75-A-78
Corina Kalaam (Applicant)
v.
The Minister of Manpower and Immigration
(Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J.—Ottawa, June 20,
1975.
Practice—Immigration Appeal Board dismissing appeal—
Applicant applying for extension of time to apply for leave to
appeal pending receipt of Board's reasons—Grounds for
allowing extension—Immigration Appeal Board Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. I-3, s. 23(1)—Federal Court Rule 324.
An extension will not be granted as a matter of course. The
absence of the Board's reasons does not create a situation
warranting an extension where there is no known ground for
attacking the decision. Even without the reasons it is possible to
submit grounds for appeal. There may be cases where, for good
reason, the Court should be requested to delay dealing with an
application for extension until written reasons are available but
such request should be supported by appropriate affidavit
material.
Benoit v. Public Service Commission [1973] F.C. 962;
Lignos v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration [1973]
F.C. 1073 and Kukan v. Minister of Manpower and
Immigration [1974] 1 F.C. 12, followed.
MOTION in writing under Rule 324.
COUNSEL:
C. A. Rashid for applicant.
T. James for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
C. A. Rashid, Toronto, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
JACKETT C.J.: This is an application filed on
May 1, 1975, in writing (Rule 324) for an exten
sion of time within which an application may be
granted for leave to appeal from a decision of the
Immigration Appeal Board dated April 17, 1975.
The provision for such an appeal is contained in
section 23 of the Immigration Appeal Board Act,
which reads, in part, as follows:
23. (1) An appeal lies to the Federal Court of Appeal on
any question of law, including a question of jurisdiction, from a
decision of the Board on an appeal under this Act if leave to
appeal is granted by that Court within fifteen days after the
decision appealed from is pronounced or within such extended
time as a judge of that Court may, for special reasons, allow.
The material submitted in support of the
application consists of an affidavit the substantive
part of which reads as follows:
1. I am the solicitor for the Applicant herein and as such have
knowledge of the facts herein deposed to.
2. On the 17th day of April, 1975, I represented the Applicant
at the hearing of her appeal before the Immigration Appeal
Board at 102 Bloor Street West, Toronto, Ontario.
3. On the 24th day of April, 1975, I received a Certified copy
of the Order of the Immigration Appeal Board notifying me
that the said Appeal had been dismissed. The said Order was
signed on the 17th day of April, 1975.
4. On the 28th day of April, 1975, I requested written reasons
for the said decision. Attached hereto and marked with the
letter "A" is a copy of that request.
5. I am of the opinion that the reasons for decision are
necessary in preparing an application for leave to appeal to the
Federal Court of Appeal, but I am advised and verily believe
that the reasons will not be forthcoming within the time limit
for making an application for Leave of Appeal.
No submissions in support of the application are
contained in the letter of the solicitor for the
applicant dated April 29, 1975, under cover of
which the application was sent to the Registry.
The respondent, on May 26, 1975, filed written
submissions opposing the application. Inter alia,
he relies on the decisions of this Court requiring
• that such an application must be supported by
material establishing facts showing that the pro
posed proceeding is not frivolous and submits
that, as the material filed by the applicant does not
disclose any arguable question of law upon which
it is proposed to appeal, the application for an
extension of time should be dismissed.
On June 18, 1975, the solicitor for the applicant
informed the Registry that he did not intend to file
submissions.
I am of opinion that the application should be
dismissed upon the ground above indicated.
' See Benoit v. Public Service Commission [1973] F.C. 962;
Lignos v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration [1973] F.C.
1073; Kukan v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration
[1974] 1 F.C. 12.
The only purpose in setting out in detail my
reasons for dismissing the application is to deal
with the misapprehension, upon which it appears
to be based, that an extension of time will be
granted, as a matter of course, if it is sought before
the Immigration Appeal Board gives its reasons
for the judgment from which it is desired to
appeal.
While I recognize that an opportunity to study
the reasons given by the Appeal Board may facili
tate the task of showing that there is an arguable
ground for attacking its decision, the absence of
such reasons does not create a situation warranting
an extension of time to appeal where there is no
known ground for attacking the decision that it is
desired to appeal from. Furthermore, even in the
absence of such reasons, it is possible to put for
ward grounds of appeal to the Board upon which,
in the absence of knowledge of the Board's reason
ing, it may appear that there is ground for an
appeal to this Court. This is particularly so where
the counsel before the Board is available to estab
lish the position taken before the Board. It may
also be so where the facts as established by affida
vit show an arguable question of law. There may,
it is true, be cases where, by reason of the appli
cant's lack of understanding of the language used
before the Board, or for some other reason, there is
good ground for requesting this Court to delay
dealing with an application for extension of time
until the proceedings before the Board are avail
able, but such a request should be supported by
appropriate affidavit material.
In this case, there is no material in support of
the application to warrant any disposition of the
application except its dismissal.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.