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A-872-80
Attorney General of Canada (Applicant)
v.
Dennis Abrahams (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Thurlow C.J. and Hyde and Culliton D.JJ.—Toronto, May 25 and 29, 1981.
Judicial review — Unemployment insurance — Work stop page — Application to review and set aside Umpire's decision entitling respondent to benefit — Respondent lost his employ ment by reason of a labour dispute — He subsequently obtained other employment, but left after six months — Umpire held that respondent was "regularly engaged in some other occupation" — Umpire applied a new and different interpretation to the word "regularly" — Whether Umpire erred — Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71- 72, c. 48, s. 44(1) — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
This is an application to review and set aside the decision of an Umpire entitling the respondent to unemployment insurance benefit. The respondent, who lost his employment by reason of a labour dispute, subsequently found other employment, but left after six months for personal reasons. The respondent had, at all times, every intention of returning to his former employ ment once the labour dispute was settled. The Umpire, revers ing the decision of a Board of Referees, held that the respond ent was "regularly engaged in some other occupation" pursuant to section 44(1)(c) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971. In so doing, the Umpire dismissed the claimant's intention to return to his former employment and held that when the facts do not suggest a casual employment and when the claimant pursues his secondary employment day in and day out for a period of time, then the claimant holds regular employment for the time it endures. The issue is whether the Umpire erred.
Held, the application is allowed. As section 44(1)(c) of the Act has been interpreted by the Umpires with consistency in dealing with many cases over a long period of time, during which there have been many opportunities, both when the statute was being amended and when it was revised in 1971, for Parliament to correct the interpretation so put upon the provi sion, if the interpretation was not what had been intended, it would be wrong at this stage to adopt a new and different interpretation. Thus casual, temporary or stop-gap employment undertaken by a claimant for the mere purpose of riding out the period of a labour dispute does not fall within the meaning of section 44(1)(c) of the Act.
APPLICATION for judicial review. COUNSEL:
Paul Plourde for applicant. Brian Shell for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for applicant.
Brian Shell, % United Steelworkers of America, Toronto, for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment delivered orally in English by
THURLOW C.J.: This is an application under section 28 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, to review and set aside a decision of the Honourable J. L. Dubinsky as an Umpire under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48.
The decision reversed a majority decision of a Board of Referees which had held the respondent- claimant disentitled by subsection 44(1) of the Act to unemployment insurance benefit. The subsec tion provides:
44. (1) A claimant who has lost his employment by reason of a stoppage of work attributable to a labour dispute at the factory, workshop or other premises at which he was employed is not entitled to receive benefit until
(a) the termination of the stoppage of work,
(b) he becomes bona fide employed elsewhere in the occupa tion that he usually follows, or
(c) he has become regularly engaged in some other
occupation,
whichever event first occurs.
The claimant, who had been employed as a driller by International Nickel Company of Canada Ltd. for some eight years, was one of a large number of persons who lost their employ ment by reason of a labour dispute. Some three weeks after the loss of his employment, the claim ant obtained employment as a porter at a hospital where he worked three days a week. While so employed, he attended university two days a week. The employment continued for six months when, for personal reasons, the claimant left the job. At that time the labour dispute was still in progress. At all material times, the claimant had every intention of returning to his employment with International Nickel Company of Canada once the labour dispute was settled.
In holding the claimant disentitled to unemploy ment insurance benefit, the majority of the Board of Referees had directed its attention to paragraph 44(1)(b) and had found that the claimant had not been bona fide engaged in the same occupation but it had not discussed paragraph 44(1)(c). The dis senting member had found that the claimant had been "regularly engaged in some other occupa tion" within the meaning of that paragraph.
The learned Umpire reached the same conclu sion but did so after applying an interpretation of the paragraph which was new and which differed from the interpretation placed on it by previous decisions of the Umpires, including decisions of Addy J., in the case of Lavallée, CUB 4404, and of Cattanach J., in the case of Desrochers, CUB 4750, which the learned Umpire declined to follow.
As far back as 1949, it had been held by Mr. Justice Savard that jobs that did not give a prom ise of lasting employment but were mere tempo rary substitutes which did not intervene in the chain of causality between the claimants' unem ployment and the stoppage of work due to a labour dispute would not satisfy paragraph 44(1)(c).
Jurisprudence developed subsequently by other Umpires, including Cameron J., Kearney J., Cat- tanach J., and Addy J., had established the impor tance of the claimant's intention to return to his former employment when the labour dispute ended as a fact to be taken into consideration in deter mining whether periods of employment of varying duration engaged in by claimants pending or during the continuance of a labour dispute should be regarded as satisfying the requirement of "regularly engaged in some other occupation" in paragraph 44(1)(c).
