be found.
9 Compare Canadian National Railway v. Bell Telephone, [1939] S.C.R. 308, per Duff C.J.C. at page 317.
 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.