A-435-79
Alicia Catherine Jackman (Appellant) (Plaintiff)
v.
The Queen (Respondent) (Defendant)
Court of Appeal, Heald and Urie JJ. and Kerr
D.J.—Ottawa, February 26, 1980.
Public Service — Reference made in trial judgment to
common law principle of tenure in Public Service being at
Sovereign's pleasure but ultimate decision based not on that
principle but on interpretation of ss. 24, 25 and 29 of Public
Service Employment Act as applied to facts of case — Trial
Judge was correct in finding that person employed under s. 24
or 25 is an "employee" within meaning of s. 2(1) and thus
embraced by s. 29 — Appeal dismissed — Public Service
Employment Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32, ss. 24, 25, 29.
APPEAL.
COUNSEL:
Maurice W. Wright, Q.C. for appellant
(plaintiff).
E. A. Bowie for respondent (defendant).
SOLICITORS:
Soloway, Wright, Houston, Greenberg,
O'Grady, Morin, Ottawa, for appellant
(plaintiff).
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent (defendant).
The following are the reasons for judgment
delivered orally in English by
URIE J.: Reading the reasons for judgment of
the learned Trial Judge [page 605 supra] as a
whole, it is quite clear that his judgment was based
on his interpretation of sections 24, 25 and 29 of
the Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. P-32, as applied to the facts of this case. It
cannot be denied that reference was made in his
reasons to the common law principle that tenure in
office in the Public Service was at the pleasure of
the Sovereign. However, by the same token, it
cannot be denied that his ultimate decision was not
based on that common law principle but on his
view that whether an employee's employment was
founded on section 24 or on section 25 of the Act,
such employee is, in either case, subject to lay-off
under section 29. Since under either section 24 or
section 25 the person so employed is an
"employee" within the meaning of section 2(1)
and thus is embraced by the provisions of section
29, in my view, the learned Trial Judge was clearly
correct in so finding.
The appeal should, therefore, in my view, be
dismissed. Since this appeal was one of six argued
together, the respondent should be entitled to costs
on each but to a counsel fee only in this appeal.
* * *
HEALD J. concurred
* * *
KERR D.J. concurred.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.