Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

A-169-78
Patrick Vincent McCarthy (Applicant) v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Urie, Ryan and Le Dain JJ.— Vancouver, May 2 and 4, 1978.
Judicial review — Immigration — Inquiry resulting in deportation order — Counsel unable to attend on date peremptorily set — Applicant unrepresented by counsel because of inability to retain and instruct other counsel in the time allowed and in the conditions in which he was detained — Whether or not the deportation order should be set aside — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28 — Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-2, ss. 18(1)(e)(vi), 26(2).
This is a section 28 application to review and set aside a deportation order on the ground that the applicant was deprived of his right to be represented by counsel and denied a fair opportunity to meet the case against him. A Special Inquiry Officer insisted on continuing an inquiry that resulted in a deportation order issuing against the applicant. Applicant's counsel had requested that the inquiry be adjourned to a date when he would be able to attend. Applicant, in the time allowed him and in the conditions in which he was detained, did not have an opportunity to retain and instruct other counsel.
Held, the application is allowed. By insisting that the inquiry proceed, in spite of the fact that the applicant had been unable to retain counsel to replace his lawyer who was not available at that particular time, the Special Inquiry Officer effectively deprived the applicant of the right to be represented by counsel, which is expressly provided by section 26(2) of the Immigration Act, and thereby of a fair opportunity to meet the case against him. Applicant did not have a reasonable opportunity, in the time allowed him and in the conditions in which he was detained, to retain and instruct other counsel.
Pierre v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration [1978] 2 F.C. 849, distinguished.
APPLICATION. COUNSEL:
J. R. Taylor for applicant.
G. C. Carruthers for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
John R. Taylor and Associates, Vancouver, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment delivered orally in English by
LE DAIN J.: This is a section 28 application to review and set aside a deportation order made on March 30, 1978.
The ground of attack is that the applicant was deprived of his right to be represented by counsel and denied a fair opportunity to meet the case against him.
The issue before the Special Inquiry Officer was whether the applicant was a person who fell within the terms of section 18(1)(e)(vi) of the Immigra tion Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-2,—"any person, other than a Canadian citizen or a person with Canadian domicile, who entered Canada as a non-immigrant and remains therein after ceasing to be ... in the particular class in which he was admitted as a non-immigrant". The section 18 report and the section 25 direction to hold the inquiry appear to have been based on the opinion that the applicant had engaged in employment without authorization and had thereby ceased to be a visitor. Mr. Glenn Bailey, the immigration officer who examined the applicant, filed a declaration in which he stated in part:
He also admitted to me that he has been working at the Barn Cabaret on Granville Street from December 1977 until two weeks ago. He has been helping refurbish the building, paint ing, and designing the kitchen. For this work he received free board and room, some spending money and some money to be reimbursed after the club opens and starts making money. Mr. McCarthy admits he does not have the authorization of an Immigration Officer to accept employment.
The inquiry opened before Mr. J. R. Pickwell, Special Inquiry Officer, on Tuesday, March 28, 1978. Mr. John R. Taylor, barrister and solicitor, appeared as counsel for the applicant. Mr. Taylor was granted an adjournment of some three hours to familiarize himself with the case. The inquiry proceeded for some two hours on Tuesday after noon in the course of which the applicant denied that he was engaged in employment with the Barn Cabaret and Mr. Taylor indicated that he wished to cross-examine Mr. Bailey and to call the owner of the Barn Cabaret to testify concerning the question of employment. He put his submission on this point as follows: "But I think when the issue
turns on the matter of employment that we, that you should permit the officers to testify and you should permit the subject of the Inquiry to call anyone who owns the premises". Mr. Bailey was called by the Special Inquiry Officer and was cross-examined at length by Mr. Taylor. Shortly after 4 p.m. on Tuesday the Special Inquiry Offi cer indicated that he intended to adjourn the inquiry until 1:30 p.m. on the following day, Wednesday, March 29th. Mr. Taylor stated that he had a prior out-of-town commitment on that date. He requested an adjournment to Monday, April 3rd. The Special Inquiry Officer replied as follows:
By Special Inquiry Officer:
Mr. Taylor, I am not prepared to put this matter off until Monday afternoon, and I am, I must advise you that one o'clock 29th of March, 1978, is a peremptory date, and should you not be able to attend that you appoint some other counsel from your office, or ....
