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A-553-80
Canadian National Railway Company (Appellant) v.
Canadian Transport Commission and British Columbia Forest Products Ltd. (Respondents)
Court of Appeal, Urie and Ryan JJ. and MacKay D.J.—Toronto, March 18; Ottawa, March 24, 1981.
Transportation — Appeal from Railway Transport Com mittee's order for disclosure to British Columbia Forest Prod ucts Ltd. of costs and revenues information filed by appellant with an application to abandon a branch line — Whether the Committee's decision is appealable under s. 64(2) of National Transportation Act — Whether s. 329(3) of the Railway Act precludes the attacking at a public hearing of a finding concerning actual loss — Whether s. 253(4) of the Railway Act limits the general discretion of the Commission under s. 331 to permit publication of information concerning the costs of a railway if it is in the public interest — Appeal dismissed — National Transportation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17, as amend ed, ss. 45, 64(2) — Railway Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-2, ss. 253(2),(3),(4), 254(1),(3), 329(3), 331.
Appeal from a decision of the Railway Transport Committee pursuant to leave that was granted subject to the determination of the appealability of the decision. The Committee ordered disclosure to British Columbia Forest Products Ltd. of costs and revenues information filed with an application for the abandonment of a branch line if it could show that certain data were relevant and essential to their case, and the appellant was unable to demonstrate any actual and substantial harm. Sub section 64(2) of the National Transportation Act gives a right of appeal on a question of law or jurisdiction upon leave therefor having been obtained within one month after the making of the order, decision, rule or regulation sought to be appealed from. Sections 253 and 254 of the Railway Act require the railway to submit a statement of costs and revenues of the railway attributable to the line sought to be abandoned. Section 331 of the Railway Act prohibits the publication of confidential information unless in the opinion of the Commis sion such publication is necessary in the public interest. Subsec tion 329(3) of the Railway Act provides that any determination of costs by the Commission is final and binding upon all parties. The issues are whether the Committee's decision is appealable under subsection 64(2) of the National Transporta tion Act; whether the finding concerning actual loss by the Commission pursuant to subsection 253(4) of the Railway Act cannot be attacked at a public hearing by virtue of subsection 329(3); and, whether the requirement in subsection 253(4) that the Commission shall give notice of the principal conclusions concerning actual loss, limits the general discretion given to the
Commission by section 331 to permit publication of informa tion concerning the costs of a railway company.
Held, the appeal is dismissed. The ruling made is a "deci- sion" of the kind contemplated by subsection 64(2) of the National Transportation Act because it is one made within the jurisdiction of the Commission as provided by section 331 of the Railway Act, notwithstanding that as yet no one has been ordered to do anything nor has anything been done pursuant to the ruling. As to the second issue, subsection 329(3) affirms that the Commission's cost determination is final but that fact does not affect the discretion reposed in the Commission to decide what, if any, public participation there may be in making that determination. As to the third issue, subsection 253(4) establishes the minimum amount of information which the Commission is required to publish with respect to its report. Such minimum requirement in no way limits the overriding discretion provided to the Commission for more extensive publi cation if in its opinion it is in the public interest to do so. Since the formulation of an opinion is involved, the Court would not substitute its opinion for that of the Commission.
Attorney General of Canada v. Cylien [1973] F.C. 1166, referred to. In re Anti-dumping Act and in re Danmor Shoe Co. Ltd. [1974] 1 F.C. 22, referred to. British Columbia Packers Ltd. v. Canada Labour Relations Board [1973] F.C. 1194, referred to.
APPEAL. COUNSEL:
S. Cantin and F. C. Hume for appellant.
G. W. Nadeau, Q.C. for respondent Canadian Transport Commission.
J. E. Foran and M. M. Monnin for respond
ent British Columbia Forest Products Ltd.
SOLICITORS:
Law Department of Canadian National Rail way, Montreal, for appellant.
