A-214-79 
Attorney General of Canada (Appellant) 
v. 
Canadian Human Rights Commission (Respond-
ent) 
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Urie and Ryan JJ.— 
Ottawa, May 28 and June 11, 1979. 
Practice — Parties — Appeal from judgment dismissing 
action against Canadian Human Rights Commission on 
ground that that Commission is not a suable entity — Trial 
Judge clearly indicating that dismissal was not made pursuant 
to Rule 419, and that no statutory authority is necessary to 
dismiss an action brought against a non-suable entity — 
Whether or not an action for a declaration under s. 18 of the 
Federal Court Act cannot be brought against respondent 
merely because respondent is not vested with legal personality 
— Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 18 --
Federal Court Rule 419. 
Canadian Radio-Television Commission v. Teleprompter 
Cable Communications Corp. [1972] F.C. 1265, followed. 
APPEAL. 
COUNSEL: 
Duff Friesen and L. Holland for appellant. 
Gordon Henderson, Q.C., Emilio Binavince 
and Russell Juriansz for respondent. 
SOLICITORS: 
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for 
appellant. 
Gowling & Henderson, Ottawa, for respond
ent. 
The following are the reasons for judgment 
rendered in English by 
RYAN J.: This is an appeal from a judgment of 
the Trial Division, [page 137 supra] dated March 
23, 1979, dismissing this action without costs. The 
judgment was made on an application for an order 
declaring the statement of claim and the action a 
nullity or, in the alternative, for an order striking 
out the statement of claim and dismissing the 
action pursuant to Rule 419(1) of the Rules of this 
Court'; the applicant relied on subparagraphs (a), 
(c) and (f) of Rule 419(1). 
The Trial Judge dismissed the action on the 
ground that the respondent (the defendant), the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission, was not a 
person amenable to action, that it was not a suable 
legal entity. In so doing, the learned Trial Judge 
made it clear that he was not acting under Rule 
419. He was of the view that he needed no statu
tory authority to dismiss an action brought against 
a non-suable entity. 
With respect, I do not share the Trial Judge's 
view that an action for a declaration under section 
18 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd 
Supp.), c. 10, cannot be brought against the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission merely 
because the Commission is not, as such, vested 
with legal personality by the Canadian Human 
Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, or otherwise. It 
seems to me that the decision of this Court in 
Canadian Radio-Television Commission v. Tele-
prompter Cable Communications Corp. 2 is deci
sive of the question. I would quote from the judg
ment of Mr. Justice Thurlow [as he then was] at 
pages 1266 and 1267: 
' Rule 419 provides: 
Rule 419. (1) The Court may at any stage of an action order 
any pleading or anything in any pleading to be struck out, 
with or without leave to amend, on the ground that 
(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence, as 
the case may be, 
(b) it is immaterial or redundant, 
(c) it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, 
(d) it may prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of 
the action, 
(e) it constitutes a departure from a previous pleading, or 
(f) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court; 
and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or 
judgment to be entered accordingly. 
• (2) No evidence shall be admissible on an application 
under paragraph (1)(a). 
(3) In this rule "departure" means that which is prohib
ited by Rule 411. 
2 [1972] F.C. 1265. 
With respect to the objection as to the status of the appellant 
as a legal entity section 5(1) of the Broadcasting Act, by which 
the appellant is constituted, provides that: 
5. (1) There shall be a commission to be known as the 
Canadian Radio-Television Commission, consisting of five 
full-time members and ten part-time members to be appoint
ed by the Governor in Council. 
An examination of the other provisions of Part II of that Act 
to my mind makes it clear that the members of the commission 
so constituted are a body or are persons "having jurisdiction or 
powers etc." falling within the definition of "federal board, 
commission or other tribunal" in section 2 of the Federal Court 
Act and that the Trial Division of this Court has in respect of 
such body or persons the jurisdiction conferred by section 18 of 
that Act. The rest of what is involved in the appellant's 
submission with respect to the defendant's status is but a 
matter of the rules of the Court for the exercise of that 
jurisdiction. As I see it, the appellant is not a body corporate or 
other entity having a legal personality recognized as distinct 
from that of its members and the respondent in framing its 
proceeding might have joined as defendants the members of the 
commission by their personal names or might have joined them 
all by the name of their office, i.e., by naming as defendants, 
"the members of the Canadian Radio-Television Commission". 
Instead of adopting either of these courses the respondent 
named the commission by its statutory name which appears to 
me to be a compendious reference to what the commission 
consists of, that is to say, its members. Save in the cases 
provided for by Rules 1708 to 1713 I know of no rule of the 
Court which authorizes the naming of a group of defendants by 
the name of the group but on the other hand no rule of the 
Court of which I am aware prohibits such a practice and it 
seems to me that the practice of naming the group by its 
statutory name is particularly convenient and appropriate in a 
case such as this where the principal object of the proceeding is 
to obtain a determination of the scope of the authority con
ferred by statute on that group of persons. In my opinion 
therefore the appellant's objection is technical and without 
merit and should be rejected. Moreover, if the objection were 
sound it would follow that there is no appellant before the 
Court and that this appeal itself is a nullity. 
I am also of opinion that the respondent has not 
made out a case for striking out the statement of 
claim or dismissing the action on the basis of any 
of the subparagraphs of Rule 419(1) which were 
relied on. There is clearly no substance to the 
application so far as reliance is placed on subpara-
graph (c) or (J) of the Rule. Nor has the respond
ent persuaded me that the statement of claim does 
not disclose a reasonable cause of action. The 
arguments of counsel demonstrated that questions 
of law of some difficulty are raised by the claims 
asserted. It cannot be said of the statement of 
claim that it is apparent on its face that the action 
is one which obviously must fail. 
I would allow the appeal. I would set aside the 
judgment appealed against and dismiss the 
application to the Trial Division. The appellant has 
not asked for costs here or below. There will be no 
order as to costs. 
* * * 
PRATTE J.: I agree. 
* * * 
URIE J.: I agree. 
 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.