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T-4035-78
Techno Maritime Limitée (Plaintiff) v.
Deep Diving Systems Limited and the Vessel Techno Balsam (Defendants)
and
Farquhar Bethune Insurance Ltd. (Intervenant)
Trial Division, Walsh J.—Montreal, March 11; Ottawa, March 24, 1980.
Maritime law Contracts Action to obtain judgment in rem Claim for towage arising out of s. 22(2)(k) of the Federal Court Act Whether the Court can exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to s. 43(3) of the Act with respect to such a claim Whether defendant was beneficial owner of the vessel at the time when the cause of action arose Date of cause of action Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, ss. 22(2)(k), 43(3) Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, art. 68(2).
By agreement made September 29, 1977 and registered on October 18, 1977, defendant purchased the vessel Techno Balsam from plaintiff who, on October 18, 1977, entered into a towage agreement with defendant whose first cheque in settle ment of it was returned n.s.f. when deposited. On September 29, 1977, defendant sold the vessel to the intervenant. However, as of June 1, 1978, the vessel was sold back by intervenant to defendant who mortgaged it in favour of the intervenant. The issue, which arises out of section 43(3) of the Federal Court Act, is whether the Court can exercise its jurisdiction in rem in favour of the plaintiff who already has a judgment in personam against Deep Diving Systems Limited, with respect to plain tiffs claim for towage. Plaintiff argues that the requirements of section 43(3) have been met in that defendant Deep Diving Systems Limited was the beneficial owner of the vessel at the time when the action was brought, i.e. on or about September 8, 1978 (a fact which is undisputed by the parties) and that same defendant who was liable on the claim in personam, was the beneficial owner of the ship when the cause of action arose, i.e. the moment the towing contract was entered into. Accord ing to plaintiff, it is significant that section 43(3) should refer to the time when the cause of action "arose" and not to the time when the cause of action "accrues". The sole question to be decided is the date at which plaintiffs cause of action arose.
Held, plaintiffs action is dismissed. The towing contract between plaintiff and defendant merely had the effect of giving the defendant the right to insist that it be executed by plaintiff and conversely gave the plaintiff the right following execution to be paid within 30 days after submission of its invoice for the services so rendered. Neither party could sue on it at the time the contract was signed. The present action is for payment of a
sum of money and plaintiff only had a right to bring such action when the contract was completed and duly invoiced and not paid.
The Monica S. [1967] 3 All E.R. 740, referred to. The National Drying Machinery Co. v. Wabasso Ltd. [1979] C.A. 279, referred to. Mario v. Société Radio-Canada [1978] C.S. 509, referred to. Bradford Old Bank, Ltd. v. Sutcliffe [1918] 2 K.B. (C.A.) 833, referred to. Lewington v. Raycroft [1935] 4 D.L.R. 378, referred to. Yellowega v. Yellowega (1969) 66 W.W.R. 241, referred to.
ACTION. COUNSEL:
G. Vaillancourt for plaintiff. G. P. Barry for intervenant.
SOLICITORS:
Langlois, Drouin & Associés, Quebec City, for plaintiff.
McMaster Meighen, Montreal, for interve- nant.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
WALSH J.: This matter came on for trial on the issue of whether plaintiff which already has a judgment in personam against defendant Deep Diving Systems Limited can now obtain a judg ment in rem against the vessel Techno Balsam which is opposed by the intervenant which is credi tor of a mortgage on the vessel. Defendant is not contesting. There is little dispute as to the facts, the issue being one of law arising out of the provisions of section 43(3) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, which reads as follows:
43....
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), the jurisdiction con ferred on the Court by section 22 shall not be exercised in rem with respect to a claim mentioned in paragraph 22(2)(e), (J), (g), (h), (i), (k), (m), (n), (p) or (r) unless, at the time of the commencement of the action, the ship, aircraft or other prop erty that is the subject of the action is beneficially owned by the person who was the beneficial owner at the time when the cause of action arose.
The claim arises out of section 22(2)(k) of the Act being a claim for towage, and it is intervenant's contention that the vessel was not beneficially owned by defendant at the time when the cause of
action arose, although it is not denied that it was so owned at the time of the commencement of the action on or about September 8, 1978.
