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A-935-84
Attorney General of Canada, Governor in Council, Director General of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans for the Pacific Region, "Fisheries Officers", Wayne Shinners, The Queen in Right of Canada as represented by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (Appellants)(Defendants)
v.
Fishing Vessel Owners' Association of British Columbia, Pacific Coast Salmon Seiners Associa tion, Prince Rupert Fishing Vessel Owners Asso ciation, Certain Members of the Fishing Vessel Owners' Association of British Columbia as set out in Schedule "A" hereto and Certain Other Purse Seine Fishing Vessel Owners as set out in Schedule "B" hereto (Respondents)(Plaintiffs)
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Heald and Stone JJ.— Vancouver, April 10, 11 and 12; Ottawa, April 29, 1985.
Judicial review — Equitable remedies — Injunctions — Appeal from Trial Judge's order restraining departmental officials from making decisions under Fisheries Act — Regional Director determining open periods for salmon fishing in Pacific Region longer for vessels using gill net gear than for those using purse seine gear — Appeal allowed — American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.) applied — Trial Judge erred in trying to resolve conflict of evidence as to whether decision based on conservation considerations — Trial Judge erred in assuming injunction not causing damage to appellants — Public interest suffering irreparable harm when public authority prevented from exercising statutory powers — Judge erred in failing to consider application seek ing to disturb status quo — Different fishing times allotted in previous years.
Fisheries — Regional Director enjoined from prescribing longer open period for commercial salmon fishing for vessels using gill net gear than those using purse seine gear — Interlocutory injunction set aside — Trial Judge erred in trying to resolve conflict of evidence as to whether decision based on conservation considerations, assuming no damage to appellants and not considering application seeking to disturb status quo — Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) [R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 5] (as am. by Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule to the Constitution Act, 1982, Item 1), s. 91(12) — Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14, s. 34(a),(b),(m) — Pacific Commercial Salmon Fishery Regu lations, C.R.C., c. 823, s. 5(1) (as am. by SOR/82-529, s. 3).
CASE JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396 (I-I.L.).
COUNSEL:
G. O. Eggertson for appellants (defendants). N. E. Daugulis for respondents (plaintiffs).
Gordon L. Bisaro for intervenor, Pacific Gillnetters.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for appellants (defendants).
Bull, Housser & Tupper, Vancouver, for respondents (plaintiffs).
Gordon L. Bisaro, Vancouver, for intervenor, Pacific Gillnetters.
DuMoulin, Lowes & Boskovich, Vancouver, for Gulf Trollers Association.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
PRATTE J.: This is an appeal from an order of the Trial Division (Collier J.) [dated July 13, 1984, T-1356-84, not yet reported] restraining, until final disposition of the action, designated officials from the Department of Fisheries and Oceans from making certain decisions that they intended to make under the Fisheries Act.'
Under subsection 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867, [30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) [R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II, No. 5] (as am. by Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule to the Consti tution Act, 1982, Item 1)] the Federal Parliament was given the exclusive power to legislate in respect of "Sea Coast and Inland Fisheries". The Fisheries Act was enacted pursuant to that author ity. Under section 34 of that Act, the Governor in Council may make regulations:
1 R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14.
34....
(a) for the proper management and control of the seacoast and inland fisheries;
(b) respecting the conservation and protection of fish;
(m) authorizing a person engaged or employed in the administration or enforcement of this Act to vary any close time or fishing quota that has been fixed by the regulations.
Acting under the authority of those provisions, the Governor in Council made the Pacific Com mercial Salmon Fishery Regulations. 2 These Regulations prescribe a complete closure, from January 1 to December 31 of each year, for com mercial fishing of all species of salmon in all areas of the Pacific Region; however, they also provide, in subsection 5(1) [as am. by SOR/82-529, s. 3], that:
5. (1) The Regional Director or a fishery officer may vary any fishing quota or close time set out in these Regulations in respect of any river, Area or Subarea.
