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Saluda Foods Limited (Plaintiff)
v.
W. K. Buckley Limited (Defendant)
Trial Division, Heald J.—Toronto, January 30 and 31; February 1,2,3 and 9, 1973.
Evidence—Practice—Trade marks—Infringement action— Motion for interlocutory injunction—Affidavits of public opinion survey to show confusion between trade marks—Not admissible—Rule 332(1).
Defendant put a cold remedy called MEDI•CITRON on the market. Plaintiff sued for infringement of its registered trade mark NEO CITRAN. On a motion for an interlocutory injunc tion plaintiff filed affidavits of analysts and interviewers employed by a market research organization showing the results of a survey of 300 persons as to the extent to which they were confused by the packages of NEO CITRAN and MEDI• CITRON. Defendant moved to prohibit use of the affidavits on the hearing of the motion.
Held, plaintiff was not entitled to use the affidavits.
Building Products Ltd. v. BP Canada Ltd. (1961) 36 C.P.R. 121; Paulin Chambers Co. Ltd. v. Rowntree Co. Ltd. 51 C.P.R. 153, referred to.
MOTION.
COUNSEL:
D. S. Johnson, Q.C. and I. Hughes for plaintiff.
R. Barrigar for defendant. SOLICITORS:
MacBeth and Johnson, Toronto, for plaintiff.
Smart and Biggar, Ottawa, for defendant.
HEALD J.—This is an application by the defendant for an order striking out certain affidavits filed on behalf of the plaintiff and prohibiting their use on behalf of the plaintiff at the hearing of the plaintiff's motion for an inter locutory injunction in this action. The impugned affidavits are:
1. The affidavits of Ronald Bondar dated November 9, 1972 and January 20, 1973;
2. The affidavits of Lois Atkins dated November 16, 1972 and December 28, 1972;
3. The affidavit of Philip J. Weingarden;
4. The affidavits of Fanny Whitlock dated November 16, 1972 and December 28, 1972; and
5. The affidavits of Jackie Brammer, Gaby Flantje, Kim Geddes, Lynda Harley, Eliz- abeth Kinsman, Karen Macdonald, Marg Rennie, Eileen Semple and June Templeton.
Ronald Bondar says that he is Project Direc tor for Elliott Research Corporation Limited which firm was engaged to carry out a market research investigation to determine if the con sumer would or would not be likely to confuse a newly introduced cold remedy medicine known as MEDI • CITRON with the cold remedy medicine already on the market and known as NEO CITRAN.
Members of the Elliott staff interviewed 300 consumers divided into two groups of 150 each. One group of 150 were asked questions on a standard form of questionnaire in respect of NEO CITRAN and five other cold remedies. Anyone claiming to have used NEO CITRAN or to be aware of NEO CITRAN was then presented with a package of MEDI • CITRON and a package of NEO CITRAN and asked this question: "You mention that you know of NEO CITRAN. Just to make sure I know what you are referring to, please look at these packages and tell me which product is the one you have been talking about." The form then specifies five alternate answers and the interviewer is instructed to tick the one most closely applicable to the inter viewee's response. The five alternate answers are:
(a) NEO CITRAN specified, no confusion.
(b) NEO CITRAN specified, some confusion.
(c) MEDI•CITRON specified, no confusion.
(d) MEDI• CITRON specified, some confusion.
(e) Neither package specified, respondent not sure.
The other group of 150 persons were asked
the identical questions concerning MEDI•CITRON along with the same five other cold remedies. Anyone claiming to have used MEDI•CITRON or to be aware of MEDI• CITRON was presented the two packages and asked the same question as the other group and the same questionnaire form with the same five alternate answers was used. Mr. Bondar's affidavit of November 9, 1972, purports to analyze the results of the survey and makes two salient points, first that a significant percentage of the people who claimed to be users of NEO CITRAN were con fused as to which product they had in fact used when simultaneously presented with both pack ages and that an even larger percentage of those interviewees who claimed to have been aware of NEO CITRAN were confused when simultane ously presented with both packages. Philip J. Weingarden, also employed by Elliott and engaged in market research for that company, deposes to basically the same information and makes the same salient or significant points as did Bondar.
All of the other affidavits are from interview ers who have attached to their affidavits the completed questionnaire forms covering the interviews which each interviewer completed.
Subject survey was carried out between Sep- tember 4 and September 18, 1972. Two hundred and seventy nine out of the total of 300 persons were interviewed at the Towne & Countrye Mall, Yonge Street and Steeles Avenue in Met ropolitan Toronto and the remaining 21 persons were interviewed in the Brampton Mall in Brampton.
