Judgments

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A-406-80
Canadian Telecommunications Union, Division No. 1 of the United Telegraph Workers (Appli- cant)
v.
Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers, Canadian Telecommunications Division of Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers, Canadian Na tional Railway Company, Telecommunications Department, Canadian Association of Communi cations and Allied Workers, United Telegraph Workers, Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees, and Canada Labour Relations Board (Respondents)
and
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Court of Appeal, Pratte and Le Dain JJ. and Lalande D.J.—Montreal, March 5 and 6; Ottawa, June 22, 1981.
Judicial review — Labour relations — Application to set aside the decision of the Canada Labour Relations Board ordering that the Canadian Association of Communications and Allied Workers (CACAW) succeed the Canadian Brother hood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (CBRT) as the bargaining agent for the telecommunications employees of Canadian National Railway Company (CN) — Applicant is the bargaining agent for the telecommunications employees of Canadian Pacific Limited (CP) — CN and CP entered into a partnership agreement providing for the integration of their telecommunications services — Board refused to permit appli cant to intervene in the decertification of the CBRT proceed ings because it did not represent the employees of the employer before the Board — Applicant submits that if CBRT had continued to be the bargaining agent for the CN employees, it would not have threatened the existence of the applicant since CBRT probably would not have applied to be recognized as the bargaining agent of all the employees of the partnership — Whether applicant is "directly affected" by Board's decision and therefore entitled to apply for judicial review pursuant to s. 28(2) of the Federal Court Act — Application dismissed — Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, as amended, ss. 119, 143, 144 — Canada Labour Relations Board Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-499, ss. 2, 17 — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
Application to set aside a decision of the Canada Labour Relations Board ordering that the Canadian Association of Communications and Allied Workers (CACAW) be the bar gaining agent for the telecommunications employees of the Canadian National Railway Company (CN). The Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (CBRT), the Union representing CN telecommunications employees, applied to the Board to be decertified. CACAW intervened and asked to be recognized as the successor to CBRT. Before a vote was held, the applicant herein, which is the bargaining agent for the telecommunications employees of Canadian Pacific Limited (CP), sought to intervene. CN and CP signed a partnership agreement providing for the integra tion of their telecommunications services. Any union affected by the partnership could apply to the Board under subsection 144(3) of the Canada Labour Code for recognition as the bargaining agent of all the employees of the partnership. The applicant and the CBRT had this right. The Board rejected the applicant's request to intervene in the CBRT decertification proceedings because the applicant did not represent the employees of the employer before the Board. After a vote was held, the Board substituted CACAW as the bargaining agent. The applicant submits that it is directly affected by this decision because if the CBRT had continued to be the certified bargaining agent of the CN employees it would not have threatened the existence of the applicant since it probably would not have applied to be recognized as the successor as it was supported by few employees of the partnership. The ques tion is whether the applicant is "directly affected" by the Board's decision pursuant to subsection 28(2) of the Federal Court Act.
Held, the application is dismissed. Under subsection 28(2) of the Federal Court Act, a section 28 application "may be made by the Attorney General of Canada or any party directly affected by the decision or order". In order to succeed, the applicant must be "directly affected" by the decision under attack. While the decision clearly affects the rights and obliga tions of the CBRT and the CACAW, it affects the applicant in an entirely different manner: the decision strengthens the posi tion of the CACAW in the eyes of the employees and gives that Union a status enabling it to initiate proceedings under subsec tion 144(3) of the Code which may eventually lead to the applicant's decertification. The applicant is only affected in directly by the Board's decision which merely creates a situa tion that may, eventually, affect the applicant. Therefore the applicant does not have the locus standi required to bring a section 28 application.
Also, per Le Dain J.: The interest which the applicant asserts as the basis of standing may be described as the maintenance of an existing competitive relationship. It has been suggested that the courts should be more ready to recognize an adverse effect on a competitive position as sufficient for standing. But the courts must consider whether the particular competitive posi tion or advantage is entitled to protection. The recognition and maintenance of the competitive position or advantage of the applicant would involve the denial of the right of the employees
in the Division to continuity of willing and effective representa tion pending determination of the right to represent employees of the CN-CP telecommunications partnership. That cannot be an interest the protection of which is contemplated by the Code, and should not be regarded as sufficient for standing to challenge the Board's decision.
