T-774-71
William C. Robinson (Plaintiff)
v.
The Queen (Defendant)
Trial Division, Walsh J.—Montreal, January 15;
Ottawa, February 6, 1980.
Crown — Torts — Action for damages for unjustifiable
dismissal, injury to reputation, and slander and libel — Plain
tiff was employed under a written agreement which provided
for termination without notice for non-performance of the
agreement — Military policy Directives which were enacted
after the plaintiff's written contract, provided for a probation
ary period prior to termination — Plaintiff was dismissed
summarily for alleged non-performance — Whether the plain
tiffs written contract or the policy Directives prevail —
Whether the plaintiffs reputation was damaged by his sum
mary dismissal.
Action for damages for unjustifiable dismissal, injury to
reputation, and slander and libel. Plaintiff was hired as a
civilian to manage the grocery store on a Canadian Armed
Forces Base by what was at first a verbal agreement. At the
time of his dismissal he was engaged as supervisor of the Base
grocery store by virtue of a written agreement which provided
for termination without notice for non-performance of the
agreement. It also provided that as supervisor, plaintiff would
be allowed a tolerance of one per cent of sales since the
previous stock-taking. In September 1969 a stock check dis
closed a shortage which amounted to 1.4% of the sales. The
plaintiff suggested that the shortage probably resulted from
pilferage or from an error in taking the inventory, but his
request for a second check was denied. Instead, he received a
letter terminating his employment immediately based on his
performance and his inability to account for the shortage. The
plaintiff appealed his termination, citing military policy Direc
tives, which require probationary periods before a permanent
employee is terminated, and prior approval of ESCO before an
outlet supervisor is terminated. The plaintiffs appeal was
refused, and the plaintiffs identification card, which enabled
him to purchase items at a discount in the Canex stores, was
taken away. Notices were posted in the garage, grocery store
and bar prohibiting service to the plaintiff. The defendant
contended that the Directives did not apply as the plaintiffs
original contract of employment antedated the Directives. The
principal issue is whether it was proper to dismiss the plaintiff
on the basis of the terms of his written contract of employment
or whether the military authorities were obliged to follow the
provisions of their own policy Directives. A second issue is
whether the dismissal was made in such an unreasonable and
hasty manner as to imply dishonesty on the part of the plaintiff
thereby damaging his reputation, and diminishing his oppor
tunities for re-employment and that slanderous and libellous
statements were also made about him.
Held, the action is allowed. The contract under which the
plaintiff was working at the time of dismissal was a new
contract, dated April 29, 1969 subsequent to the Directives.
The terms in any contract of employment of civilian personnel
must be read and interpreted in the light of these Directives
and cannot derogate from them, especially in the case of a
contract signed after the Directives were issued. If the Direc
tives are to have any meaning whatsoever no agreement can or
should be made which is in conflict with them. It is evident that
a number of the requirements of the Directives were not
complied with in connection with plaintiff's summary dismissal.
Unless the Directives respecting the taking of inventories and
warning, probation and dismissal of Canex employees are to be
completely ignored as not being applicable to plaintiff, then he
was dismissed by the Base Commander without following the
proper procedures, hastily and summarily and was treated
thereafter in a manner so severe and excessive, including the
taking away of his identity card as an authorized patron of the
Canadian Forces Exchange System, and the issue of orders not
to serve him, that he suffered damages to his reputation, the
clear implication being that he was, if not dishonest, at least
incompetent and unreliable, which undoubtedly hampered his
first attempts to secure other employment.
ACTION.
COUNSEL:
K. J. MacDougall, Q.C. for plaintiff.
C. Ruelland, Q. C. for defendant.
SOLICITORS:
Bronstetter, Wilkie, Penhale, Donovan,
Giroux & Charbonneau, Montreal, for plain
tiff.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
defendant.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
WALSH J.: These proceedings seeking damages
of $10,000 for unjustifiable dismissal, $10,000 for
injury to reputation and $5,000 for slander and
libel were instituted on November 18, 1969 but
have only now come to trial. Plaintiff's counsel
explained the extraordinary delay which resulted
from the fact that at an early stage in the proceed
ings an account sent to plaintiff for legal services
rendered was never received by him as a result of
his having moved apparently without leaving a
forwarding address. Accordingly his attorneys did
nothing further to advance the proceedings to trial,
plaintiff himself neglected to communicate with
them from his new address or make any inquiries
as to progress, and surprisingly enough defendant
took no step to have the proceedings dismissed for
want of prosecution. In 1977 during the course of
a review of old files plaintiff's attorneys decided to
make an effort to locate plaintiff, which was not
too difficult, and were able to communicate with
him. Some progress was then made, plaintiff being
examined for discovery on December 16, 1977 and
a representative of defendant on August 29, 1978,
and in due course lists of documents were pro
duced and the matter set down for trial. Unfortu
nately however a number of documents contained
in military records which might have been helpful
and useful as evidence are no longer available,
having been destroyed after five years.
The facts are relatively clear, the principal issue
being whether in dismissing plaintiff from his posi
tion as a civilian employee operating a store, one of
the Canex System at St. Hubert Air Base, it was
proper to dismiss him on the basis of the terms of
his contract of employment dated April 29, 1969
or whether the military authorities were not
obliged to also follow the provisions of their own
Directive NPF (Non-Public Funds) 8/68 as well
as NPF Directive 19/68 dealing with stock-taking
and inventory evaluation. A second issue is wheth
er in making the allegedly improper and illegal
dismissal they did so in such an unreasonable and
hasty manner as to imply dishonesty on the part of
plaintiff thereby damaging his reputation, and
diminishing his opportunities for re-employment
and that slanderous and libellous statements were
also made about him.
The evidence disclosed that after 14 years ser
vice in the RCAF as a steward in various messes
and on various Bases plaintiff had had an honour
able discharge. He was engaged as a civilian to
manage the grocery store on St. Hubert Base by
what was at first a verbal agreement commencing
in May 1968, this being a store operated by what
is known as the Non-Public Funds Division. The
Canex System which operated all such facilities
throughout the country commenced in October
1968 and he worked there for the first three
months on a verbal agreement at a salary of $250
a month together with a bonus on sales. In a later
agreement which was not produced this was raised
to $525 a month and at the time of his dismissal he
was engaged by virtue of a written agreement
dated April 29, 1969. This agreement appoints
him supervisor of the Base grocery store. Clause a)
provides that it will commence on May 1, 1969
and will continue "until revoked by either party
under the terms and conditions listed hereunder".
It sets out his rights and responsibilities including
the recommendation of the promotion and dismis
sal of the staff employed in the grocery store.
Clause h) provides that he will abide by all perti
nent regulations governing the control, purchase
and sale of merchandise. Clause j) provides that
(as supervisor) he will be allowed a tolerance of
one per cent of sales since the previous stock-tak
ing and undertakes to reimburse the Base Fund for
any shortage beyond this. Clause p) provides for
termination as follows:
(i) by the BAdO, without notice of intent to terminate, in
the event of non performance of the terms, conditions, cove
nants and provisos herein, or in the event that the net profit
derived by Base Fund falls below one hundred dollars per
month and the SUPERVISOR cannot provide an acceptable
reason for the drop in net profit; or it can be established that
the drop was due to policies, work habits, etc., that were
initiated by the SUPERVISOR on his own authority; and
(ii) by either party by giving thirty days notice in writing of
intent to terminate this agreement.
He had a staff of six, four being full-time and two
part-time. The store sold no meat save for pre
packaged sliced meat but in addition to groceries
sold non-prescription pharmaceutical products,
cigarettes, beer and soft drinks. His staff consisted
of a woman who was the assistant manageress, a
head cashier, two women to restock the shelves
who worked part-time and two delivery boys. The
profit from the store never fell below the minimum
of $100 required by clause p)(i) supra. An inven
tory was made every quarter so that a shortage
would be over a three-month period. He states that
a stock check had been taken on May 25, 1969,
the next one being on September 7, 1969 (Exhibit
P-3) which disclosed a shortage of $784. During
this period from May to September sales had
amounted to $55,000 with a net profit of $1,300. If
the shortage of $784 is deducted, the balance of
$516 net profit still exceeded the $100 per month
required under the contract. Only one check was
taken in connection with the shortage although he
had requested a second check. He had discussed
this shortage with Lieutenant Robert Bélanger
who was then the Deputy Base Exchange Officer
to whom he was responsible under the terms of his
employment contract and had been unable to
explain the shortage other than suggest that it
probably resulted either from pilferage or from an
error in taking the inventory which is why he
requested that a second inventory be taken. Plain
tiff claims that he was told that this would be too
expensive. On September 18, 1969, he received a
letter headed "Notice of Termination of Employ
ment" from Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Woodcock
for the Base Commander in which it was stated:
it is the decision of the said Base Commander to invoke the
provisions of Para (p) sub -para (i) of the said agreement. You
are hereby given formal notice that the aforementioned Agree
ment shall terminate 18 October 1969.