In view of the various contracts and agreements which were made by plaintiff and defendants on the one hand and defendants and intervenant on the other it is necessary to review the various dates, some of which are of especial significance.
On or about September 2, 1977, defendant Deep Diving Systems Limited offered to purchase the vessel then owned by plaintiff docked at Sorel, Quebec, for $325,000. On September 29, 1977, an agreement was made between plaintiff and defend ant for the sale of the vessel and the bill of sale was duly registered on October 18, 1977. On the same date, October 18, plaintiff by letter to defendant undertook to tow the vessel from Sorel to Thunder Bay, Ontario, for a maximum price of $15,000, to arrive there not later than October 24, 1977. The manner in which the charges were to be calculated is set out therein. On December 16, 1977, plaintiff invoiced defendant in the amount of $15,205. On June 8, 1978, plaintiff and defendant agreed that the amount of the invoice now amounting to $15,909 including interest would be paid by three cheques of $5,303 each, the first payable on July 31, 1978, the second August 31, 1978, and the third September 30, 1978. The agreement concludes "If the cheques are delivered to Techno Maritime Limited within three weeks of the present date and can be cashed in due time then this agreement will constitute a final settle ment of the said invoice". The cheques were deliv ered by letter dated June 20 but the first cheque dated July 31, 1978, was returned n.s.f. when deposited in the bank on August 17.
Although plaintiff refers to the cheques in its proceedings it must be found that the action is actually brought on the towage contract since the claim includes a demand for 18% interest based on the clause in the contract calling for such interest when accounts are not paid within 30 days. In fact had plaintiff treated the agreement of June 8, 1978, by virtue of which the three cheques were issued as creating a novation and replacing the claim for towage then this Court would not have jurisdiction to entertain such a claim, and in any event there could be no action in rem.
Intervenant for its part had on October 14, 1977, entered into an agreement with defendant Deep Diving Systems Limited to purchase the vessel for the price of $350,000 then to lease her to said defendant on terms set out therein. A further agreement of October 18, 1977, provided that the said intervenant would provide cheques to enable defendant to complete the purchase from Techno Maritime Limitée and that immediately on such closing full title to the vessel would then be con veyed to intervenant. This sale was also registered on October 18, 1977. Intervenant then chartered the vessel to defendant Deep Diving Systems Lim ited, but defendant defaulted on a number of the payments due with the result that intervenant then resold the vessel to defendant, for a price of $1, the bill of sale being dated on June 1, 1978, but for some reason not registered until August 15. On the same day defendant mortgaged the vessel in the amount of $350,000 in favour of intervenant. This also was not registered until August 15. It was explained in evidence that this gave intervenant better security than a mere personal claim against the defendant as charterer of the vessel would have done.
Plaintiff produced a copy of a list of expendi tures made by intervenant on behalf of Cansub (which was explained in evidence as being a joint venture between subsidiaries of defendant and intervenant) up to September 27, 1978, in the amount of $148,841.06. Included in these expenses were two transfers to McMaster and Company, attorneys for intervenant re Techno Maritime Limitée on September 19, 1978, in the amounts of $16,000 and $2,000 respectively.
Plaintiff obtained a default judgment in perso- nam against defendant on March 19, 1979, for $15,909 with interest at 18% from June 8, 1978 and costs, which provided that a charge be regis tered against the vessel for this amount pursuant to Rule 1900 of the Rules of this Court. A writ of fieri facias was issued on March 29, 1979 and plaintiff also attempted to garnishee the sum of $18,000 allegedly held back by intervenant from defendant and deposited in the hands of interve- nant's attorney. This is the $18,000 referred to in the statement. This was dismissed by judgment of Mr. Justice Marceau on April 23, 1979 without
prejudice to the right of plaintiff to resubmit the issue of the garnishment if it could establish that intervenant was a judgment debtor of defendant for this amount.
