A-98-79
Attorney General of Canada (Applicant)
v.
Paul Murby, Lorne Butchart, J. David Lee, sit
ting as an Appeal Board under section 21 of the
Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
P-32 (Respondents)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J.—Ottawa, April 30,
1979.
Practice — Application for appointment of counsel to
appear as amicus curiae — Basis for appointment — Applica
tion dismissed with leave to re-apply on further and better
material — Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
P-32, s. 21 — Federal Court Rule 324.
MOTION in writing under Rule 324.
COUNSEL:
W. J. A. Hobson, Q.C. for applicant.
No one appearing for respondents.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
applicant.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
JACKETT C.J.: This is an application for direc
tions for the appointment of counsel to appear as
amicus curiae supported by an undertaking by the
Deputy Attorney General of Canada to-remuner
ate counsel invited to appear as amicus curiae.
The section 28 application in respect of which
this interlocutory application is made is to set
aside a decision of an "Appeal Board" under
section 21 of the Public Service Employment Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32 allowing appeals by Ronda
Lynn Lee against certain appointments. The sec
tion 28 application indicates an attack based on
lack of jurisdiction under section 21 to give the
decision attacked.
In the only other matters of which I am aware
where an amicus curiae was appointed by this
Court (The Queen v. Rhine [1979] 2 F.C. 651 and
The Queen v. Prytula [ 1979] 2 F.C. 516) the
amicus curiae was appointed on representations
showing that the applicant had exhausted the pos
sibilities of having the other party to the proceed
ing oppose the appeal, which, in each case, raised
an important question as to the jurisdiction of the
Trial Division.
The ordinary rule is that, in the absence of
special reason, a matter in the Court should be
argued only by the parties thereto. If the unnamed
respondent who was the successful appellant under
section 21 opposes this section 28 application, in
the absence of special reason, I should have
thought that there is no justification for appointing
an amicus curiae even if an important question is
raised.
The application to appoint an amicus curiae is
therefore dismissed with leave to re-apply on fur
ther and better material. (As the applicant is
prepared to pay an amicus curiae, he may wish to
consider whether this is a case in which he should
offer to reimburse the unnamed respondent in
question in respect of the expenses of opposing the
section 28 application in view of the general
importance of the legal question raised thereby.)
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.