The letter went on to state that termination was
based solely on his inability to operate the grocery
store in a manner at all times and in every respect
satisfactory, and specifically that he could not
provide any acceptable reason for the shortage.
The letter requires him to turn in the keys of the
grocery store forthwith and "to take such personal
possessions you may have from the premises and
not return". It goes on to state:
Because this action is distasteful to all concerned, you will be
provided with 30 days pay in lieu of notice, plus any severance
benefits due to you. From this will be deducted the amount of
the shortage that is in excess of 1% of gross sales for the period
involved, that is the sum of two hundred and twenty four
dollars and ninety five cents ($224.95).
This letter was handed to him by Lieutenant
Bélanger. Plaintiff immediately protested this
abrupt termination. On September 21, 1969, he
wrote a letter to ESCO Brigadier-General C. H.
Mussells, Canex, Canadian Forces Headquarters,
Ottawa, appealing this which he states he was
entitled to do. In the letter he calls attention to
Directives NPF 8/68 and 19/68 referred to
(supra). He was under the impression that he was
a category II employee, but in evidence Lieutenant
Bélanger (subsequently Captain Bélanger and
since retired) testified that he was classified as
I(b). It should be noted that all of Bélanger's
evidence is of necessity based on memory without
corroboration save for the documents produced as
exhibits by plaintiff, whereas one of plaintiffs
exhibits, being the copy of his letter dated Septem-
ber 21, 1969 to Brigadier-General Mussells, sets
out in writing his version of the facts written at the
immediate time and is probably more accurate. At
this time I may say that throughout his testimony
I found plaintiff to be an extremely accurate,
reasonable and apparently honest witness. (This is
not to suggest that Captain Bélanger was not also
a reasonable and honest witness.)
It appears that plaintiff, if not a category II
employee apparently should have been one, if one
relies on the provisions of Directive NPF 8/68,
section 3 of which defines category I employees as
non-managerial employees. While it is true that
subparagraph (a) refers to "outlet supervisors",
subparagraph (b) refers to "sales clerks". Certain
ly plaintiff was more than this. Section 23A states
that some of these employees may be in a
managerial position (category II) with approval of
ESCO based on whether the employee has to make
subjective decisions, dollar turnover, the number of
employees supervised, the amount of direct super
vision given to the employee and so forth. Catego
ry II provides for employees whose primary duties
are directly related to management, business oper
ations, to exercise discretion and independent
judgment in the execution of duties without close
or direct supervision, and so forth. Plaintiff herein
was responsible for his staff, purchase and sale of
merchandise pursuant to regulation, and keeping
the accounts, and was certainly much more than a
sales clerk.
In any event I do not believe anything turns on
whether plaintiff was a category I or category II
employee. This matter will be considered on the
basis that he was in category I as Lieutenant
Bélanger believed. The reasons for termination of
employment as set out in Directive 8/68 are the
same for both and include unsatisfactory work
performance and dishonesty. Probation is provided
for however in section 50 which was not complied
with by the military authorities. It reads as
follows:
50. No permanent employee shall be terminated for unsatis
factory conduct or work performance, infraction of rules,
absence from work without authorization or adequate reason,
or poor attendance until he has been warned of his short
comings in writing. The warning which shall be prepared in one
copy, in the Case of Category I Employees, and in duplicate in
the case of outlet supervisors and Category II Employees,
signed by the Exchange Officer or the Purchasing Office
Manager and shall contain the following information:
a. employee's short coming;
b. a definite probationary period during which he will be
given the opportunity to overcome his shortcoming;
c. assistance and counselling available to the employee to
assist him to overcome his shortcoming;
d. a statement to the effect that failure to overcome the
shortcoming shall result in a transfer of the employee to a job
more commensurate with his interest and ability or termina
tion of employment; and
e. an acknowledgement by the employee that he has read the
warning.
