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A-447-77
Samuel Moore & Company (Appellant)
v.
Commissioner of Patents (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Jackett C.J.—Ottawa, August 14, 1979.
Patents — Appeal from decision of Commissioner of Pat ents refusing grant of patent — Application by appellant to have appeal heard in camera — Application is an exception to general rule that all judicial proceedings are public — Excep tion where publicity would destroy the subject-matter — Whether patent applications fall within that exceptional class — Application dismissed — Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4, ss. 10, 28(1), 42, 44 — Patent Rules, C.R.C. 1978, Vol. XIII, c. 1250 — Federal Court Rule 201(3).
APPLICATION. COUNSEL:
G. Henderson, Q.C. for appellant. J. A. Scollin, Q.C. for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Gowling & Henderson, Ottawa, for appellant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment delivered orally in English by
JACKETT C.J.: By notice of appeal dated June 30, 1977, the appellant appealed to this Court from the decision of the Commissioner of Patents "refusing the grant of a patent in Canadian Patent Application 152,573". The appellant today applies for certain orders, viz.:
1. An Order directing that the Administrator of this Court remove from the Court file maintained in connection with this Appeal the Patent Office file records relating to Application No. 152,573, the transcript of the hearing before the Patent Appeal Board, all affidavits filed, the Appeal Book and all appendices thereto prepared in connection with this Appeal and keep such materials and all further materials filed or added to the case in a sealed envelope the contents of which shall be available for inspection only by the Court, the parties to the within Appeal and their solicitors;
2. For an Order enjoining the Respondent, its agents, servants and any other person acting on its behalf to keep confidential
and secret the materials and the contents of the materials referred to in Paragraph I above.
3. For an Order enjoining the Respondent, its agents, servants and any person acting on its behalf from disclosing or giving any information respecting the materials referred to in Para graph I and the prosecution of this application before the Patent Office or on the within Appeal to any person other than the Appellant or its solicitors or this Court;
4. For an Order directing the Respondent to take all reason able steps within its power to retrieve all materials or copies or summaries of any of the materials referred to in Paragraph 1 given or provided by the Respondent or its agents, servants or any person acting on its behalf to any person other than the Appellant or its solicitors or this Court;
5. For an Order directing that all further proceedings in con nection with this Appeal be held in camera; and
The appeal from the Commissioner gets before this Court by virtue of sections 42 and 44 of the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-4, which, as far as applicable, read:
42. Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that the appli cant is not by law entitled to be granted a patent he shall refuse the application and, by registered letter addressed to the appli cant or his registered agent, notify the applicant of such refusal and of the ground or reason therefor.
44. Every person who has failed to obtain a patent by reason of a refusal ... of the Commissioner to grant it may, at any time within six months after notice as provided for in section(s) 42 ... has been mailed, appeal from the decision of the Commissioner to the Federal Court and that Court has exclu sive jurisdiction to hear and determine such appeal.
In effect, the principal orders sought would be exceptions from the general rule that all judicial proceedings are public. In so far as the Court file is concerned, this rule is contained in Federal Court Rule 201(3), which provides, in effect, that, subject to supervision and the exigencies of the work of the Court "Any person may ... inspect any Court file or the annex thereto". With refer ence to public hearings, in so far as I am aware, the law has never been laid down, authoritatively,
An application for orders to the same effect was made on Court file A-446-77 based on the argument on this application. These reasons will also explain the disposition of that applica tion and it is hereby requested that a copy be placed on that file.
less stringently than in Scott v. Scott, 2 per Vis count Haldane L.C. at pages 437-438, where he said:
While the broad principle is that the Courts of this country must, as between parties, administer justice in public, this principle is subject to apparent exceptions, such as those to which I have referred. But the exceptions are themselves the outcome of a yet more fundamental principle that the chief object of Courts of justice must be to secure that justice is done. In the two cases of wards of Court and of lunatics the Court is really sitting primarily to guard the interests of the ward or the lunatic. Its jurisdiction is in this respect parental and administrative, and the disposal of controverted questions is an incident only in the jurisdiction. It may often be neces sary, in order to attain its primary object, that the Court should exclude the public. The broad principle which ordinarily gov erns it therefore yields to the paramount duty, which is the care of the ward or the lunatic. The other case referred to, that of litigation as to a secret process, where the effect of publicity would be to destroy the subject-matter, illustrates a class which stands on a different footing. There it may well be that justice could not be done at all if it had to be done in public. As the paramount object must always be to do justice, the general rule as to publicity, after all only the means to an end, must accordingly yield. But the burden lies on those seeking to displace its application in the particular case to make out that the ordinary rule must as of necessity be superseded by this paramount consideration. The question is by no means one which, consistently with the spirit of our jurisprudence, can be dealt with by the judge as resting in his mere discretion as to what is expedient. The latter must treat it as one of principle, and as turning, not on convenience, but on necessity.