G. W. Nadeau, Q.C., Ottawa, for respondent Canadian Transport Commission.
Aikins, MacAulay & Thorvaldson, Win- nipeg, for respondent British Columbia Forest Products Ltd.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
URIE J.: This is an appeal from a decision of the Railway Transport Committee (hereinafter called the Committee) of the Canadian Transport Com mission (hereinafter called the Commission) pur suant to leave granted by the Court. The order granting leave, inter alia, reserved to the Court hearing the appeal "any question as to the timeli ness of the application [for leave to appeal, pre sumably] and as to whether the said decision is one that may be appealed under subsection 64(2) ..." of the National Transportation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17, as amended.
At the outset of the appeal argument was heard from counsel for each of the parties and for the Canadian Transport Commission, on the question as to whether the decision appealed from is appeal- able under subsection 64(2). That subsection per mits an appeal to this Court on a question of law, or a question of jurisdiction upon leave therefor having been obtained within one month after the making of the order, decision, rule or regulation sought to be appealed from. In this case leave to appeal having been already granted it is necessary for the Court to decide only whether the decision appealed from is one which is appealable. If it is, then the question of the timeliness of the applica tion for leave is to be considered.
It was respondent, British Columbia Forest Products Ltd.'s submission that, by analogy to the line of judgments of this Court in section 28 judicial review applications, commencing with the judgment Attorney General of Canada v. Cylien,' the decision made by the Commission in this case was merely a ruling made as to the manner in which the public hearing was to proceed and was not a decision on the ultimate question which the Commission is empowered to decide, namely, whether the application of the appellant for a branch line abandonment ought to be granted. In other words, it merely exercised its incidental jurisdiction in the conduct of the application before it. It thus was not a final decision of the
' [1973] F.C. 1166. See also: In re Anti-dumping Act and in re Danmor Shoe Co. Ltd. [1974] 1 F.C. 22; British Columbia Packers Ltd. v. Canada Labour Relations Board [1973] F.C. 1194.
Tribunal appealable to this Court.
I do not think it necessary in this case to decide whether the reasoning in the judicial review cases is applicable in deciding whether the decision, in respect of which leave to appeal is sought under subsection 64(2) of the Act, is one which is appeal- able. Rather I think it is necessary to ascertain whether in the Railway Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-2, there is statutory authority for the Commission to make the kind of decision that it made in this case. The decision must, thus, be examined.
Very briefly the facts are these. The appellant, pursuant to sections 253 to 258 of the Railway Act, applied to abandon its operations over a cer tain branch line in British Columbia. Subsections 253(2),(3) and (4) and subsections 254(1) and (3) set out the manner in which the Railway Trans port Committee of the Commission is to consider abandonment applications. Those sections read as follows:
253... .
(2) If a company desires to abandon the operation of a branch line, the company shall file an application to abandon the operation of that line with the Commission in accordance with any rules that may have been made by the Commission pursuant to subsection (1); and the Commission shall cause such public notice of the application to be given in the area served by the branch line as the Commission deems reasonable.
(3) Concurrently with the filing of its application to abandon the operation of a branch line the company shall also submit to the Commission a statement of the costs and revenues of the company attributable to the line in each of such number of consecutive financial years of the company as the Commission may prescribe (hereinafter in this section and section 254 referred to as the "prescribed accounting years"); and the company shall forthwith thereafter, in each station on the line in accordance with any regulation of the Commission in that behalf, post a notice of the application to abandon the operation of the line.
(4) If the Commission is satisfied that the application to abandon the operation of a branch line has been filed in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission, the Commission shall, after investigation, and whether or not it has afforded the company an opportunity to make further submissions, review the statement of costs and revenues referred to in subsection (3), together with all other documents, facts and figures that in its opinion are relevant, and shall prepare a report setting out the amounts, if any, that in its opinion constitute the actual loss of the branch line in each of the prescribed accounting years, and the Commission shall cause such public notice of the principal conclusions of the report to be given in the area served by the branch line as the Commission deems reasonable.
