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T-2685-80
Société de perception et d'administration Ultimex Limitée and Jacques Lanctôt (Plaintiffs)
v.
The Queen and Bernard Leblanc (Defendants)
and
Attorney General's Prosecutor of the Province of Quebec for the District of Hull (Mis -en-cause)
Trial Division, Marceau J.—Ottawa, June 17 and 18, 1980.
Practice Motion to strike pleadings Application by defendant Leblanc to strike out statement of claim and dismiss action pursuant to Rule 419, on ground that Court has no jurisdiction to hear action Application by both defendants to strike pleadings because statement of claim discloses no cause of action Plaintiffs are suing for damages on ground that a criminal indictment was laid in bad faith against a third party with respect to an alleged crime committed against them, and they were not consulted before charges were laid Applications allowed Federal Court Rule 419.
APPLICATIONS. COUNSEL:
J. E. Allard for plaintiffs.
J. C. Ruelland, Q.C. for defendants.
SOLICITORS:
J. E. Allard, Hull, Quebec, for plaintiffs.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for defendants.
The following is the English version of the reasons for order rendered by
MARCEAU J.: Two applications to strike out the statement of claim and dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 419 were submitted by defendants. One, relating to defendant Leblanc, maintains that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear the action brought; the other, submitted by both defendants, contends that in any case the statement of claim discloses no cause of action that could be a basis for the conclusions sought.
The action to begin with is a cause for some amazement, as plaintiffs are suing Her Majesty the Queen and a Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer for damages on the ground that a criminal indictment was laid without basis, maliciously and in bad faith against a third party. As I understand it, their action is based on the fact that the alleged crime, the criminal proceedings for which are still pending, was committed against them, and they were not consulted before the third party was charged.
It is clear that both applications are entirely valid. To begin with, the Court has no jurisdiction with respect to the individual defendant, as the application brought against him personally is not based on "existing federal law" (a recent decision on this point is that of Bosada v. The Queen [1979] 2 F.C. 335, affirmed by the Court of Appeal [1980] 2 F.C. 744). Second, and even more importantly, the action manifestly cannot stand against any of the defendants. This is so, first, because the victim of a criminal offence need not give his consent or be consulted before an indictment is laid against the alleged perpetrator; second, because the civil remedy to which an instance of malicious prosecution may give rise belongs first and foremost to the individual who was improperly charged; and finally, because there can be no question of claiming malicious prosecu tion before the criminal proceedings arising out of such prosecution have resulted in an acquittal.
ORDER
The applications to strike out the statement of claim are allowed and the action is dismissed with respect to both defendants, with costs.
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