It is worth repeating Viscount Haldane's language with reference to what exception can legally be made to public hearings in the course of genuine litigation. In that connection, he refers to
... litigation as to a secret process, where the effect of publicity would be to destroy the subject matter
as illustrating a class which stands on a "different footing."
Counsel for the appellant bases his application on the contention that this appeal falls within this exceptional classa. In so contending, he does not say that the material on file establishes that the subject matter of this appeal is a secret process. As
2 [1913] A.C. 417.
3 I assume, without expressing any view thereon, that this
class would also be an implied exception to Rule 201(3).
I understand him (and I checked my understand ing with him as closely as possible), his contention is that every application for a patent under the Canadian Patent Act is per se a trade secret so that, where it is the subject matter of litigation, the general rule of public hearings should not be applied. Alternatively, if I understood him aright, he put it that, in every case of a patent application, the application and all supporting material is sup plied by an applicant for a patent to the Commis sioner in confidential circumstances that bring into play the general rule laid down in Scott v. Scott, (supra).
In support of these contentions, counsel relied on section 10 of the Patent Act, which reads:
10. All specifications, drawings, models, disclaimers, judg ments, returns, and other papers, except caveats, and except those filed in connection with applications for patents that are still pending or have been abandoned shall be open to the inspection of the public at the Patent Office, under such regulations as are adopted in that behalf.
and Rule 13 of the Patent Rules, C.R.C. 1978, Vol. XIII, c. 1250, which reads:
13. Except as provided by section 11 of the Act or by these Rules, the Office shall not give any information respecting an application for patent to any person other than the person with whom the correspondence relating to the application is conduct ed or his duly constituted successor or a person specially authorized by the applicant or his patent agent to receive the information.
and he contended very strenuously that the whole scheme of the Patent Act would be defeated unless a person induced thereby to disclose his inventions to the Commissioner is protected from having what he disclosed to the Commissioner published to his competitors prior to grant of a patent. 4
I have not been persuaded that there is to be found in the Patent Act a scheme that would be defeated by public hearings of appeals from deci sions of the Commissioner. An inventor has a choice between maintaining and developing his invention as a trade secret and applying for a patent. If he chooses to apply for a patent and is granted one, his invention is thereby made patent to all the world and he receives in consideration a
° In particular, he referred to how prior publication could be utilized to obtain rights under section 58 to the prejudice of the applicant.
seventeen-year monopoly. 5 It would seem that when an application ceases to be pending in the Patent Office "by reason of a refusal", papers connected with it would also be open to the public by virtue of section 10. In that case, the applicant has an option to appeal (section 44) but such an appeal must be taken pursuant to the "rules and practice" of the Federal Court (section 17). In other words, as I understand it, the appeal must be in public unless being in public would destroy the "subject matter" of the litigation or otherwise defeat the ends of justice.
What must be considered, therefore, is what is the subject matter of the appeal. Put briefly, if the appellant wins, it gets a patent entitling it to a seventeen-year monopoly for its invention. The essential elements of the appellant's case on appeal are spelled out in section 28(1) of the Patent Act, 6 an examination of which shows that all the facts essential to its success are facts that were in existence at or before the time of its application for a patent. Knowledge acquired subsequently by third persons cannot destroy the appellant's right to its seventeen-year monopoly, if that right exist ed at the time of the appeal.
The lack of any practical need to restrict the usual glare of publicity regarded by us as essential
5 Section 10 is the provision that makes his invention "pat- ent"—"All ... papers ... shall be open to inspection of the Public at the Patent Office". I should not have thought that the exception in favour of "pending" applications would apply to an application that had been refused; but, in any event, the section has, of its own force, no application to the Court.
6 Section 28(1) reads:
28. (1) Subject to the subsequent provisions of this sec tion, any inventor or legal representative of an inventor of an invention that was
(a) not known or used by any other person before he invented it,
(b) not described in any patent or in any publication printed in Canada or in any other country more than two years before presentation of the petition hereunder men tioned, and
(c) not in public use or on sale in Canada for more than two years prior to his application in Canada,
may, on presentation to the Commissioner of a petition setting forth the facts (in this Act termed the filing of the application) and on compliance with all other requirements of this Act, obtain a patent granting to him an exclusive property in such invention.
to maintaining the purity of judicial administra tion is, in my view, demonstrated by the fact that, as far as I can ascertain, no similar application has ever been made in such a case or in a "conflict" case where the same grounds would be available.
The application will be dismissed.
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