As a consequence, the salmon fishing season, in the Pacific Region, is determined from time to time by the Regional Director. At the beginning of the year, the Department publishes a "Guide" indicating, inter alia, when and where the Region al Director intends to permit salmon fishing during the year. In the 1984 Commercial Fishing Guide, published in March 1984, it was stated that, in that year, in areas 12, 13, 16 and 23, the "open periods" for fishing vessels using gill net gear would be longer than for the vessels using seine gear; it was further stated that the periods for the gill netters would open before those of the seiners. 3
The three respondents are associations of owners of fishing vessels equipped with purse seine nets. They sued the appellants for a declaration that the proposed fishing plan, in so far as it discriminated between the gill netters and the seiners, was both beyond the legislative power of Parliament and beyond the powers conferred upon the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and its officials by the
2 C.R.C., c. 823.
3 According to the evidence, "purse seining is a method of fishing by encircling the fish in a net, gill netting is a method of fishing by laying a net which catches fish when they become entangled in the net by their gills."
Fisheries Act. They also applied for an interlocuto ry injunction so as to prevent the implementation of the proposed fishing plan until final disposition of the action. Collier J. granted that application. Hence, this appeal.
In his reasons for judgment, the Judge first expressed the view that the prime purpose of the Fisheries Act and of Parliament's legislative power in respect of fisheries was the protection and con servation of fish; he also said that the scheme under which the Regional Director was given the power to vary the close times and fishing areas set out in the Regulations had the same purpose. He then assessed the contradictory affidavit evidence adduced by both parties and, rejecting the evi dence contained in an affidavit filed by the appel lants, held that the proposed allocation of fishing times in the areas in question was not based on conservation or protection considerations. His con clusion on this point reads as follows [at pages 7-8]:
I am satisfied the proposal for areas 12, 13, 16 and 23, trying to divert a greater portion of the allowable catch to gill netters, was not based on any ground of protection or conservation. Nor was it related to management or control necessarily incidental to protection or conservation. I conclude, from the evidence, the sole ground was socio-economic: to ensure that a greater por tion of the salmon fishing industry business and its source of economic livelihood went to fishermen who used gill net gear.
Having said this, the Judge held [at page 8] that the plaintiffs were entitled to an interlocutory injunction "restraining the regional director or any fishing officer from varying any fishing quota or close time in the manner as set out in the 1984 Commercial Fishing Guide." Referring to the principles formulated by Lord Diplock in Ameri- can Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd.,° he based that conclusion on the following considerations:
4 [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.).
1. the plaintiffs' claim, as conceded by counsel for the defendants, raised a serious question;
2. in the absence of an injunction, the plaintiffs would suffer an irreparable damage; on the other hand, the defendants would suffer no damage if an injunction were granted;
3. the plaintiffs had a strong case.
In my opinion, this decision should be set aside for the following reasons:
(a) the Judge should not have tried, as he did, to resolve the conflict of evidence on the question whether the proposed allocation of fishing time was based on conservation considerations. As was stated by Lord Diplock in American Cyanamid: 5
It is no part of the court's function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations.
The court is not justified in embarking upon anything resem bling a trial of the action upon conflicting affidavits in order to evaluate the strength of either party's case.
(b) the Judge assumed that the grant of the injunction would not cause any damage to the appellants. This was wrong. When a public au thority is prevented from exercising its statutory powers, it can be said, in a case like the present one, that the public interest, of which that au thority is the guardian, suffers irreparable harm;
(c) the Judge did not take into consideration that the respondents' application sought, in a sense, to disturb rather than preserve the status quo. Indeed, the record discloses that in the years preceding 1984, the Regional Director had, in exercising his powers under subsection 5(1) of the Regulations, allotted different fish ing times to the gill netters and the seiners.
For these reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Trial Division and dismiss the respondents' application for an interlocutory
5 [1975] A.C. 396 (H.L.), at pp. 407 and 409.
injunction. I would grant the appellants their costs in both Divisions but would make no order as to the intervenors' costs.
HEALD J.: I concur. STONE J.: I agree.
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