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T-3794-78
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company and 3M Canada Limited-3M Canada Limitée (Plaintiffs)
v.
Lorcon Inc. (Defendant)
Trial Division, Walsh J.—Montreal, June 20; Ottawa, June 23, 1983.
Practice — Stay of proceedings — Motion to stay or dismiss patent-infringement action for excessive, prejudicial delay in prosecuting — Action commenced in August 1978; motion brought in May 1983 — Plaintiff suing other persons in U.S. — Principal defence witness R incapacitated — Implicated division of defendant company sold — Circum stances unusual in that plaintiffs wish to proceed — Each case turns on facts — Defendant's non-agreement to protective order regarding witnesses during U.S. litigation partly respon sible for delay — Dismissal of U.S. claim not necessarily implying similar result herein — Plaintiffs' change of lawyers not excusing delay but time required to familiarize with file — Defendant content to leave matter dormant until plaintiffs indicated intention to proceed — Defendant prejudiced some what if R cannot testify — His recollection probably no better if case tried earlier — Plaintiffs not seeking to capitalize on R's deteriorating condition — Plaintiffs offering to provide R's evidence before Restrictive Trade Practices Commission and video tape of U.S testimony — Monopoly allegation not stressed by defendant — Defendant aware of proceedings when division sold so would have obtained potential evidence in advance — Motion dismissed on plaintiffs' undertaking to provide transcripts and video tapes if, for medical reasons, R unable to give viva voce or commission evidence — Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, RR. 419(1)(40, 440, 447 — Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
Patents — Practice — Motion to stay or dismiss infringe ment action for excessive, prejudicial delay in prosecuting — Plaintiffs wanting to proceed — Principal defence witness R incapacitated — Implicated division of defendant company sold — Defendant not agreeing to protective order regarding witnesses during plaintiffs U.S. litigation — Motion dis missed on plaintiffs' undertaking to provide transcripts and video tapes of evidence given by R in other proceedings if
necessary — Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, RR. 419(1)(d),(/), 440.
The defendant applied under Rule 419(1)(d) and (f) and Rule 440, for an order staying or dismissing the plaintiffs' patent-infringement action, on the ground that excessive delay in proceeding had prejudiced the defence.
The action, which initially involved two patents, was com menced on August 22, 1978. At first the matter proceeded normally. The first-named plaintiff was conducting other litiga tion (against other defendants) in the United States, and that other litigation gave rise to discussions between counsel herein, regarding the need for a protective order with respect to witnesses to be examined in Canada. The discussions, including correspondence, extended from approximately the middle of June, 1979, to the end of February, 1980. At that point the plaintiffs' counsel sent his opposite number a letter requesting a reply. Apparently none was forthcoming. In the autumn of 1980 and spring of 1981, the plaintiffs' lawyers worked at preparing a list of documents pursuant to Rule 447, and made trips to Minnesota for this purpose. The American lawsuit was tried in March and April, 1981 and dismissed by a judgment rendered in November. In the spring of 1982, the plaintiffs nonetheless decided to continue this Canadian litigation; how ever, in June, 1982, the counsel in charge of their case left the firm and the file was transferred to another lawyer. A decision was made in January, 1983 not to proceed further with the claim relating to one of the two patents, but in February the plaintiffs advised counsel for the defendant of their intention to resume the prosecution of the remaining claim.
During the period in which the foregoing events were unfold ing, two other notable developments occurred. The first was the incapacitation of one A. F. Ratzer, who was to be a principal witness for the defendant. Ratzer's evidence had, in large measure, served as the basis for the dismissal of the American action. He had also appeared before the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission ("RTPC"), where he gave testimony relevant to an allegation contained in the defendant's counter claim: namely, that the plaintiffs had attempted to further an illegal monopoly by causing certain substances to be withheld from the defendant. Ratzer suffered a stroke in the summer of 1979, and another in August, 1982. By the time of the hearing of this motion, his health was such that it was unlikely he would be able to travel to Canada to testify, or even to give evidence by means of rogatory commission. Furthermore, he had been taking a painkiller which adversely affected his memory.
The second important circumstance occurred in December, 1982, when the division of the defendant company involved in the alleged patent infringement was sold. Because of this
change, the defendant maintained, there was now a possibility that it would encounter some difficulty in obtaining documents or other evidence necessary for its case.
