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A-689-78
Attorney General of Canada (Applicant)
v.
Pierre Leclerc (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Pratte and Ryan JJ. and Hyde D.J.—Quebec City, May 24, 1979.
Judicial review — Unemployment insurance — Umpire allowing respondent to call witnesses but denying Unemploy ment Insurance Commission that right — Umpire's procedure was to penalize Commission's negligence in failing to submit appeal case until after expiry of sixty-day period laid down in the Regulations — Whether or not decision a quo vitiated by illegality — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28 — Unemployment Insurance Regulations, SOR/76- 248, s. 184(3).
APPLICATION for judicial review. COUNSEL:
Jean-Marc Aubry for applicant. Léon Girard for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for applicant.
Godin, Lacoursière & Girard, Trois-Rivières, for respondent.
The following is the English version Of the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered orally by
PRATTE J.: In accordance with section 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, applicant is seeking to set aside a decision of an Umpire made pursuant to the Unemployment In surance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48. By that decision, the Umpire allowed respondent's appeal from the decision of a Board of Referees.
Applicant's only contention is that the Umpire acted unlawfully in that, at the hearing of the appeal, he denied the Unemployment Insurance Commission the right, which he had allowed respondent, to call witnesses.
The Umpire proceeded in this unusual manner because he wished to penalize, in a way not detri mental to respondent, the Commission's negligence
in failing to submit the appeal case until after expiry of the sixty-day period laid down by subsec tion 184(3) of the Unemployment Insurance Regulations, SOR/76-248.
We are all of the opinion that the decision a quo is vitiated by illegality. The Umpire is largely in control of the procedure followed in hearing appeals; however, he must apply the same rules to both sides. He may not, solely in order to penalize one side for a delay, deny it a right which he allows the other side.
For these reasons, the decision a quo will be quashed and the case returned to be decided after a new hearing, in which the same rights will be accorded to both sides.
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