Special Inquiry Officer to Person Concerned:
Q. ... Mr. McCarthy, I suggest to you that you obtain some other counsel to represent yourself. Peremptory date means that the Inquiry will proceed to a possible conclusion at that time.
The inquiry resumed on Wednesday, March 29th at 1:30 p.m. Mr. Taylor appeared shortly after 2 p.m. and stated that he was not prepared to proceed. He said that he was obliged to leave for New York that evening. He said that he thought the inquiry had been adjourned to Friday. After a long discussion with Mr. Taylor, the Special Inqui ry Officer made the following statement:
... I am setting this Inquiry to proceed at 9:00 a.m., tomorrow morning, which is 30 March, 1978, and that is a peremptory date. This means that if Mr. Taylor is not available to attend as your counsel that you should equip yourself with a counsel who would act on your behalf.
The inquiry was adjourned at 2:27 p.m.
The inquiry resumed at 9:35 a.m. on Thursday, March 30th. At the outset the Special Inquiry Officer made the following statement:
Q. Mr. McCarthy, I note that you appear today without your counsel Mr. Taylor, and because I have received a letter this morning delivered by hand which I will introduce into the proceedings later on, I would like to make a statement. This letter is from Mr. Taylor's office.
This Inquiry was commenced at 9:15 a.m. on the 28th of March 1978, and it was immediately recessed to permit
the attendance of your counsel. Your counsel appeared at this office and the Inquiry was continued at 11:20 a.m. Counsel requested an adjournment for four hours to familiarize himself with your case, and you were offered release on a thousand dollar cash bond. The Inquiry was reconvened at 2:10 p.m. the same day, 28 March 1978, and evidence was taken from you and Immigration Offi cer Glenn Bailey. At 4:15 p.m. the Inquiry was adjourned and was set to continue on a peremptory basis at 1:30 p.m. on the 29th of March, 1978. You were again offered release on a thousand dollar cash bond. Earlier in the same day your counsel, Mr. Taylor, filed with the Courts an application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. At 1:30 p.m., on the 29th of March counsel failed to appear when the Inquiry was opened and after a phone call by you he appeared claiming that he understood the Inquiry was to continue on Friday. I informed him that he was in error and instructed him to continue with this case and he refused to do so and gave me no valid reason for not going ahead. He requested the matter be put over until 3 April 1978 as he was leaving town on a previous business arrangement. I made the decision at that time to adjourn the Inquiry until this morning indicating to you that this would be a peremptory date for the Inquiry to proceed and you were advised that if your counsel did not appear that you should arrange to have alternate counsel. I also made the decision, because I had received new evidence in the form of a photofax picture from Ottawa identifying you as a person wanted on charges in Ireland, that I was not prepared to release you from custody pending com pletion of this Inquiry. At eight o'clock this morning I received a letter dated 29 March 1978 from your counsel, John Taylor and Associates, and this is addressed to me at this office and reads as follows:
At this point the Special Inquiry Officer read the letter which is as follows:
The writer is leaving to night on C.P. Airlines for Hartford Connecticut for a special event honouring Mr. Gordon Howe. The writer is travelling with Mr. Taylor Senior and the trip has been arranged for sometime. The special ceremony is to take place in Hartford on Thursday and Friday March 30th and 31st, 1978.
I will also be attending to other business in the New York area on Friday March 31st. Mr. Dale Vick is also out of the City and country and is meeting me in New York on Friday the 31st March, 1978. Mr. Isman of our office is also engaged in a three day trial in the Criminal Courts. Mr. Whiteside of our office is not familiar with immigration matters and is engaged tomorrow.
In view of the fact that I was committed to be out of the city on Thursday and Friday of this week I would greatly appreciate your adjourning the inquiry to continue on Tuesday afternoon next the 4th of April, 1978.
My client has no other counsel to assist him at this time and it would be most unfair and unjust to expect that other counsel could be appointed at such late date to assist him in connection with a matter which might result in his deportation from Canada.
We have also taken proceedings in the Federal Court of Canada to prohibit the continuation of the inquiry because we are of the opinion that there was no proper jurisdiction to hold or continue with the inquiry. We are delivering a copy of the Notice of Motion to the Federal Court to you along with this letter. We would ask that you give consideration to the Notice of Motion to the Federal Court and that you adjourn the Inquiry pending the outcome of the matter in this Court.