One other document was produced by plaintiff namely an agreement entered into on October 18, 1977, between intervenant and defendant at the same time as the bare boat charter between them. This agreement provides that on the expiration of the charter, and provided the lessee has fulfilled its obligations thereon it can on payment of a further sum of $1 purchase the vessel from intervenant (the name of the boat is variously given as Techno Balsam, MIL Balsam, and The Salvager, but nothing turns on this). This agreement further gave an option to defendant Deep Diving Systems Limited to purchase the boat on payment of three months' rent for an amount equal to the remaining unamortized principal balance of $350,000. There does not appear to be anything in this agreement which affects the title of intervenant to the vessel as of October 18, 1977.
In summary defendant purchased the vessel from plaintiff on September 29, 1977, the agree ment being registered on October 18, 1977, and defendant sold the vessel the same day to interve- nant by agreement registered October 21, and immediately obtained a charter for her. As of June 1, 1978, however, the vessel was sold back by intervenant to defendant and intervenant's mort gage for $350,000 placed on the vessel. For the period from October 18, or (if the date of registra tion is taken) from October 21, 1977, to June 1, 1978, the vessel belonged to intervenant. However, when the proceedings were commenced on Sep- tember 8, 1978, the vessel indisputably belonged to defendant. The sole question to be decided is the date at which plaintiff's cause of action arose. The cause of action did not give rise to a maritime lien but was for a maritime debt which can be enforced in this Court by proceedings in rem provided that this is not prevented by the provisions of section 43(3) of the Federal Court Act (supra). There are three dates in issue, namely October 18, 1977, when the towage agreement was entered into, December 16, 1977, when the invoice was ren dered by plaintiff to defendants, and possibly June
8, 1978, when cheques subsequently found to be n.s.f. were issued in settlement of it. I have already rejected the argument however that a novation was created by the acceptance of them or that proceed ings could not have been brought before that date. Another possible date which was referred to is the date of completion of the towage to Thunder Bay, apparently sometime in November. Defendant did not own the vessel however in the period between October 18 (or at the latest October 21), 1977 and June 1, 1978.
Plaintiff submitted a very complete memoran dum of authorities, both British and Canadian, dealing with actions in rem. Most of the jurispru dence referred to deals however with the owner ship of the vessel at the time of the institution of the action in rem, which is not the issue in the present case, although certain judicial statements, taken out of context, would give some support to plaintiff's claim. For example counsel refers to a statement of Brandon J. in The Monica S. [1967] 3 All E.R. 740 in which at page 756, in reference to the decision in the case of The Beldis [1935] All E.R. Rep. 760, he stated:
I think that he meant exactly what he said, that a person having a statutory right of action in rem without a maritime lien, could exercise that right provided that, at the date of bringing the action, the res was in the ownership of the person liable on the claim.
Later on at page 760 he states however:
The first requirement is that the person who would be liable on the claim in personam should have been the owner or charterer of, or in possession or control of, the ship when the cause of action arose. The second requirement is that, at the time when the action is brought, the ship would be beneficially owned as respects all shares in it by that person.
What he refers to as the first requirement is precisely what is set out in section 43(3).
It is not necessary or proper to go outside of the wording of section 43(3) as the wording of it is quite clear and it must be complied with.
Plaintiff contends however that it is significant that the wording of this section refers to the time when the cause of action "arose" and in the French version "a pris naissance" and not to the time when the cause of action "accrues". In this connection it is argued that the cause of action arose the moment the towing contract was entered into.
Counsel concedes that the cause of action only accrued when a suit could be maintained thereon, which was certainly not before the invoice was rendered on December 16, establishing the amount of the claim, and in fact probably not until 30 days thereafter since the towing contract provided that interest at 18% would be paid only when the account was 30 days overdue, and the invoice itself bore the notation "condition net 30 days". A suit on it before that date would therefore presumably ;lave been premature. Some of the Quebec juris prudence cited in support of plaintiff's contention must be read with care moreover since article 68(2) of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, dealing with the place where action must be brought, uses the term "where the whole cause of action has arisen". In the case of The National Drying Machinery Co. v. Wabasso Ltd. [1979] C.A. 279 (now on appeal before the Supreme Court) Mayrand J. stated at page 288:
[TRANSLATION] Moreover in contractual matters the place where the cause of action arose ("a pris naissance") is as much if not more so where the contract was made rather than that where the inexecution of it caused a prejudice.