The original copy of the warning shall be placed on the
employee's Personal File and the duplicate, in the case of an
outlet supervisor or Category II Employee, shall be forwarded
to ESCO.
Section 51 requires the prior approval of ESCO
before "an outlet supervisor or Category II
Employee is transferred to another job or is ter
minated" [emphasis mine]. Certainly plaintiff was
an outlet supervisor, in fact his contract of employ
ment so provides, but no approval of ESCO was
sought or obtained. Section 53 provides as follows:
53. Employees may be terminated by the Exchange Officer
or Purchasing Office Manager without probation for reasons
other than unsatisfactory conduct or work performance, infrac
tion of rules, absence from work without authorization or
adequate reason or poor attendance, except that the prior
approval of ESCO is required before an outlet supervisor or
Category II Employee is terminated.
The reason given in the letter for termination is
clearly based on unsatisfactory work performance
and therefore plaintiff cannot come within this
exception, probation was required, and moreover
as an outlet supervisor the prior approval of
ESCO.
Defendant contended that Directive 8/68 did
not apply, and in fact objected to the production of
it as well as Directive 19/68, which objections
were taken under reserve and I now dismiss. It was
submitted that Directive 8/68 only took effect on
October 1, 1968 and Directive 19/68 subsequently
in December. It was argued that plaintiff's original
contract of employment antedated these Directives
and therefore cannot be affected by them. I reject
this argument. In the first place the contract under
which he was working at the time of dismissal was
a new contract (even if it may have been in the
same wording, as defendant contends, as the ear
lier agreement which was not produced) dated
April 29, 1969 subsequent to the Directives.
Secondly I cannot conceive that such Directives
are not binding on the authorities in question, in
that the terms in any contract of employment of
civilian personnel must be read and interpreted in
the light of these Directives and cannot derogate
from them, especially in the case of a contract
signed after the Directives were issued. To decide
otherwise would be an absurdity. The Base Com
mander could ignore the Directives and engage an
employee by contract stating that he could be
dismissed at any time without cause and without
notice, which would clearly be in contravention of
the Directives, and if the contract alone were to be
interpreted it could be invoked against the
employee on the grounds that he had signed and
accepted these conditions. This would defeat the
entire policies set out in the Directives. Plaintiff
testified that these Directives as issued were shown
to all of the employees and in fact in his letter of
September 21, 1969, immediately following his
dismissal, to Brigadier-General Mussells he
specifically referred to them. Defendant also
referred to section 4 of Directive 8/68 which reads
in part as follows:
Except as otherwise directed by ESCO, they apply to all other
non-public fund civilian employees of the Exchange System.
In interpreting this it is evident that plaintiff was a
non-public fund civilian employee of the Exchange
System and there is no suggestion that ESCO
directed that it not be applied to him or to such
employees. The Commanding Officer therefore
had no discretion not to apply them to plaintiff. It
is evident that a number of the requirements of
Directive 8/68 were not complied with in connec
tion with plaintiff's summary dismissal.