We would appreciate you letting our office know the outcome of our application and the writer will be informed while out of the city.
The transcript of the inquiry continues as follows:
I MARK THIS LETTER FOR IDENTIFICATION EXHIBIT `I' AND ENTER INTO THESE PROCEEDINGS.
Also enclosed with this letter was a six-page Notice of Motion filed with the Federal Court of Canada on the 29 March 1978 wherein a request is made to the Court for a Writ of Prohibi tion and a Writ of Mandamus.
I NOW MARK THIS DOCUMENT FOR IDENTIFICATION EXHIBIT `J' AND ENTER IT INTO THESE PROCEEDINGS.
Mr. McCarthy, it is apparent to me that your counsel has devoted considerable time to applying to the Federal Court of Canada 'and applying for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. He has no time to appear before this jurisdiction and present your case. It is therefore, in view of this, it is therefore my decision to proceed with this matter particularly when you were told on two occasions ; that this matter would proceed on a peremptory basis to a= conclusion. The applications to the Courts for writs do not prevent-this Inquiry from continuing. Since your counsel has not appeared and you do not appear to have arranged for other counsel to represent you, I will now ask you whether or not you have any evidence to submit or any statement to make before I make a decision in your case.
A. Yes Sir, I wish to be represented by counsel before these proceedings continue. I have had no time to consult any other attorney because I was allowed no phone calls in gaol. I was allowed no visitors. I am allowed visiting hours between two and four, and that's it. I was not allowed to see nobody and therefore I can make no arrangements. I am locked up in gaol. I have no use of the phone, I can't call nobody. I wish to be present with counsel at all times while I am sitting in this room, in the interest of justice.
Q. Now, you have made a statement concerning counsel. Do you wish to make any statement concerning the allega tions of the Immigration Officer which were given to you in detail at the commencement of this Inquiry, namely, that you were not a Canadian citizen, that you are a person who does not have Canadian domicile, and that you are a person who entered Canada as a non-immigrant and failed to remain in the—correction—and you ceased to be in the particular class in which you were admitted as a non-immigrant.
A. Sir, I have nothing to say until counsel is present.
After a short recess to consider the evidence the Special Inquiry Officer decided that the applicant was a person who fell within the terms of section 18(1)(e)(vi) of the Act and ordered him to be deported.
Upon consideration of the particular circum stances of this case, it is my opinion that by insisting that the inquiry proceed on the morning of March 30, 1978, in spite of the fact that the applicant had been unable to retain counsel to replace Mr. Taylor, the Special Inquiry Officer effectively deprived the applicant of the right to be represented by counsel, which is expressly provided by section 26(2) of the Immigration Act and thereby of a fair opportunity to meet the case against him. There was an issue of fact on which the applicant desired, with the assistance of coun sel, to adduce further evidence, and there were submissions of law that might be made as to whether the facts constituted employment within the meaning of the Regulations and as to the effect of such employment, if it was employment, on the applicant's status as a visitor. The applicant did not have a reasonable opportunity, in the time allowed him and in the conditions in which he was detained, to retain and instruct other counsel.
I have considered the decision of this Court in the case of Pierre v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration', but the circumstances of the two cases are quite different. In the Pierre case there had been many adjournments over a long period of time. The person concerned was advised on December 7, 1977 that he would be required to proceed with other counsel, if necessary, on December 19, 1977. In the present case there had been several recesses while the Special Inquiry Officer waited for Mr. Taylor to appear and an adjournment of a few hours to permit him to familiarize himself with the case, but the request for an adjournment of some two working days because of Mr. Taylor's out-of-town commitment. was the first request of that kind that had been made. Mr. Taylor had not yet been able to exam ine the person who was alleged to have employed the applicant. His testimony was crucial to the issue before the Special Inquiry Officer. Even
1 [1978] 2 F.C. 849.
assuming that the refusal of the adjournment requested by Mr. Taylor was in these circum stances a reasonable exercise of discretion, which I think is highly questionable, the delay afforded to the applicant to retain and instruct other counsel was in the circumstances unreasonably short.
For these reasons I would allow the section 28 application, set aside the deportation order and refer the matter back to the immigration authori ties for a new inquiry.
URIE J. concurred.
RYAN J. concurred.
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