This motion was brought on May 11, 1983. Held, the motion is dismissed.
The circumstances giving rise to this application are out of the ordinary. In the more usual case, a motion of this kind is brought either because the plaintiff has indicated no intention of proceeding and the defendant moves to have the action dismissed, or because the defendant wants to force the plaintiff to take some steps to advance the action. Here, though, the plaintiffs do wish to proceed, but the defendant seeks to terminate the action on the ground that they have delayed too long in advancing the case to trial.
Each such case must turn upon its particular facts. While the justification for delay offered by the plaintiffs is not as strong as it might be, some of the responsibility for that delay may be ascribed to the defendant itself, since it was the party which failed to agree to a protective order that would have applied while the American litigation was ongoing. The dismissal of the plaintiffs claim in that other action does not necessarily imply a similar result for the case at bar. The change of lawyers experienced by the plaintiffs cannot itself afford an excuse for delay; yet, in complex patent litigation such as this, a lawyer who takes over a case in progress from a colleague would undoubtedly have to spend some time familiarizing himself with the file before proceeding with the action. It should also be noted that the defendant did not move for a dismissal of the action at an earlier date. Instead, it was quite content to let the matter remain dormant, and brought the present application only when the plaintiffs indicated their intention to proceed.
It is reasonable to conclude that the defendant will indeed suffer some prejudice if Mr. Ratzer is unable to give either viva voce or commission evidence. On the other hand, it is unlikely that his recollection of events would have been any better in 1981 or 1982, had the matter gone to trial then. The defendant concedes that any dilatoriness on the part of the plaintiffs since 1980 was not accounted for by a desire to take advantage of Mr. Ratzer's deteriorating medical condition. Moreover, his testimony at the trial in the United States was not only transcribed but also recorded on video tape, which the plaintiffs have offered to produce at the trial herein. The defendant has replied that certain topics, though addressed during that tes timony, may have been dealt with inadequately for purposes of the Canadian litigation; however, any supplementary evidence which Mr. Ratzer might be able to supply would likely be of minimal significance. The plaintiffs have also offered to make available to the defendant the evidence given by Mr. Ratzer before the RTPC, but in any event, the allegation relating to monopoly is not being stressed by the defendant. Indeed, the defendant admits that it is not presently experiencing any difficulties in obtaining the substances in question.
The sale of the implicated division may also cause the defendant some inconvenience. When the sale occurred, though, the defendant was well aware of all aspects of these proceedings and surely would have made copies of any poten-
tially relevant documents, and obtained any further information which it might wish to submit in evidence.
The motion is dismissed, on the plaintiffs' undertaking to provide transcripts and video tapes of Mr. Ratzer's testimony at the American trial, together with a transcript of his evidence before the RTPC if the defendant wishes, in the event that Mr. Ratzer is, for medical reasons, unable to give satisfactory evidence either viva voce or by commission.
CASE JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
DISTINGUISHED:
Norton Co. v. Lionite Abrasives Ltd. (1976), 32 C.P.R. (2d) 270 (F.C.T.D.).
COUNSEL:
J. N. Landry for plaintiffs. G. E. Fisk for defendant.
SOLICITORS:
Ogilvy, Renault, Montreal, for plaintiffs.
Gowling & Henderson, Ottawa, for defend ant.
The following are the reasons for order ren dered in English by
WALSH J.: Defendant moves pursuant to Rule 419(1)(d) and (J) and Rule 440 [of the Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663] for an order staying or dismissing plaintiffs' action on the ground that the inordinate delay in proceeding has prejudiced the defendant in its defence of the action. Signifi cant chronological dates are as follows. Proceed ings in infringement of patent were commenced by plaintiffs on August 22, 1978, dealing with two different patents. They proceeded normally at first; a deposition of A. F. Ratzer, a principal witness for defendant, had been taken in United States litigation on July 25, 1979. Unfortunately he had a serious stroke a month later. Defendant produced an amended statement of defence and counterclaim on February 5, 1980. Litigation be tween plaintiff Minnesota Mining and Manufac turing Company and the Ansul Company and Ciba-Geigy Corporation arising out of American patents was proceeding in the United States as a result of which considerable discussion took place with respect to the need for a protective order for witnesses to be examined in Canada. Defendant's
counsel wrote plaintiffs' counsel on February 18, 1980, setting forth the problem with respect to such a protective order and this was replied to on February 29, 1980 by plaintiffs' counsel, contend ing that defendant had nothing to fear from the form of protective order suggested. This letter points out that as early as June 14, 1979, defend ant's counsel had been asked about a protective order, and now asks whether there are any textual changes required to protect defendant's interests. The letter concludes, "I would appreciate receiving your considered response at your earliest conve nience." This was never replied to, in writing in any event.