APPLICATION for judicial review. COUNSEL:
Hélène LeBel for applicant.
Robert Monette for respondent Canadian Na tional Railway Company, Telecommunica tions Department.
R. Koskie, Q.C. and M. Zigler for respondent Canadian Association of Communications and Allied Workers.
G. J. McConnell and J. MacPherson for respondent Canada Labour Relations Board.
Maurice Wright, Q.C. for respondent Broth erhood of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees.
SOLICITORS:
Jasmin, Rivest, Castiglio, Castiglio & LeBel, Montreal, for applicant.
Ogilvy, Renault, Montreal, for respondent Canadian National Railway Company, Tele communications Department.
Robins and Partners, Toronto, for respondent Canadian Association of Communications and Allied Workers.
Kitz, Matheson, Green & MacIsaac, Halifax, for respondent Canada Labour Relations Board.
Soloway, Wright, Houston, Greenberg, O'Grady, Morin, Ottawa, for respondent Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steam ship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
PRATTE J.: This section 28 application is direct ed against a decision of the Canada Labour Rela tions Board ordering that the Canadian Associa-
tion of Communications and Allied Workers (CACAW) be the bargaining agent for a unit comprising employees of the Telecommunications Department of the Canadian National Railway Company.
The certified bargaining agent for the employees included in that unit' was, at one time, the Canadian Telecommunications Union, Division 43 of the United Telegraph Workers. On October 21, 1974, that Union disaffiliated itself from the United Telegraph Workers and merged with the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (CBRT). Following that merger, the CBRT replaced the Union as the certified bargaining agent for the Canadian National Tele communications employees.
The Union, as a consequence of its merger with the CBRT, ceased to have any legal existence; in fact, however, it continued to exist as the Canadi- an Telecommunications Division of the CBRT. But the relations between the Division and the CBRT were not happy. Apparently, the Division wanted to enjoy more autonomy within the CBRT than that organization was willing to concede. In the end, the CBRT concluded that it had lost the confidence of a majority of employees in the unit and should no longer represent them. On August 28, 1979, it applied to the Board, under section 119 of the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, as amended, 2 for an order varying the various orders under which it had been certified and approving its request "to be divested of its representational rights and responsibilities" under those orders.
' Until the order under attack was made, those employees were divided into many units having the same bargaining agent.
2 That section reads as follows:
119. The Board may review, rescind, amend, alter or vary any order or decision made by it, and may rehear any application before making an order in respect of the application.
Notice of that application was given to the Division and the employer. The officers of the Division intervened and asked that the consider ation of the CBRT's application be delayed so as to give them time to create a new union which could succeed the CBRT and acquire the rights and responsibilities it wished to abandon.
In December 1979, the Canadian Association of Communications and Allied Workers (CACAW), which was the Union formed by the officers of the Division, intervened in the proceedings and asked to be recognized as the successor of the CBRT and the bargaining agent for the Canadian National Telecommunications employees. In support of its application, it filed evidence purporting to show that it had the support of a majority of employees in the unit.
Another intervention was received by the Board from the United Telegraph Workers, the organiza tion with which the Division had been affiliated before its merger with CBRT. That organization also claimed to be entitled to succeed the CBRT as the bargaining agent for the CN Telecommunica tions employees.
In January 1980, the Board decided to hold a vote among the members of the bargaining unit in order to determine whether the employees wished to be represented by the United Telegraph Work ers, the CBRT or the newly formed association, the CACAW. That vote showed that the CACAW had the support of an overwhelming majority of employees.