Turning now to Directive 19/68 dealing with
stock-taking inventory valuation it provides that
for groceries in the Canex System a physical
inventory account shall be taken at the end of
February and August. Section 15 provides for an
original count consisting of two checkers one of
whom is familiar with the stock. The quantities are
to be inserted and the inventory sheet signed by
the original count team. A further provision is
made that there shall then be a recheck count by a
recheck team consisting of personnel taken from
other departments or outlets to facilitate independ
ent verification. This was not done in the present
case. It is true that in his evidence in Court
Lieutenant Bélanger testified that inventories are
taken quarterly. The first inventory in plaintiffs
store showed a shortage of some $55 which had
doubled by the next one so it was decided to take
monthly inventory. The following one was higher
still and the culminating one showed a shortage of
$784 which resulted in his reporting this to the
Comptroller and Deputy Commander. Plaintiff
had no acceptable explanation and his dismissal
followed. This evidence is uncorroborated by the
production of any documents and is in direct con
tradiction to plaintiffs evidence as to the fre
quency of the inventories since, as already stated,
in his letter to Brigadier-General Mussells written
immediately following his dismissal he referred to
an inventory having been taken on May 25 and the
next one having been on September 7. Mrs. Marie
Maillet, Assistant Manageress of the store who
had worked there since 1966 testified that if short
ages are found when taking an inventory another
check is normally taken and if one had been taken
on this occasion during the two weeks she worked
there following plaintiffs departure she would
have participated. She also corroborated plaintiffs
evidence that at the time construction work was
going on to enlarge the store. He had testified that
some 6 or 7 civilian construction workers were in
and out of the store regularly during the period,
increasing the possibility of theft by customers in
the store and difficulties in dealing with the stock.
This was also referred to by plaintiff in his letter to
Brigadier-General Mussells. It should be pointed
out that the inventory shortage of $784 on sales of
$55,000 amounts to about 1.4% only slightly in
excess of the 1% tolerance evidently considered
normal and acceptable by virtue of clause j) of the
employment contract (supra). Plaintiff would be
required to reimburse the Base Fund for the excess
shortage. This in itself provides a strong incentive
for keeping shortages within the tolerated level
and a substantial penalty for failure to do so.
When the then Lieutenant Bélanger handed
plaintiff Lieutenant-Colonel Woodcock's letter dis
missing him which inter alia ordered him not to
return to the premises plaintiff then asked him for
an Exchange System Identification card which is
regularly issued to veterans on request and which
can be used in any of the Canadian Forces
Exchange Systems in Canada to make purchases
for the card holder, dependents or as a bona fide
gift. Lieutenant Bélanger readily issued him this
card. Plaintiff used it to return to the store the
following day and no doubt discussed his summary
dismissal with his former employees. It is under
standable that he would be complaining to them.
Soon after the Assistant Manageress handed in
her notice and resigned her position. She had only
worked for two weeks after he left. In her testimo
ny she stated however that no one had suggested to
her that she should resign but that the person
replacing plaintiff had no experience in the work
at all and she did not wish to work for him which
is what led to her resignation. In any event, rightly
or wrongly, the authorities apparently felt that
plaintiff was using his pass to stir up dissension
and trouble for on October 1, 1969 he was sent a
letter from Colonel H. F. Wenz, on behalf of the
Base Commander. After referring to the fact that
he was given 30 days' pay in lieu of notice so that
he would not be embarrassed by having to work
out the 30-day period following his dismissal the
letter stated:
It has been brought to my attention that although this action
was taken to relieve you of embarrassment, you have been at
the grocery store on several occasions not connected necessarily
with the purchase of groceries. It has now been realized that
your presence at the grocery store is disturbing to the
employees, and for this reason the Base Commander has direct
ed that you be denied access to the CFB Montreal, St-Hubert
Detachment and all CANEX facilities operated by it.
I have been directed to inform you that you are not entitled
to enter the base area to use any of the facilities from this date
on. It is expected that you will observe these directions to the
members of St-Hubert Detachment, and thus avoid possible
embarrassment to us all.
Plaintiff testified that on the second day when he
went to the store with his pass someone called the
Service Police who took his card from him and
ordered him to leave the Base. On examination for
discovery he stated that he was told that if he
returned to the Base he would be arrested. Fur
thermore notices were displayed in the grocery
store, the garage and the bar stating "Do not serve
Mr. Robinson". While he did not see the notices
himself he heard about them and the posting of
them is not denied.
Brigadier-General Mussells replied on October
9, 1969 to plaintiff's appeal stating that an exami
nation of the memorandum of agreement dated
April 29, 1969, discloses that he was treated
within its terms by the Base Commander so that
the appeal cannot be allowed. The letter goes on to
say:
You will realize that in coming to the agreement that you did
with the Base Commander you are bound by it where it is in
conflict with NPF Directives.
It is this conclusion with which I strongly disagree
for the reasons set out above. If the Directives are
to have any meaning whatsoever no agreement can
or should be made which is in conflict with them.
A further letter was produced from Major J. V.