Unfortunately Mr. Ratzer had to undergo bilat eral carotid artery operations in August 1980, but during the autumn of 1980 and the spring of 1981 a member of plaintiffs' law firm in charge of the case continued to work on preparation of a Rule 447 list, including trips to Minnesota. In March and April 1981 the United States patent trial took place. On November 10, 1981, the judgment came down dismissing plaintiffs' action. Counsel agree that judgment was based substantially on Mr. Ratzer's evidence given at the trial of the action there.
Despite this loss plaintiffs in the spring of 1982 decided to carry on litigation in Canada and also to commence patent-infringement proceedings in the United Kingdom. In June 1982 counsel han dling the matter for plaintiffs left the law firm and a different attorney had to take over the file for them. In August 1982 Mr. Ratzer while returning from Canada suffered a second stroke, although apparently not serious enough to require hospitali zation.
On December 1, 1982, defendant sold its Foam Division to another company. In January 1983 plaintiffs decided not to proceed with the infringe ment of one of the patents in issue, No. 735,370, which was about to expire in any event. In Febru- ary 1983 they advised defendant's counsel of their intention to resume the litigation and counsel now handling the matter went to St. Paul, Minnesota
for three days in preparation for this. Defendant's present motion was introduced on May 11, 1983. It is common ground that Mr. Ratzer's state of health is now such that it is unlikely that he could stand the strain of travelling to testify or even testify by means of a rogatory commission. He has been recently taking strong doses of a narcotic drug for pain which, according to the affidavit of his doctor, affects the memory.
Defendant submits therefore that it will suffer severe prejudice if plaintiffs are now allowed to proceed after the very considerable delays which have taken place in that it will no longer have the advantage of Mr. Ratzer's very important testimo ny in Canada; secondly, having sold a division of the company with which the patent is concerned it may have some difficulty or at least a lack of full co-operation from employees of the purchasing company in obtaining documents or evidence which might be required for the defence and coun terclaim at trial. On the first of these issues plain tiffs state that since Mr. Ratzer has been in bad health and on heavy medication since at least 1960, his condition is now no worse than it would have been had proceedings gone to trial in 1981 or 1982, and moreover not only was his testimony at trial in the United States transcribed but also it was taken down on video tape which plaintiffs offer to produce at the trial in Canada under reserve only of it being impossible for him to testify in person at the time when his evidence is required.
Defendant is not entirely satisfied with this how ever, stating that it may lack some evidence because of differences in United States and Canadian law on issues such as obviousness, which is the subject of the counterclaim, and the date on which it must be determined, and also with respect to a speech which he made at one time at Cam- pobello Island. Portions of this speech were repro duced in a magazine article and he was examined about this in the United States litigation. Defend ant suggests that there might be other questions arising out of the speech which might be pertinent to the litigation in Canada, although it was un-
necessary or not possible to go into it in the United States.
It is reasonable to conclude that defendant will suffer some prejudice if Mr. Ratzer cannot testify in person, but on the other hand it is unlikely that he could have testified with any better recollection of events in detail had proceedings gone to trial in Canada in 1981 or 1982. It also appears likely that any evidence which he might add to the evidence already given in the United States proceedings for which video tapes are available for use in Canada would be of only minimal significance.
On the issue arising from the sale of the division of defendant company with which the subject patent is concerned, this also may well cause some inconvenience to defendant, but as plaintiffs point out it was well aware of all aspects of the present proceedings when the sale was made and would surely have kept copies of any documents which might be pertinent and obtained any information which it might wish to present in evidence.