The results of the vote had not been compiled yet, when, on April 24, 1980, the Canadian Tele communications Union, Division No. 1 of the United Telegraph Workers, sought to intervene. That Union is the applicant in this Court; it is the certified bargaining agent for the employees of the Telecommunications Department of Canadian Pacific Limited and, as its name indicates, is affiliated with the United Telegraph Workers. It asserted that it had an interest in the proceedings before the Board since Canadian Pacific Limited and Canadian National Railway Company had, on March 13, 1980, signed a partnership agreement providing for the integration of their telecommuni-
cation services; it said that, as a result of that agreement, it represented employees having the same employer (i.e., the partnership) as the employees represented by CBRT. The applicant further alleged that the representation vote had been conducted irregularly and, also, that the Board, in the circumstances, had no jurisdiction to certify CACAW as the bargaining agent of the CN Telecommunications employees since no "merger or amalgamation of trade unions or a transfer of jurisdiction among trade unions" had taken place which would have permitted CACAW to invoke section 143 of the Code. 3 The Board immediately rejected that request of the applicant for reasons that it expressed as follows in a telex addressed to the applicant's counsel:
AT THIS STAGE, THE CANADIAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION, DIVISION No. 1 OF THE UNITED TELEGRAPH WORK ERS, WHICH AS WE UNDERSTAND DOES NOT REPRESENT EMPLOYEES OF THE EMPLOYER IN THESE PROCEEDINGS BUT RATHER EMPLOYEES OF ANOTHER EMPLOYER SEEKS TO INTERVENE IN THESE PROCEEDINGS BECAUSE EMPLOYEES THAT IT REPRESENTS MAY BE AFFECTED BY FUTURE PRO CEEDINGS THAT IT IS ANTICIPATED WILL RESULT FROM CER TAIN ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING THAT WILL OCCUR BY VIRTUE OF ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN CN AND CP. IN THOSE FUTURE PROCEEDINGS YOUR CLIENT UNDOUBTEDLY WILL HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST. THE TRADE UNION THAT WILL REPRESENT THE EMPLOYEES OF THE EMPLOYER IN THIS CASE WILL ALSO HAVE AN INTEREST. IN THE PRO CEEDINGS IN THIS FILE, THE BOARD WILL DETERMINE WHICH TRADE UNION THAT WILL BE.
On May 28, 1980, after the results of the vote had been known, the Board issued reasons for
3 143. (1) Where, by reason of a merger or amalgamation of trade unions or a transfer of jurisdiction among trade unions, a trade union succeeds another trade union that, at the time of the merger, amalgamation or transfer of jurisdiction, is a bargaining agent, the successor shall be deemed to have acquired the rights, privileges and duties of its predecessor, whether under a collective agreement or otherwise.
(2) Where, upon a merger or amalgamation of trade unions or a transfer of jurisdiction among trade unions, any question arises concerning the rights, privileges and duties of a trade union under this Part or under a collective agreement in respect of a bargaining unit or an employee therein, the Board on application to it by a trade union affected, shall determine what rights, privileges and duties have been acquired or are retained.
(3) Before determining, pursuant to subsection (2), what rights, privileges and duties of a trade union have been acquired or are retained, the Board may make such inquiry or direct that such representation votes be taken as it considers necessary.
decision finding that there had been a transfer of jurisdiction from the CBRT to the CACAW and that, as a consequence, the CACAW, being deemed by subsection 143 (1) to have acquired the rights and duties of its predecessor, including its bargaining rights, was substituted for the CBRT as a party to the collective agreement.
On June 6, 1980, the Board issued a formal decision ordering that the CACAW be the bar gaining agent for the bargaining unit of CN Tele communications employees formerly represented by the CBRT. This is the decision against which this section 28 application is directed.
The applicant attacks the decision of the Board on two grounds: excess of jurisdiction and violation of natural justice. Before considering them, how ever, a preliminary question must be resolved.
Under subsection 28(2) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, a section 28 application "may be made by the Attorney Gener al of Canada or any party directly affected by the decision or order". In order to succeed, therefore, the applicant must be "directly affected" by the decision under attack. Is it so affected?