Cameron J., in CUB 1247, had said:
The expression "regularly engaged" is not defined in the Act, and I do not consider it advisable or proper to lay down a hard and fast rule. Whatever is its meaning, however, it apparently purports to mean something beyond the taking of temporary employment until the stoppage of work is finished. In other
words, it involves an engagement beyond that found in a stop gap employment.
Kearney J., in CUB 2263, had said:
Now, in interpreting the word "regularly", according to the jurisprudence established by the Umpire, less importance must be given to the duration of the occupation than to the claim ant's intention when he became engaged in that occupation; it cannot be said that he became "regularly" engaged if he accepted employment with the intention of leaving it to resume his former usual occupation at the termination of the labour dispute and the stoppage of work.
Cattanach J., in CUB 4750, had said:
On the other hand a claimant is entitled to receive benefit when under paragraph (c) of section 44(1) he becomes regular ly engaged in some other occupation. That clearly means that the claimant must have abandoned his former occupation and adopted another.
To be eligible under paragraph (b) he must be employed in the occupation he usually follows, that is the same occupation, but under paragraph (c) he must be engaged in some other occupation. The introduction of the word "other" therefore presupposes a different occupation from which he usually fol lows and an abandonment of his former occupation ....
Addy J., in CUB 4404, had said:
One cannot reasonably conclude that the claimant "became regularly engaged in some other occupation" (section 44(1)(c) of the Act) since he intended to hold that job only for the duration of the dispute. He remained interested in the outcome of the dispute and certainly did not consider his new job regular in the same way as a claimant who decides to leave his usual occupation for a career elsewhere. The word "regularly" implies that the employee has given up his former job and not simply accepted a temporary one that he intends to leave as soon as he is able to return to his former employment.
Other Umpires, including Gibson J., Walsh J., and Marceau J., had followed the same principles.
The interpretation of paragraph 44(1)(c) adopt ed by the learned Umpire in the present case was based on dictionary meanings of "regularly", on an English decision holding that a person who occupied a position for five years while replacing an incumbent who was absent on war service was "regularly employed" within the meaning of The Poor Law Officers' Superannuation Act and on the principle of construction that the grammatical and ordinary sense of words in written instruments is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument.
The learned Umpire concluded that:
... where the facts pertaining to the secondary employment— as in the case at Bar—do not give rise to the slightest sugges tion that the employment was to have been only of temporary duration or as Farwell, J., put it, "casual" and the claimant in question had pursued his secondary employment day in and day out for a period of time, then even if that employment came to an end shortly after he had begun, it was in my view, regular employment for the time that it endured.
It will be observed that in this interpretation the word "regularly" is given a meaning approximate ly equivalent to "repetitiously" or "continuously" and not temporary, in the sense that the employ ment was available for an indefinite time, and that no effect is given to its casual or temporary char acter, if present, from the point of view of the intent of the claimant as to the period in which he intended or proposed or expected to be engaged in the new occupation. While this interpretation has the attraction of posing a somewhat more objective test, it seems to me that in the context in which the word "regularly" is found it connotes something more than mere repetitiveness or continuity or the probability of the employment being available more or less permanently and that an interpreta tion is to be preferred in which the expression "regularly engaged in some other occupation" is applied as a whole to the facts of a situation for the purpose of determining whether the claimant is in truth regularly engaged in a new and different occupation or is merely engaging in casual, tempo rary or stop-gap employment for the purpose of riding out the period of his unemployment result ing from the labour dispute.
In this interpretation, the intention of the claim ant assumes importance as is apparent from the decision of Walsh J., in CUB 4312 where, though the employment in question was for but five days with the prospect of some further weeks of work later on, the Umpire was satisfied that the claim ant did not intend to go back to his former job at the end of the labour dispute.
Apart from this view, however, I am of the opinion that as the paragraph has been interpreted by the Umpires with consistency in dealing with many cases over a long period of time, during which there have been many opportunities, both when the statute was being amended and when it was revised in 1971, for Parliament to correct the interpretation so put upon the provision, if the
interpretation was not what had been intended, it would be wrong at this stage to adopt a new and different interpretation.
Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the deci sion should be set aside and that the matter should be referred back to the Umpire for determination on the basis that casual, temporary or stop-gap employment undertaken by a claimant for the mere purpose of riding out the period of a labour dispute is not within the meaning of "regularly engaged in some other occupation" in paragraph 44(1)(c) of the Act.
I would make the same disposition of the application in A-834-80, Attorney General of Canada v. Zayack, which was heard at the same time.
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HYDE D. J. concurred.
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CULLITON D. J. concurred.
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