Counsel for the defendant cited the case of Building Products Ltd. v. BP Canada Ltd. (1961) 36 C.P.R. 121 where Mr. Justice Camer- on rejected as inadmissible the results of a public opinion survey. There are some differ ences between that case and the case at bar as was pointed out by counsel for the plaintiff. The Building Products decision was a decision as to admissibility at trial. This case involves admissi bility on an interlocutory application in which, under Rule 332(1), there is permitted deposi tions on information and belief provided the
grounds therefor are stated. There is the added distinction that, in the Building Products case, the challenged evidence was by the President of the survey firm who had no personal knowledge as to the manner in which the questionnaires were completed or as to the accuracy thereof, whereas here, the affidavits in question, with the exception of those by Bondar and Weingar- den, are the affidavits of the interviewers them selves. Notwithstanding these factual differ ences, I have the view that many of the objections expressed by Cameron J. on pages 129 and 130 of the report apply with equal force to the case at bar.
The question of the admissibility of survey evidence was also considered by Gibson J. in the case of Paulin Chambers Co. Ltd. v. Rown- tree Co. Ltd. 51 C.P.R. 153 and I consider his comments on pages 158 and 159 thereof to be equally apt to the facts and circumstances of this case.
This survey was carried out in a two week period in September of 1972, mostly in one shopping centre in Metropolitan Toronto. The interviewers were instructed to choose persons in the same average age and income group. Other than that, it seems to have been a random selection at that shopping centre during that particular period. We do not know anything about the education of the interviewees, wheth er they can read, whether they have any physi cal disabilities, whether they are employees or customers of the shopping centre and so on. It seems to me that responses, under such circum stances, can be of little probative value. I also have the view that a survey for such a short period of time, conducted in one area, in one city of Canada, is far from being representative.
Furthermore, the response of the person interviewed when it is recorded on the question naire involves a subjective judgment on the part of the interviewer; it involves the interviewer
deciding whether or not the interviewee was confused and this involves an interpretation by the interviewer of what the interviewee said. There is no evidence as to the background, knowledge and experience of the interviewers. A particular response by one member of the public might be interpreted in ten different ways by ten different interviewers, depending on their intelligence, their education and their experi ence. Surely, to accept such evidence, based on such unknowns and such variables, would be unwise indeed. It is true that the interviewers are before the Court and could be cross-exam ined on their affidavits but the interviewees are not before the Court, and the defendant would be at a considerable disadvantage in endeavour ing to obtain a complete picture of the various interviews on the present state of the record. The other objection which I have to this evi dence is that the responses elicited in the ques tionnaires were taken in an artificial environ ment which does not reflect reality. As Cameron J. said on page 130 of his judgment in the Building Products case:
... the interviewers ... cannot possibly create in the minds of those interviewed market conditions similar to those encountered by persons actually going to purchase the vari ous wares in question.
When a member of the public shops for a cold remedy, the various available brands are usually displayed in close proximity to each other. This is quite different from being asked, by a stran ger, a number of questions about a product without having a chance to see these products side by side where they can be compared.
There was also an additional circumstance in this case and that is the fact that the plaintiff itself has, over the years, marketed NEO CITRAN in three different coloured packages, each quite distinct from the other, and yet, those inter viewees who were shown the two competing packages, were only shown the blue package presently being used in the marketing of NEO CITRAN. This circumstance serves to underline the unsatisfactory nature of this type of evi dence. If the survey shows confusion in the market place, the plaintiff may well have con-
tributed to that confusion itself. If some of the interviewees had purchased or become familiar with NEO CITRAN in the yellow and white pack age, or the orange and yellow package previous ly used, their confusion might not be related to the defendant's packaging in any way but stem solely and directly from the marketing practices of the plaintiff.
For all of these reasons, I have concluded that the defendant's motions to prohibit the use of the affidavits set out on page one hereof, on the plaintiff's motion for interlocutory injunc tion, are well founded and I order accordingly.
The question of costs is reserved for consid eration on the motion for interlocutory injunction.
Counsel for the plaintiff has asked that the above order be amended to the extent that the following portions of the affidavit of Mrs. Lois R. Atkins, sworn November 16, 1972:
(a) Paragraph 3 except for Exhibits B and D and the conclusions drawn by the interview ers in Question 7(a) of Exhibits C, E, F and G; and
(b) Paragraph 6 except for Exhibit H
be admitted in evidence on the motion for inter locutory injunction. Counsel for the defendant has consented to this amendment and I order accordingly.
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