Reference was also made to the case of Marion v. Société Radio-Canada [1978] C.S. 509 in which Justice Tôth in discussing where an action should be brought stated in a footnote that a right of action originates in the contract which it seeks to have recognized rather than in its violation since the "lien de droit" between the parties results from the contract and that therefore the tribunal competent to hear an action for damages for fail ure to execute it is that where it was contracted rather than that where failure to execute took place or where the work was done. Other cases which were cited supported this proposition, but they were all merely dealing with the proper place for bringing action.
Against this intervenant cited other jurispru dence. In the case of Bradford Old Bank, Ltd. v. Sutcliffe [1918] 2 K.B. (C.A.) 833 at page 848 Scrutton L.J. stated:
When the statute of James provided that actions must be commenced within six years "next after the cause of such actions" it meant after the occurrence of all the facts which the plaintiff must prove as part of his case—that is, at the time
when the plaintiff could first have brought his action and proved sufficient facts to sustain it.
Reference was also made to the Ontario case of Lewington v. Raycroft' in which the judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal held at page 380:
The requirement that an action must be commenced within six years after the cause of action arose means that it must be commenced within six years after the occurrence of all the facts which the plaintiff must prove as part of his case, that is, that the time begins to run when the plaintiff could first have brought an action and proved sufficient facts to sustain it.
In a Manitoba case of Yellowega v. Yellowega 2 Hunt J. stated:
A cause of action for each payment arises when the payment is due and unpaid and, clearly, the payments which did not become due until during the six-year period immediately preceding the issuance of the statement of claim are not barred by this statute.
As plaintiff points out all these cases deal with prescription, which clearly does not run until the commencement of the period from which the right of action accrues.
It would appear that the intention of section 43(3) is to protect a purchaser of a vessel from having it seized in rem as a result of claims against the former owner, which could only be made after the purchase, for a maritime debt due by the former owner which did not create a maritime lien. The towing contract between plaintiff and defend ant merely had the effect of giving the defendant the right to insist that it be executed by plaintiff and conversely gave the plaintiff the right follow ing execution to be paid within 30 days after submission of its invoice for the services so ren dered. Neither party could sue on it at the time the contract was signed, and later on the same day the vessel was sold. The present action is for payment of a sum of money due by virtue of the towage contract and plaintiff only had a right to bring such action when the contract was completed and duly invoiced and not paid. While it might have been preferable had section 43(3) used the words "right of action" rather than "cause of action" it is nevertheless difficult to conclude that plaintiffs cause of action arose the moment the towage contract was signed.
[1935] 4 D.L.R. 378.
2 (1969) 66 W.W.R. 241, at page 243.
Further arguments were made on behalf of plaintiff. The first of these was to the effect that despite the sale by defendant to intervenant on October 18, 1977, there was no real transfer of beneficial ownership in view of the provisions of the bare boat charter granted at the same time. While this is a somewhat unusual document in that the defendant Deep Diving Systems Limited as charterer (referred to as lessee) had the right to purchase the ship at any time, and moreover after fulfilling its obligation for seven years under the charter would for $1 be able to purchase her, it appears to me that this is merely a form of charter combined with a promise of sale, and whatever rights it may have given to defendant Deep Diving Systems Limited to reacquire ownership of the vessel, as in fact it eventually did on June 1, 1978, the title to the vessel clearly was vested in the intervenant in the interval, so it cannot be contend ed that Deep Diving Systems Limited was at all times the beneficial owner of her.
A further argument raised by plaintiff deals with the $18,000 which according to plaintiff intervenant withheld from payments otherwise due to defendant as security for plaintiff's claim against defendants. Intervenant contends that this money is not due by it to defendants as defendants owe it a great deal more than this. In any event if plaintiff is able to establish that this is money belonging to defendant and owing by intervenant to defendant it can by virtue of its judgment in personam attempt to garnishee this money. That is not an issue which is before the Court in the proceedings seeking judgment in rem against the vessel Techno Balsam. The conclusion of plain tiff's action therefore seeking that arrest of the vessel Techno Balsam be maintained until defend ant has paid or guaranteed an amount sufficient to satisfy its claim is dismissed with costs in favour of intervenant.
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