Ranson for the Base Commander dated October 3,
1969, in reply to a letter of October 1 from
plaintiff which was not produced but which appar
ently protested the invalidity of the stock-taking.
This letter attempts to change the basis of his
dismissal stating that the termination right had
been exercised under clause p(ii) (supra) of his
agreement which would merely require a 30-day
notice without giving any reasons. It is clear from
the letter of dismissal from Lieutenant-Colonel
Woodcock, however, that it was based on clause
p)(i) and all the subsequent correspondence
indicated that he was being dismissed for cause
resulting from the inventory shortage, so this
belated attempt to change the basis for dismissal
after the damage to plaintiffs reputation had been
done cannot be accepted. A more kindly letter was
written to plaintiff on March 16, 1970, by Captain
J. Y. MacPherson, the Base Non-Public Funds
Accounting Officer sending plaintiff the receipt
for the $224.49 refund which had been made as a
result of the inventory shortage over the tolerated
amount. This letter states:
I am sorry to hear that you aren't having much success in
your quest for work. As usual we are passing from one crisis to
another here in Montreal so things haven't changed since you
left.
I hope the receipts prove satisfactory and that you get some
of it back.
Good luck.
This was written to Mr. Robinson at Downsview,
Ontario, to which address he had moved. It cer
tainly goes as far as a lower ranking officer could
possibly go in expressing sympathy with plaintiff
and might even imply disapproval of what had
taken place.
In this connection it must be pointed out that
plaintiff's evidence to the effect that he had
received no warning and that his job evaluation
report made once a year by Lieutenant Bélanger
had been excellent was uncontradicted. He saw
two of them, one by Lieutenant Bélanger, and one
by his predecessor. The witness Mrs. Maillet
stated that he was an excellent boss in his opera
tion of a small grocery store and very pleasant to
work for. The notices about not serving him subse
quently were placed in a small office and not
prominently displayed, however. Two other char
acter references are of considerable significance.
He eventually found employment with the Aurora
Highlands Golf Club and a letter by the Manager
of that club dated January 15, 1979 reads as
follows:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Re: Mr. William Robinson
Mr. Robinson has been in charge of the bar at Aurora
Highlands since 1970. He is at all times punctual, properly
dressed, abstemious while at work, pleasant (but correct) with
members and guests, honest, efficient in handling staff and the
performance of his duties. The cost ratios for products and staff
have always been very satisfactory.
During the next two years, the Club is closing its golf course
for remodelling and (in consequence) the position that Mr.
Robinson has occupied has been eliminated.
A witness, John Blyth of Ottawa, who was Deputy
Director of Canex testified that he had been in the
services for 26 years before retiring in May 1969
and becoming employed by Canex as a civilian
employee. He is thoroughly familiar with the
Directives and in fact was consulted in connection
with the writing of them. They are published
under the authority of the Chief of Defence, and
signed on his behalf by the Canex Director, Briga-
dier-General Mussells at the time. He considers
that they were binding on Base Commanders. He
testified that during his time in the services he had
operated National Defence Mess facilities on vari
ous bases and that plaintiff Robinson had worked
for him and he considered him to be reliable. He
had been in charge of dry canteens, officers'
messes, and airmen's clubs and so forth and had
always performed to his satisfaction. He stated
that if he was in a position to employ people he
would still consider plaintiff for employment.
This lengthy summary of the evidence leads me
to conclude that unless the Directives respecting
the taking of inventories and warning, probation
and dismissal of Canex employees are to be com
pletely ignored as not being applicable to plaintiff,
then he was dismissed by the Base Commander
without following the proper procedures, hastily
and summarily and was treated thereafter in a
manner so severe and excessive, including the
taking away of his identity card as an authorized
patron of the Canadian Forces Exchange System,
and the issue of orders not to serve him, that he
suffered damages to his reputation, the clear
implication being that he was, if not dishonest, at
least incompetent and unreliable, which undoubt
edly hampered his first attempts to secure other
employment.
He submitted a list of special damages as
follows:
From September 1969 to March 15, 1970, he was
unemployed save for certain part-time work and
claims loss of income $3,000.00
less $950.00 earned during this period or a net loss of $2,050.00
Since he was paid to October 18, however, the loss
is really five months at $525 per month or $2,625
less $950 or $1,675.
