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A-836-77
Hassan Darwich (Applicant)
v.
Minister of Manpower and Immigration (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J., Pratte and Urie JJ.—Ottawa, October 16, 1978.
Immigration — Deportation — Appeal from refusal by Immigration Appeal Board to allow appellant (applicant) to proceed with appeal to that Board from a deportation order, and direction that deportation order be executed — Board's deciding appellant fled civil war in his country but not perse cution — Whether or not Board erred in forming opinion that no reasonable ground to believe appellant a refugee — Alter natively, whether or not Board erred in law by not forming an opinion on that question — Immigration Appeal Board Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-3, s. 11(1),(2),(3).
APPEAL. COUNSEL:
Terrence Jabour for applicant. L. S. Holland for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Jabour & Hunter, Ottawa, for applicant. Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment delivered orally in English by
JACKETT C.J.: This is an appeal from a decision under section 11(3) of the Immigration Appeal Board Act,' R.S.C. 1970, c. I-3, by which, in effect, the Immigration Appeal Board refused to allow the appellant to proceed with an appeal to that Board from a deportation order and directed that the deportation order be executed as soon as practicable.
' Section 11 reads, in part:
11. (1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a person against whom an order of deportation is made under the Immigration Act may appeal to the Board on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law or fact or mixed law and fact, if, at the time that the order of deportation is made against him, he is
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In my opinion, the appeal to this Court must be dismissed, unless (a) the Board erred in law in forming the opinion, on the basis of a consider ation of a declaration filed by the appellant under section 11(2), that there were not reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant's claim that he was a refugee protected by the Convention concerning refugees could, on the hearing of the appeal, be established, or (b) the Board erred in law by not forming an opinion on that question.
In my view, the appeal must be dismissed, not withstanding that the Board did not, by its rea sons, express its conclusion in the words of the statute.
In effect, as I read the Board's reasons, an opinion is expressed that the appellant may have "fled" the civil war in his country but did not flee "persecution". 2 As I understand it, in the context
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(c) a person who claims he is a refugee protected by the Convention; or
(2) Where an appeal is made to the Board pursuant to subsection (1) and the right of appeal is based on a claim described in paragraph (1)(c) or (d), the notice of appeal to the Board shall contain or be accompanied by a declaration under oath setting out
(a) the nature of the claim;
(b) a statement in reasonable detail of the facts on which the claim is based;
(c) a summary in reasonable detail of the information and evidence intended to be offered in support of the claim upon the hearing of the appeal; and
(d) such other representations as the appellant deems relevant to the claim.
(3) Notwithstanding any provision of this Act, where the Board receives a notice of appeal and the appeal is based on a claim described in paragraph (1)(c) or (d), a quorum of the Board shall forthwith consider the declaration referred to in subsection (2) and, if on the basis of such consideration the Board is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim could, upon the hearing of the appeal, be established, it shall allow the appeal to proceed, and in any other case it shall refuse to allow the appeal to proceed and shall thereupon direct that the order of deportation be executed as soon as practicable.
2 The reasons read in part:
Article 1A(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines the term "refugee" as follows:
"[any person who] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, mem bership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
of this case, the opinion is thereby expressed that the appellant was not outside his country "owing to . .. fear of being persecuted for reasons of . .. religion ..." and, consequently, did not fall within the Convention definition of "refugee". If, on a consideration of the declaration, the Board was of opinion that the appellant was not a "refugee", it must have been of opinion that the declaration did not disclose reasonable grounds to believe that the claim to refugee status could, upon the hearing of the appeal, be established.
Furthermore, in my view, the Board did not err, in law, in forming the opinion, on a consideration of the declaration, that the appellant did not flee his native country by reason of "persecution". As I read the declaration, that conclusion is a fair conclusion from the statements in the declaration.
It follows that, in my opinion, the appeal should be dismissed.
* * *
PRATTE J. concurred.
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URIE J. concurred.
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it."
A careful examination of the appellant's declaration shows that he was probably anxious to see his wife again in Canada, but he is not a refugee protected by the Convention. He may have fled the civil war in his country, but, to repeat the opinion of the Chairman of the Board in his judgment in the case of Elias Iskandar Ishac v. the Minister of Manpower and Immigration, (M77-1040) I.A.B., Scott, Houle, Legaré (not yet published), dated April 25, 1977: "A civil war, even on religious grounds, is not persecution as contemplated by the Convention".
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