254. (1) If the Commission finds that in its opinion the company, in the operation of the branch line with respect to which an application for the abandonment of its operation was made, has incurred actual loss in one or more of the prescribed accounting years including the last year thereof, the Commis sion shall, after such hearings, if any, as are required in its opinion to enable all persons who wish to do so to present their views on the abandonment of the branch line and having regard to all matters that to it appear relevant, determine whether the branch line is uneconomic and is likely to continue to be uneconomic and whether the line should be abandoned; but if the Commission finds that in its opinion the company has incurred no actual loss in the operation of such line in the last year of the prescribed accounting years, it shall reject the application for the abandonment of the operation of the line without prejudice to any application that may subsequently be made for abandonment of the operation of that line.
(3) In determining whether an uneconomic branch line or any segment thereof should be abandoned, the Commission shall consider all matters that in its opinion are relevant to the public interest including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
(a) the actual losses that are incurred in the operation of the branch line;
It will thus be seen that, concurrently with the filing of its application for abandonment, the rail way must also submit to the Commission a state ment of the costs and revenues of the company attributable to the line for the prescribed account ing years. The respondent, British Columbia Forest Products Ltd., a principal user of the line, sought both from the appellant, and from the Committee by means of an application made pur suant to section 45 of the National Transportation Act, information as to the costs and revenues of the appellant in more detail than that set forth in the principal conclusions of the Commission required to be published in accordance with sub section 253(4) of the Railway Act. The appellant contended that the determination of actual loss was for the Commission to decide and the costs and revenues figures provided by it to the Commis sion for such a determination were confidential and were matters to be discussed solely between the railway and the Commission.
After an oral hearing on November 5, 1979, the Commission ruled that:
... the matter of costs and revenues can and should be gone into at the forthcoming hearing, and, in view of that, that BCFP was entitled to some disclosure of costs information. To determine what information should be disclosed would require hearing arguments regarding each item with reference to
balancing the relevancy and essentiality of the information requested with any harm that may result from its disclosure.
The Commission subsequently issued written reasons for its ruling the operative portion of which reads as follows:
In summary, the question of revenues and costs is not a futile or idle one in the context of this abandonment application. It is an important part of the issues to be debated at the public hearing. As such, if BCFP, who is unquestionably an interested party in this matter, can show that certain data is relevant and essential to their case, and C.N. is unable to demonstrate any actual and substantial harm that will result from its disclosure, the Committee will order disclosure of that data.
At the request of the parties, we have not considered the specifics of which data should be disclosed, but rather, have confined our remarks to the general principles that govern disclosure in this case. If the parties cannot agree on the specifics, we will hear argument and decide on the disclosure of specific data.
A careful reading of its reasons clearly indicates that the Commission took as its authority for making its carefully circumscribed ruling, the provisions of section 331 of the Railway Act read ing as follows:
331. Where information concerning the costs of a railway company or other information that is by its nature confidential is obtained from the company by the Commission in the course of any investigation under this Act, such information shall not be published or revealed in such a manner as to be available for the use of any other person, unless in the opinion of the Commission such publication is necessary in the public interest. [Emphasis mine.]
While I am not unmindful of the fact that subsection 64(2) of the National Transportation Act gives a right of appeal after obtaining leave only from orders, decisions, rules and regulations, I am satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case, the ruling made is a "decision" of the kind contemplated by that section because it is one made within the jurisdiction of the Commission as provided by section 331 of the Railway Act. I say this notwithstanding the fact that as yet no one has been ordered to do anything nor has anything been done, apparently, pursuant to the ruling. I have formed my opinion on the basis that section 331 gave to the Commission the jurisdiction to make the ruling it made. As such it is an appealable decision under subsection 64(2) of the National Transportation Act. Thus since leave has already
been given, subject to a determination of the appealability of the decision, the appeal can pro ceed to be heard on its merits.
This is not to say that the Court in another case might decide that leave to appeal ought not to be granted notwithstanding that the decision sought to be appealed is an appealable one. In any given case it is for a Judge of the Court to decide whether leave should be granted or refused.
