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T-1233-79
Disney Shops Limited (Appellant)
v.
Registrar of Trade Marks (Respondent)
Trial Division, Cattanach J.—Toronto, October 24 and 26, 1979.
Trade marks — Appeal from decision of Registrar of Trade Marks refusing to grant appellant's application for registra tion of the mark "polo" in association with slacks, belts, bathrobes, hats, handkerchiefs, socks and shorts because pro posed mark was either clearly descriptive or deceptively mis - descriptive — Registrar found that "polo" identified a par ticular type of fabric in the public domain — Dictionary definitions of "polo cloth" emphasize that that term was the subject of a trade mark and do not justify the conclusion that 'polo" identifies a cloth in the public domain — Registration of trade mark referred to in the definitions not found in the Register — Appeal allowed — Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10, ss. 12(1)(b), 60.
APPEAL. COUNSEL:
W. T. Howell for appellant. B. Segal for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
W. T. Howell, Toronto, for appellant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
CATTANACH J.: This is an appeal from a deci sion of the Registrar of Trade Marks dated Janu- ary 12, 1979 refusing to grant the appellant's application for registration of a trade mark of the word "polo" for use in association with slacks, belts, bathrobes, hats, handkerchiefs, socks and shorts on the ground the trade mark sought to be registered is either clearly descriptive or deceptive ly misdescriptive of the character or quality of the wares in association with which the trade mark is to be used and as such is not registrable by virtue of section 12(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10.
In so concluding the Registrar stated as follows in his decision:
The Examiner has demonstrated that the word "polo" identifies a particular type of fabric and for that reason alone no one party can be granted the right to monopolize its use in the manner described in s. 19 of the Trade Marks Act.
If I were to accept the Registrar's premise that the word "polo" identifies a particular type of fabric and which fabric is therefore in the public domain I would be in accord with the Registrar's conclusion as above expressed.
The conclusion that the word "polo" identifies a particular type of fabric (as does the word "serge") is predicated upon two definitions of the words "polo cloth" as they appear in Fairchild's Dictionary of Textiles and Modern Textile Dic tionary. I have not had the opportunity to examine the dictionaries because only extracts therefrom were made available to me.
From the titles I would assume that they are dictionaries of words used extensively in the textile trade and that the extracts made available to me were taken from the latest and most up-to-date editions. Counsel for the respondent conceded this assumption.
In the Modern Textile Dictionary the words "polo cloth" are defined as follows:
Registered trademark of Worumbo Mills, Inc., Lisbon Falls, Maine, for a popular staple used in men's and women's topcoat- ing and polo coats. Made with one warp and one filling, the fabric content is choice camel hair and fine wool. This facefin- ished material, which weighs 21 ounces per yard, has consider able nap on the surface effect. Twill weave is used to make this smart, appealing fabric which comes in natural camel shade and in shades of brown, blue and gray.
Polo cloth is identified by the use of a silk stripe on the back of the cloth. There is a stripe every three inches in the texture, and it is an actual part of the warp construction.
In Fairchild's Dictionary of Textiles the words "polo cloth" are defined as follows:
A trademark for heavyweight coating fabric finished on both sides with a dense nap that covers the weave. Made of soft spun yarns and generally a tan color. These can be all wool or all camel hair or blends.
In both definitions emphasis is placed on the fact that the words "polo cloth" have been the subject matter of a trade mark. That being so the
words are used to distinguish a particular cloth in association with which the words are used manu factured by the owner of the trade mark of these words from cloth manufactured by other persons.
It was on the basis of the definitions in the two dictionaries which have been reproduced above that the Registrar concluded that the word "polo" identifies a particular cloth for which reason no one person can have the monopoly of that word. The dictionary definitions do not justify the con clusion that the word "polo" identifies a cloth in the public domain. From the definitions the word identifies the cloth of a particular manufacturer but not a cloth in the public domain or that the words "polo cloth" are generic in the sense that "serge" and other like words are descriptive of a particular type of cloth are generic.
On the contrary the definitions justify a conclu sion directly opposite to that reached by the Registrar.
A search of the Register conducted by an exam iner, sent up by the Registrar under section 60 of the Act, does not disclose the registration of the trade mark referred to in the definitions. Therefore the trade mark must be registered elsewhere and no evidence has established the extent to which the trade mark has become known in Canada.
Since the conclusion by the Registrar that the words "polo cloth" are generic and so clearly descriptive was not justified for the reasons above expressed, I announced at the conclusion of the hearing that the appeal was allowed and that the appellant was not entitled to costs against the Registrar.
At that time I undertook to reduce the reasons verbally expressed to writing as I do now.
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