A-17-78
Patrick Louhisdon, alias Patrick Louhisdon
Dominique (Applicant)
v.
Employment and Immigration Canada (Respond-
ent)
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Ryan and Le Dain JJ.—
Montreal, February 20, 22 and March 13, 1978.
Judicial review — Immigration —, Request to delay making
deportation order in order to apply to Minister for permit,
pursuant to s. 8 of the Immigration Act, denied by Special
Inquiry Officer — Whether or not Special Inquiry Officer
acted illegally by denying applicant the option of applying to
the Minister for a permit — Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
I-2, ss. 8, 18(1)(e)(ii),(iii),(vi) — Federal Court Act, R.S.C.
1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
Applicant seeks cancellation, under section 28 of the Federal
Court Act, of a deportation order made against him. The
Special Inquiry Officer refused to grant applicant's request to
delay making the deportation order so that applicant could
refer the matter to the Minister for a decision as to whether a
permit should be issued under section 8 of the Immigration
Act. It is argued that the Special Inquiry Officer acted illegally
because by doing so he deprived applicant the option of obtain
ing a section 8 permit.
Held, (Le Dain dissenting) the application is dismissed. This
argument is without merit. Section 8 of the Immigration Act
simply gives the Minister the power to grant a permit; it does
not create any right in favour of those who benefit from the
exercise of this power. Although making the deportation order
deprives applicant the option of obtaining a permit, it does not
give applicant grounds for complaint.
Per Le Dain J. dissenting: For reasons set out in Oloko (see
infra, page 593), the application should be allowed. The Special
Inquiry Officer was not justified in assuming that the Minister
or Director had examined the possibility of granting applicant a
permit when he had not received application for such permit.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Ramawad is applicable to
the case at bar.
Ramawad v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 375, referred to.
APPLICATION for judicial review.
COUNSEL:
F. Philibert for applicant.
G. R. Léger, Q.C., for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Hargreaves, Bélanger, Leduc & Philibert,
Montreal, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The following is the English version of the
reasons for judgment rendered by
PRATTE J.: Applicant is seeking cancellation,
under section 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C.
1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, of the deportation order
made against him on January 5, 1978.
Applicant was born in Haiti on April 15, 1958
and came to Canada for several months as a
tourist in 1969, when he was eleven years old.
Since that time, though he never obtained authori
zation to extend his stay, he has not left the
country. On October 13, 1977, he was convicted of
offences under the Criminal Code and sentenced
to five months in prison. While he was serving his
sentence a report was drawn up under section 18
of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-2, alleg
ing that he was a person described in subpara-
graphs (ii),(iii) and (vi) of section 18(1)(e).' An
inquiry was held, at the conclusion of which the
Special Inquiry Officer, having decided that the
allegations contained in the report were proven,
made the deportation order concerned in this
appeal.
Counsel for the applicant put forward only one
argument: he contended that the Special Inquiry
Officer made an error that caused him to lose
jurisdiction in the case when he refused to grant
' These provisions read as follows:
18. (1) Where he has knowledge thereof, the clerk or
secretary of a municipality in Canada in which a person
hereinafter described resides or may be, an immigration
officer or a constable or other peace officer. shall send a
written report to the Director, with full particulars
concerning
(e) any person, other than a Canadian citizen or a person
with Canadian domicile, who
(ii) has been convicted of an offence under the Criminal
Code,
(iii) has become an inmate of a penitentiary, gaol,
reformatory or prison or of an asylum or hospital for
mental diseases,
(vi) entered Canada as a non-immigrant and remains
therein after ceasing to be a non-immigrant or to be in
the particular class in which he was admitted as a
non-immigrant.
applicant's request that he adjourn the making of
the deportation order and refer the matter to the
Minister, for a decision as to whether he would
issue a permit under section 8 authorizing appli
cant to remain in Canada. In the opinion of coun
sel for the applicant, the Special Inquiry Officer
acted illegally in making the deportation order
hastily, because by so doing he deprived applicant
of the option of obtaining a permit issued by the
Minister under section 8. In support of this argu
ment counsel cited the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Ramawad v. Minis
ter of Manpower and Immigration [1978] 2
S.C.R. 375.
In my view this argument is without merit.
Section 8 of the Immigration Act simply gives the
Minister the power to grant a permit; it does not
create any right in favour of those who might
benefit from the exercise of this power. It is true
that making the deportation order had the effect
of depriving applicant of the option of obtaining a
permit from the Minister. This does not, however,
give applicant grounds for complaint. The deporta
tion order has this effect under the Act regardless
of when it is made. In my view, the decision of the
Supreme Court in Ramawad cannot help appli
cant. All that was decided in that case, in my
opinion, is that a person who is seeking an employ
ment visa under sections 3B et seq of the Immi
gration Regulations, Part I, and who requests that
his case be submitted to the Minister so that the
latter may exercise the power conferred on him by
section 3G(d) of the Regulations, may not be
deported on the ground that he has no employment
visa until the matter has been put before the
Minister.
For these reasons, I would dismiss the
application.
* * *
RYAN J.: I concur.
* * *
The following is the English version of the
reasons for judgment rendered by
LE DAIN J. (dissenting): For the reasons that I
set out in Oloko [infra, page 593], I am of the
opinion that the application under section 28
should be allowed and that the deportation order
made against applicant on January 5, 1978 should
be cancelled. In my view, the Special Inquiry
Officer was not justified in assuming that the
Minister or the Director had examined the possi
bility of granting applicant a permit from the
Minister when he had not received an application
for such a permit. The reasoning on which the
Supreme Court based its decision in Ramawad is
therefore applicable to the case at bar.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.