Defendant has also alleged in its counterclaim that plaintiffs attempted to further an illegal monopoly contrary to the Combines Investigation Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23] by having certain substances withheld from defendant's use. Mr. Ratzer testified in Ottawa on November 19, 1975, before the Restrictive Trade Practices Commis sion, in connection with this and plaintiffs offer to also make this evidence available for defendant's use if desired. Defendant does not stress this aspect of its counterclaim and in fact has offered to withdraw same if plaintiffs do not continue with the present proceedings. Plaintiffs however are unwilling to agree to this, and defendant concedes that it is not now experiencing any difficulties in obtaining the necessary substances.
The above constitutes an outline of the facts. With respect to the law this motion is unusual since normally a defendant seeks to have an action by plaintiffs dismissed for want of proceeding because the plaintiffs have indicated no intention of proceeding with it, or to force plaintiffs to take
some steps to advance the action. In the present case the converse is so. Plaintiffs wish to proceed with the action but defendant is attempting to stop it because plaintiffs have taken too long in advanc ing the matter to trial. Defendant referred to a number of cases and the reading of them indicates that each must depend on its own facts. Perhaps the most pertinent case, since the facts are some what similar, is that of Norton Co. v. Lionite Abrasives Ltd.' in which Mahoney J. in this Court dismissed an action for want of proceedings when plaintiff attempted to proceed after delay of nearly six years while awaiting the outcome of litigation in the United States. Judge Mahoney pointed out that the onus was on the plaintiff to prove facts rendering its six-year delay in prosecuting the action reasonable. He goes on to state however that he is not disposed to reject as unproved any concrete facts deposed to, as if they are untrue in any material particular; the defendant ought, by affidavit, to prove this rather than rely on any perceived insufficiency in the affidavit. He does point out however, and seems to rely in rendering judgment, on the fact that there was no express allegation of any prejudice to defendant resulting from the delay and the nature of the action was not such as to render prejudice implicit in such a lengthy delay. This is clearly distinguishable from the present case where defendant's affidavit points out prejudice which may result from the delay. On the other hand the delay in the present case is not as extensive. Plaintiffs' justification for same, though not as strong as it might be, nevertheless does point out that it was defendant who failed to agree to a protective order covering testimony in Canada while the United States litigation was proceeding, and it is at least arguable that litiga tion in Canada or for that matter in the United Kingdom need not necessarily have the same result as the judgment rendered in the United States. Defendant concedes that if plaintiffs have not proceeded more diligently in Canada since 1980 it is not because they were aware of Mr. Ratzer's deteriorating medical condition and seeking to take advantage of it. While it is unfortunate that the attorney in the law firm acting for plaintiffs left the firm and had to be replaced by another attorney and this in itself cannot be justification
(1976), 32 C.P.R. (2d) 270 (F.C.T.D.).
for delay, it is certainly understandable in very complex patent litigation such as the present action that the replacing attorney would have to familiarize himself with the record before moving ahead with the action. It is also not without signifi cance that defendant did not itself seek to invoke Rule 440 at an earlier date to have the action dismissed for want of prosecution, but was quite content to leave matters dormant, and only took this step after plaintiffs indicated their intention of proceeding.
On the facts of this case defendant's motion will therefore be dismissed, subject to the undertaking by plaintiffs to produce at trial, if required, tran scripts and video recordings of the evidence of Mr. Ratzer during the course of the litigation in the United States between Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company and the Ansul Company and Ciba-Geigy Corporation and also the tran script of evidence by Mr. Ratzer before the Re strictive Trade Practices Commission in Canada, if defendant so desires, under reserve only of it being established that Mr. Ratzer cannot at that time for medical reasons testify either viva voce in Court or by rogatory commission. Plaintiffs must take some steps to advance the present proceedings within sixty days hereof.
ORDER
Defendant's motion is dismissed, with costs in the event, on plaintiffs' undertaking to provide transcripts and video recordings of the evidence of Mr. A. F. Ratzer given in the State of Wisconsin in the United States of America in Civil Action No. 78-C-330 between Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, plaintiff and the Ansul Company and Ciba-Geigy Corporation, defend ants, for use in the proceedings here, together with evidence given in Canada by Mr. Ratzer before the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission in 1975 if defendant so desires, subject only to the
reserve of Mr. Ratzer being for medical reasons unable to give satisfactory evidence viva voce or by rogatory commission for use in the proceedings here. Plaintiffs must take some steps to advance the present proceedings within sixty days hereof.
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