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T-6270-79
Burrard-Yarrows Corporation (Plaintiff) v.
The Hoegh Merchant, Leif Hoegh & Co. A/S (Defendants)
Trial Division, Collier J.—Vancouver, March 2 and 24, 1981.
Practice — Motion to stay plaintiff's action for damages re cargo — Bill of lading provided that courts of country where carrier had its principal place of business had jurisdiction over disputes — Carrier is registered in Norway — Defendants undertake to agree to extension of time for filing of suit in Norway and agree that guarantee will apply to the proceedings in Norway — Motion allowed — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 50(1)(b).
MOTION. COUNSEL:
D. F. McEwen for plaintiff. W. Perrett for defendants.
SOLICITORS:
Ray, Wolfe, Connell, Lightbody & Reynolds, Vancouver, for plaintiff.
Macrae, Montgomery & Cunningham, Van- couver, for defendants.
The following are the reasons for order ren dered in English by
COLLIER J.: This is a motion on behalf of the defendants to stay the plaintiff's action.
The plaintiff was the owner, and consignee under a bill of lading, of two marine diesel engines and 27 cases of related parts. The engines were manufactured in West Germany. The bill of lading was issued at Hamburg on November 18, 1979, acknowledging that the goods had been shipped on board at Bremen. The engines were to be shipped to the plaintiff consignee in Vancouver. During the voyage the two diesel engines, during heavy weather, broke loose from their fastenings. They were very badly damaged. The damage was inspected by representatives of various interests at San Francisco and Vancouver. They were ulti mately sold on an "as is where is" basis.
The claim for damages is substantial. Clause 26 of the bill of lading is as follows:
26. Law and Jurisdiction: Any claim or dispute arising under this Bill of Lading shall be determined by the Courts of the country where the Carrier has its principal place of business and according to the laws of that country except as provided elsewhere herein.
The carrying vessel is registered at Oslo, Norway. She was owned at all material times by the defendant company. That company was incor porated under the laws of Norway and has its principal place of business in Oslo.
The plaintiff commenced its action in this Court on December 21, 1979. The vessel was threatened with arrest. A letter of guarantee was given to the plaintiff by the defendants' Protection and Indem nity Club [hereinafter referred to as the Club or the P & I Club]. The Club undertook to pay any judgment up to $3,500,000, and to furnish bail in that amount if demanded.
The defendants rely on the jurisdiction clause earlier set out. The defendants say they propose to call a number of witnesses from Norway and West Germany to establish the various defences alleged in the defence, as well as to contest the extent of the damage. The defendants say, on those grounds, the plaintiff should be held to its bargain as to jurisdiction; this action should be stayed. The plaintiff should bring its action in the courts in Norway.
The defendants have agreed that should this action be stayed and action be brought by the plaintiff in Norway, the undertaking by the defendants' P & I Club will apply to the proceed ings in Norway. The defendants have also under taken to agree to an extension of time for the filing of suit by the plaintiff in Norway.
Affidavit evidence was put forward by the plain tiff, indicating the witnesses it proposed to call from this jurisdiction and from California.
A lengthy argument ensued. There was a dif ference of view as to the onus, in Canada, in respect of an application of this kind. A good deal of time was spent in establishing the probable number of witnesses necessary for each side.
The plaintiff endeavoured to show that, on that kind of a count, the logical forum was in this jurisdiction. I do not think a mathematical count is conclusive. It is merely one of many factors to be considered whether the Court, in its discretion, will order a stay or permit the present proceedings to continue.
In my opinion the applicable principles to be applied in a motion of this kind are those set out by Brandon J. in The ' Eleftheria" [ 1969] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 237 at page 242:
The principles established by the authorities can, I think, be summarized as follows: (I) Where plaintiffs sue in England in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign Court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the English Court, assum ing the claim to be otherwise within the jurisdiction, is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not. (2) The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing so is shown. (3) The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiffs. (4) In exercising its discretion the Court should take into account all the circum stances of the particular case. (5) In particular, but without prejudice to (4), the following matters, where they arise, may be properly regarded: (a) In what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between the English and foreign Courts. (b) Whether the law of the foreign Court applies and, if so, whether it differs from English law in any material respects. (c) With what country either party is connected, and how closely. (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages. (e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign Court because they would (i) be deprived of security for that claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a time-bar not applicable in England; or (iv) for political, racial, religious or other reasons be unlikely to get a fair trial.
After considering the affidavit evidence filed on behalf of the parties, the jurisprudence cited, and the submissions made, I have concluded it is in the
interest of justice', as well as on a balance of convenience, that this action should be stayed.
There will, therefore, be an order staying the present action. There will be a proviso that the defendants furnish the undertaking as to security in Norway, and agree to the extension of any time limits.
UPON MOTION dated the 17th day of Septem- ber, 1980 on behalf of the defendants for an order that the plaintiff's action be stayed,
ORDER
UPON
(a) the defendants, or their Protection and Indemnity Club undertaking that the letter of guarantee dated January 17, 1980 by Assur- anceforeningen Skuld (Gjensidig) shall extend to and cover the defendants' liability in respect of any judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the defendants in the courts of Norway;
(b) the defendants agreeing to extend the time within which the plaintiff may bring suit against them in the courts of Norway;
all further proceedings in the present action are stayed.
2. The costs of this motion are in the cause.
' See paragraph 50(1)(b) of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10.
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