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A-242-75
Minister of National Revenue (Applicant)
v.
J. Blackburn (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J., Heald J. and MacKay D.J.—Toronto, January 8, 1976.
Judicial review—Decision by Unemployment Insurance Umpire—Whether employees taken over by new corporation remained "employed by the same employer"—Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48, s. 149(2).
An Umpire under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971 decided that certain employees who were, until March 1, 1973 employed by one corporation, and by another corporation thereafter, remained "employed by the same employer" within the meaning of section 149(2) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.
Held, the decision is set aside. While generally, the employees were doing the same things in the same business, their employer was, after March 1, the new corporation. They were not "employed by the same employer"; there is nothing in the context to justify giving the words any other than their ordinary meaning.
JUDICIAL review. COUNSEL:
M. Bonner for applicant. Respondent for herself.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for applicant.
The following are the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered orally in English by
JACKETT C.J.: This is a section 28 application to set aside a decision rendered by Collier J. as an Umpire under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971.
Collier J. has explained the question that has to be decided in a way that cannot be improved upon and we propose to refer only to the barebones of the facts and law necessary to decide that ques tion. We can only add that we adopt everything said by Collier J. in support of his conclusion and only regret that we cannot adopt the conclusion itself.
Briefly, certain employees were, prior to March 1, 1973, employed by one corporation, which will be referred to as the "old corporation" and, from that time on they were employed by a second corporation, which will be referred to as the "new corporation"; and the question is whether such employees, after that time, remained "employed by the same employer" within the meaning of those words in section 149(2) of the Unemploy ment Insurance Act, 1971, which reads as follows:
149. (2) Notwithstanding Part III, where a person is after the commencement of Part III employed in insurable employ ment that was immediately before the commencement of Part III excepted employment under the former Act by reason of paragraph (q) of section 27 of that Act or section 70, 75 or 76 of the regulations made under that Act, the employee's premi um and employer's premium payable in respect of that person while he remains employed by the same employer shall, in respect of each of the years 1972, 1973 and 1974, be that reduced premium specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of subsec tion (1) in respect of those years.
While, from many points of view, as far as the employees were concerned, there was no change in their position after the corporate reorganization— they were still employed doing the same things in the same business, which had been purchased from the old corporation by the new corporation— nevertheless, their employer after the time in ques tion, was the new corporation and not the old corporation. In such circumstances, we are forced to the conclusion that they were not "employed by the same employer" within the ordinary meaning of those words and we have not been able to find anything in the context to justify giving those words any meaning other than the ordinary mean ing. The result seems hard in the circumstances of this case but the condition imposed by Parliament cannot, for that reason, be ignored in some cases and applied only in cases where it is more obvious why Parliament would have imposed it.
For these reasons, we are constrained to con clude that the Umpire's decision must be set aside and the appeal to the Umpire referred back with a direction that it be dismissed.
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