During this period he had to borrow $500 from
the Bank for living expenses, but this cannot be
allowed since although he had to eventually repay
this money he did receive it from the Bank. In the
absence of information as to how long the loan was
outstanding no claim for interest can be allowed.
From March 15, 1970 to May 1, 1971, he claims a
loss of $1,600 this being the difference between
what he was earning at the Aurora Highlands Golf
Club at that time and the $525 per month he was
paid as supervisor of the Base Store. This is admis
sible under the circumstances. He testified that
after being dismissed he made every effort to
secure employment, applying for numerous posi
tions but when the application forms asked where
he had been previously employed and why he had
left that employment, the truthful answer that he
had been dismissed resulted in his receiving no
answers. He was not bilingual and could not find
work anywhere in the Montreal area, which is why
he borrowed money from the Bank to go to
Ontario where he eventually got the position with
the Aurora Highlands Golf Club. He had worked
temporarily in December and January in Montreal
for a Personnel Agency on commission which was
not sufficiently profitable to live on. Under the
circumstances I believe it is proper to allow his
claim for $650 for moving his family from Mon-
treal to Aurora. He also claims $1,000 for drapes,
rugs, curtain rods and so forth required in connec
tion with furnishing the new premises. Since these
would be new and possibly better than what he left
behind the full amount should not perhaps be
allowed but I would allow $500 under this head
ing. He also claims $500 for five trips to various
places in Ontario seeking work which he eventual
ly found in Aurora, as well as $50 for a trip to
Montreal in December 1977 in connection with his
examination for discovery, and I believe that these
amounts can be allowed. Finally he claims $1,000
for loss of use of his purchasing card which en
titled him to a substantial Canex discount. While
it was suggested that after moving to Aurora he
might have been able to reapply for a card at the
Base at Downsview, 25 miles from Aurora without
their being aware that his card at St. Hubert had
been cancelled, he did not know that he could do
this. As a veteran he was entitled to this card
although there is not necessarily an obligation to
issue one. Over the subsequent years in furnishing
his new home he spent $600 for a T.V., $800 for a
refrigerator, $400 for a stove, $1,300 for a bed
room suite, carpets amounting to some $600,
drapes $600, coffee and end tables $300, dish
washer $550 and various gifts, lawn furniture and
so forth to the extent of about $2,000 estimating
that he must have purchased about $7,800 worth
of major household furnishings in retail stores
rather than in the Base facilities where he would
normally be entitled to a discount and he claims
$1,000 for this, which does not appear unreason
able.
These various items total $5,975. While the
conclusion to the statement of claim gives no
details of special damages these could probably
come under the heading of $10,000 sought for
unjustifiable dismissal. I do not believe however
that his good reputation has suffered any perma
nent damage. This was overcome as a result of his
subsequent steady and highly satisfactory employ-
ment for nine years at the Aurora Highlands Golf
Club. Neither was he directly slandered or libelled
although his summary dismissal for cause arising
out of the inventory shortage, and his subsequent
banning from the Base, even as a customer of the
facilities was certainly somewhat damaging. While
Quebec law does not recognize punitive or exem
plary damages, moral damages are recognized and
plaintiff undoubtedly suffered great humiliation
and worry about how he was to support his family
in the succeeding months while he was searching
for other employment. I believe that a sum of
$1,500 would not be an excessive allowance for
this. This makes a total of $7,475 for which judg
ment will be rendered with costs. Plaintiff seeks
interest from the date of institution of proceedings
but I do not believe that it would be proper to
allow such interest in the circumstances of this
case. Although it is true, as was contended, that
any amount awarded now is worth considerably
less in terms of 1980 dollars than the same amount
would have been worth in 1969 this is not a
principle which can be validly adopted so as to
increase the amount of an award, and if there was
greatly excessive delay in bringing this matter to
trial the blame must be shared by plaintiff and his
attorneys. It was certainly not the responsibility of
defendant to arrange for an earlier hearing. I
therefore do not believe that interest should be
allowed for the intervening period. The judgment
will therefore merely be for the amount awarded
with costs and interest from date of judgment.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.