The decision of the Board substituted the CACAW for the CBRT as the bargaining agent for the unit of the CN Telecommunications employees. The applicant is the certified bargain ing agent of another group of employees, the CP Telecommunications employees. How can it be directly affected by that decision? The applicant answers that question by referring to the partner ship agreement entered into by Canadian National Railway Company and Canadian Pacific Limited, the full effect of which must be appreciated in the light of section 144 of the Code which reads in part as follows:
144. (1) In this section,
"business" means any federal work, undertaking or business and any part thereof;
"sell", in relation to a business, includes the lease, transfer and other disposition of the business.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), where an employer sells his business,
(a) a trade union that is the bargaining agent for the employees employed in the business continues to be their bargaining agent;
(3) Where an employer sells his business, and his employees are intermingled with employees of the employer to whom the business is sold,
(a) the Board may, on application to it by any trade union affected,
(i) determine whether the employees affected constitute one or more units appropriate for collective bargaining,
(ii) determine which trade union shall be the bargaining agent for the employees in each such unit, and
(iii) amend, to the extent the Board considers necessary, any certificate issued to a trade union or the description of a bargaining unit contained in any collective agreement;
When the partnership between Canadian Na tional Railway Company and Canadian Pacific Limited came into being, each one of these compa nies disposed in favour of the other of an undivided part of its telecommunication business and, as a result, the employees of the two companies became intermingled. Any trade union affected by the creation of the partnership could therefore apply to the Board under subsection 144(3) in order to be recognized as the bargaining agent of all the employees of the partnership. The applicant clear ly had that right and so had the CBRT. The Board, in finding that the CACAW had succeeded the CBRT, in effect permitted the CACAW to make, in place of the CBRT, an application to the Board under subsection 144(3). The applicant apparently entertained friendly relations with the CBRT. Moreover, that Union had the support of few employees of the partnership. If the CBRT had continued to be the certified bargaining agent of the CN employees, it would not have threatened the existence of the applicant since, in all likeli hood, it would never have applied to the Board under subsection 144(3). Now that, by virtue of the Board's decision, the CACAW has taken the place of the CBRT, the situation is different since the CACAW enjoys the support of many employees and wishes to eliminate the applicant. Those are, expressed as clearly as I can, the rea sons why the applicant contends to be directly affected by the decision under attack.
While the decision under attack clearly affects the rights and obligations of the CBRT and the CACAW, it affects the applicant in an entirely different manner. More precisely, the applicant is affected in two ways: the decision strengthens the position of the CACAW in the eyes of the employees and gives that Union a status enabling it to initiate proceedings under subsection 144(3) which may, eventually, lead to the applicant's decertification. Can the applicant be said, in those circumstances, to be directly affected? I do not think so. In my opinion, the applicant is only affected indirectly by that decision which merely creates a situation that may, eventually, affect the applicant.
I am therefore of opinion that the applicant does not have the locus standi required to bring a section 28 application. For that reason, I would dismiss the application.
* * *
LALANDE D.J.: I concur.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
LE DAIN J.: I agree that the section 28 applica tion should be dismissed on the ground that the applicant lacks standing.
To have standing to bring a section 28 applica tion a person other than the Attorney General must, in the words of subsection 28(2) of the Federal Court Act, be a "party directly affected by the decision or order" that is attacked. There would appear to be two requirements: the appli cant must be a "party" within the meaning of the subsection and must be one directly affected by the decision.
From the context of subsection 28(2) as a whole (see the words "within ten days of the time the decision or order was first communicated ... to that party by the board, commission or other tribunal") I conclude that the word "party" is used in the technical sense of a party to the proceedings before the tribunal whose decision is attacked. Cf. Administrator under the Anti-Inflation Act v.
Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation, District 34 [1978] 2 F.C. 202, where the Court appears to have assumed this view of the meaning of "party". But in my opinion a broad view should be taken of the word "party" where it can be shown that the applicant was directly affected by the decision. In such a case it must be sufficient that the applicant sought to be a party or, indeed, was a person who should have been offered the opportunity to be a party. For purposes of the present case, therefore, I would assume that the applicant was a party within the meaning of sub section 28(2) by virtue of having sought to inter vene to raise the question of jurisdiction which it invokes in its section 28 application, although the Board refused to grant it intervenor status on the ground that it did not represent employees of Canadian National Railway Company (CN), which was being treated as the employer in the proceedings pending before the Board. This view is not in conflict with the provisions of the Canada Labour Relations Board Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-499 which, in section 2, define "party" as "a person who has filed an application, a reply or an intervention with the Board," and in section 17 provide: "On receipt of an intervention filed pursu ant to section 16, the Board shall, where it is of the opinion that the intervention would be in further ance of the purposes and intent of the Code or its administration, accept the intervention."