In so far as the timeliness of the application for leave to appeal is concerned, since the delay in filing the application was apparently occasioned by the appellant seeking a review of the decision of the Commission by the Review Committee, as was its right, and since the appeal raises a fairly arguable ground, time should be extended, if necessary nunc pro tunc.
I turn now to the merits of the appeal. The argument of the appellant, as I understood it, is as follows. Subsection 253(4) of the Railway Act, supra, imposes inter alia, a duty on the Commis sion to prepare a report setting out the amounts, if any, that in its opinion constitute the actual loss of the branch line in each of the prescribed account ing years. The principal conclusions of the report shall be the subject of public notice in the area served by the branch line. It was said that the actual loss finding must be made prior to proceed ing further in the determination of whether the branch line is uneconomic, is likely to be uneco nomic and should be abandoned in accordance with the requirements of subsection 254(1), supra. In counsel's submission, the finding of actual loss is a condition precedent to the holding of a public hearing and that finding cannot be attacked at such a hearing. This, it was said, is a determina tion of costs by the Commission and, by virtue of subsection 329(3), is final and binding upon all the parties interested or affected thereby. 2 In his view all that interested persons can do at a public hearing is "to present their views on the abandon
2 329 .
(3) Any determination of costs by the Commission for any of the purposes of this Act is final and binding upon all parties interested or affected thereby.
Ment". That does not, he said, include the right to express their views on whether the line is or is likely to be uneconomic that matter having been disposed of by the Commission in its determination of the condition precedent in respect of actual loss.
I do not so view sections 253 and 254. Subsec tion 254(1) provides that, at an abandonment hearing:
all ... persons ... [may] ... present their views on the aban donment of the branch line ....
Those words do not limit the scope of their presen tations. The Commission so found in its reasons in the following passage:
Clearly, by the provisions of s. 254(1), all interested parties are entitled to present their views on whether the branch line is uneconomic. The matter of actual loss and the extent of such loss has to be an important element in the uneconomic test. It is also pursuant to s. 254(3) a matter that the Committee must consider in determining whether a branch line should be aban doned. It is thus more than simply a prerequisite to be met in order to go on to the next step in the abandonment process. It is a matter of continuing importance throughout the abandon ment application process.
We find nothing in either s. 253 or s. 254 that would limit the Commission to receiving submissions only from the railway with regard to actual loss. There must be an actual loss in at least one of the prescribed accounting years before the Com mittee can consider authorizing abandonment. However, the matter of actual loss remains an important factor in determin ing first whether the line is uneconomic and likely to continue to be uneconomic and secondly, whether the line should be abandoned. As such, it may be the subject of comments and submissions from other parties.
I agree with this interpretation of the subsec tions in question and cannot usefully add anything to it. Moreover, in my opinion, subsection 329(3) does not in any way affect the interpretation. That subsection affirms that the Commission's cost determination is final but that fact does not affect the discretion reposed in the Commission to decide what, if any, public participation there may be in making that determination.
Appellant's counsel next argued that the con cluding words of subsection 253(4), viz, "... and the Commission shall cause such public notice of the principal conclusions of the report to be given
in the area served by the branch line as the Commission deems reasonable" have the effect of limiting the general discretion given to the Com mission by section 331 to permit publication of information concerning the costs of a railway com pany if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The short answer to that conten tion is, it seems to me, that the concluding words of subsection 253(4) establish the minimum amount of information which the Commission is required to publish with respect to its report. Such minimum requirement in no way limits the over riding discretion provided to the Commission for more extensive publication if in its opinion it is in the public interest to do so. In that connection it should be observed that since the formulation of an opinion is involved, this Court would not substitute its opinion for that of the Commission, nor has it been asked to do so in this appeal.
Accordingly for the foregoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal and certify to the Commission that in the opinion of the Court the Railway Transport Committee did not err in its ruling dated February 4, 1980 herein appealed.
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RYAN J.: I concur.
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MACKAY D.J.: I concur.
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