A-460-75
Mariarosa De Luca (Applicant)
v.
Minister of Manpower and Immigration
(Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Thurlow and Ryan JJ. and
Smith D.J.—Toronto, September 18, 1975.
Judicial review—Citizenship and immigration—Whether
deportation order invalid—Special Inquiry Officer demanded
"specified" length of stay as opposed to "limited" stay—
Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-2, s. 2.
The applicant applied to the Court to review a deportation
order on the ground that the Special Inquiry Officer erred in
law in , requiring the applicant to state the specific length of
time she was planning to stay in Canada.
Held, the application is dismissed. The Special Inquiry Offi
cer did not misdirect herself when referring to a "specified"
time, as opposed to a "limited" time. Evidently, what was
considered by the Special Inquiry Officer was applicant's ina
bility to "set a limit on the length of time" she wished to
remain in Canada. Reference to a "specified" time was only
one of a number of factors influencing her.
JUDICIAL review.
COUNSEL:
R. M. Dash for applicant.
G. R. Garton for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Zammit & Dash, Toronto, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment of
the Court delivered orally in English by
THURLOW J.: In the opinion of the Court the
conclusion of the Special Inquiry Officer that the
applicant was not a bona fide non-immigrant visi
tor is well supported by the material before her
and her decision was not based on any error of law.
The applicant's attack on the deportation order
was based on the following passage from the rea
sons given by the Special Inquiry Officer:
The definition of entry for a non-immigrant to Canada is
found in Section 2 of the Immigration Act. This definition
reads as follows: " `entry' means the lawful admission of a
non-immigrant to Canada for a special or temporary purpose
and for a limited time". What this means is that to be allowed
to enter Canada as a tourist as you are requesting you must
have a specified purpose, as well as a specified length of time.
Although there appears to be a purpose to your visit, if only
to see your brothers, you cannot set a limit on the length of
time you wish to remain. You have stated from one to five
months at one point, a year or longer at another point, and
longer than a year if it was possible for your brothers to sponsor
you. You have no set date on which you plan to return nor do
you have any set date by which you must return to Italy.
It was submitted that the Special Inquiry Offi
cer misdirected herself in law when she referred to
a necessity for a "specified" time as opposed to a
"limited" time, but it is apparent from what fol
lowed immediately that what was considered by
the Special Inquiry Officer was the applicant's
inability "to set a limit on the length of time" she
wished to remain in Canada.
It is also apparent from reading the whole of the
reasons given by the Special Inquiry Officer that
this was but one of a number of factors influencing
her to reach her conclusion. Her reference to a
"specified" time as opposed to a "limited" time is
perhaps unfortunate; indeed the whole of the refer
ence to the statutory definition of entry and its
elements is perhaps unfortunate because the defi
nition throws but a dim, if any, light on what it
was necessary to decide. But the reasons should
not be read microscopically and in our view neither
the reference to the definition nor the difference in
sense between the two words in this context could
make any real difference in the weight attributed
by the Special Inquiry Officer to this particular
feature of the applicant's evidence among the
others to which she adverted in support of her
opinion.
The application accordingly fails and will be
dismissed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.