The difficulty, as the reasons of my brother Pratte indicate, is to determine whether in the very special circumstances of this case the applicant should be considered to have been directly affected by the decision of the Board on June 6, 1980 which recognized the Canadian Association of Communi cations and Allied Workers (CACAW) as the successor, by virtue of a transfer of jurisdiction among unions within the meaning of section 143 of the Canada Labour Code, of the Canadian Broth erhood of Railway, Transport and General Work ers (CBRT & GW) as bargaining agent for the unit of telecommunications employees covered by the existing collective agreement between CBRT & GW and CN. What this involves in my opinion is a determination whether that decision directly affected an interest which the Court should recog nize as sufficient for standing. The recognition of standing, at least where the interest on which it
rests cannot be clearly defined in terms of legal right or obligation, is a matter of judicial discre tion: Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; The Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265; Thio, Locus Standi and Judicial Review, 1971, pages 236-238; Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 1978 Supplement, page 169.
It is clear that the decision did not affect the legal rights of the applicant as a bargaining agent, whether the employees whom it represented at the time of the decision be regarded as the employees of Canadian Pacific Limited (CP) or as the employees of the CN-CP telecommunications partnership which took effect as of January 1, 1980. In so far as the status of these employees may be relevant to the question of standing, I am of the view that the meaning to be given to clauses 12 and 13 of the partnership agreement, which was signed on March 13, 1980, is that while the employees engaged in the operations of the part nership would from January 1, 1980 be under the direction of the management of the partnership, they would continue until January 1, 1981 to be considered to be the employees of CN or CP, as the case may be, which were to be responsible for such matters as payroll and employee benefits (subject to reimbursement by the partnership), and to have "full control over the terms of employ ment and hiring and firing of such employees." Clause 13 clearly provides that it is as of January 1, 1981 that the employees of the parties engaged in the operations of the partnership are to be employees of the partnership. The Board's decision did not create or affect any right to represent the employees of the CN-CP telecommunications partnership as such. It did not recognize a new bargaining unit consisting of such employees. It simply substituted CACAW for CBRT & GW as bargaining agent for the unit of employees in the Telecommunications Department of CN covered by the existing collective agreement between CBRT & GW and CN.
The interest which the applicant asserts in the present case as the basis of standing may be described as the maintenance of an existing com petitive relationship because of its implications for subsequent successor proceedings, pursuant to sec tion 144 of the Code, to determine the right to represent employees of the CN-CP telecommuni cations partnership. That interest was described in the applicant's intervention, or application to inter vene, in the proceedings before the Board as follows:
The intervenor is concerned that the proceedings currently under way may be used as a stepping stone to invoke the provisions of subsection 144(3) of the Canada Labour Code so as to deprive the intervenor and the employees it represents of their rights and privileges pursuant to existing collective agree ments. Therefore, it has a legitimate interest in ensuring that certification is not issued to an unstable organization which has not complied with the requirements of the Code and does not truly represent employees for which it seeks to obtain bargain ing rights or that the representation vote conducted by the Board is not otherwise vitiated by other irregularities.
What was involved was more concretely and vividly reflected in the following passage from the minutes of a meeting of the Canadian Telecom munications Division of CBRT & GW ("the Divi sion") held on September 25, 1979:
The C.B.R.T. & G.W. have made it plain that when the two Companies merge, which is presently scheduled for January 1st 1980, the C.B.R.T. & G.W. will not apply to be declared the "Successor Union", and furthermore, they will not interfere if the C.P. Union, (United Telegraph Workers), makes an application for successor rights. We would therefore be in great danger of being absorbed by the C.P. Union, even though our members outnumber theirs two to one.
The applicant had an interest in the mainte nance of that situation, and the injury to that interest caused by the Board's decision was that it substituted a union 'which may be presumed to have intended to seek successor rights under sec tion 144 of the Code for one that presumably did not.
It has been suggested that the courts should be more ready to recognize an adverse effect on a competitive position as sufficient for standing, par ticularly in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp
397 U.S. 150: Evans, Janisch, Mullan and Risk, Administrative Law Cases, Text, and Materials, 1980, page 906. But the courts must consider whether the particular competitive position or advantage is entitled to protection. The recognition and maintenance of the competitive position or advantage of the applicant in the present case would involve the denial of the right of the employees in the Division to continuity of willing and effective representation pending determination of the right to represent employees of the CN-CP telecommunications partnership, as such. That cannot in my opinion be an interest the protection of which is contemplated by the Code, and should not, therefore, be regarded as sufficient for stand ing to challenge the Board's decision to recognize CACAW as the successor of CBRT & GW within the meaning of section 143.
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