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A-277-89
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. (Plaintiff) (Appellant)
v.
Attorney General of Canada (Defendant) (Respondent)
and
Canadian Cancer Society (Intervenor)
A-301-89
Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. (Plaintiff)
v.
Attorney General of Canada (Defendant)
INDEXED AS: ROTHMANS, BENSON & HEDGES INC. V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) (CA.)
Court of Appeal, Hugessen, MacGuigan and Des- jardins JJ.A.—Ottawa, August 17, 1989.
Practice — Parties — Intervention — Appeals from orders granting Canadian Cancer Society (CCS), and denying Insti tute of Canadian Advertising (ICA), leave to intervene in action attacking constitutionality of Tobacco Products Control Act — Interventions at trial not to be unduly restricted where Charter s. I defence to attack on public statute only serious issue — Interest required to intervene in public interest litiga tion recognized by courts in organization genuinely interested in, and possessing special knowledge and expertise related to, issues — No error in finding CCS meeting test, but interven tion should be restricted to s. 1 issues — ICA's application granted — Position extending beyond question of advertising of tobacco products to more general questions relating to commercial free speech — May contribute to balancing pro cess in s. 1 assessment of justification of limits imposed upon Charter-guaranteed freedom.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Limitation clause — Appeals from orders granting one organization and denying another leave to intervene in action attacking constitu tionality of Tobacco Products Control Act — Interventions at trial not subject to traditional restrictions where Charter s. I defence to attack on public statute only serious issue — Interest required to intervene recognized in organization genu-
inely interested in, and possessing special knowledge and exp ertise related to, issues.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), ss. 1, 2(b).
Tobacco Products Control Act, S.C. 1988, c. 20.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
REFERRED TO:
Re Canadian Labour Congress and Bhindi et al. (1985),
17 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (B.C.C.A.). COUNSEL:
Edward P. Belobaba and Barbara L. Ruther-
ford for appellant.
Gerry N. Sparrow for respondent.
Karl Delwaide and Andre T. Mecs for
intervenor.
Claude R. Thomson, Q.C. for Institute of
Canadian Advertising.
SOLICITORS:
Gowling, Strathy & Henderson, Toronto, for
appellant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondent.
Martineau, Walker, Montréal, for intervenor.
Campbell, Godfrey & Lewtas, Toronto, for Institute of Canadian Advertising.
The following are the reasons for judgment of the Court delivered orally in English by
HUG ESSEN J.A.: These two appeals, which were heard together, are from orders made by Rouleau J. granting, in the case of the Canadian Cancer Society (CCS) [ [ 1990] 1 F.C. 74], and denying, in the case of the Institute of Canadian Advertising (ICA) [[1990] 1 F.C. 84], leave to intervene in an action brought by Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. (Rothmans) against the Attorney General of Canada attacking the constitutionality of the Tobacco Products Control Act (TPCA) (S.C. 1988, c. 20).
It is common ground that the plaintiff's attack is primarily Charter [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)] based, invoking the guarantee of freedom of expression in paragraph 2(b). There can also be no doubt, given the prohibitions con tained in the TPCA, that such attack is best met by a section 1 defence and that it is on the success or failure of the latter that the outcome of the action will depend.
We are all of the view that Rouleau J. correctly enunciated the criteria which should be applicable in determining whether or not to allow the request ed interventions. This is an area in which the law is rapidly developing and in a case such as this, where the principal and perhaps the only serious issue is a section 1 defence to an attack on a public statute, there are no good reasons to unduly restrict interventions at the trial level in the way that courts have traditionally and properly done for other sorts of litigation. A section 1 question normally requires evidence for the Court to make a proper determination and such evidence should be adduced at trial (see Re Canadian Labour Congress and Bhindi et al. (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (B.C.C.A.)). Accordingly we think that, in any event for the purpose of this case, Rouleau J. was right when he said [at page 79] "the interest required to intervene in public interest litigation has been recognized by the courts in an organization which is genuinely interested in the issues raised by the action and which possesses special knowledge and expertise related to the issues raised".
As far as the intervention by the CCS is con cerned we have not been persuaded that Rouleau J. committed any reviewable error in finding that it met the test thus enunciated. It is our view, however, that the intervention by the CCS should be restricted to section 1 issues, that it be required to deliver a pleading or statement of intervention within ten days and permitted to call evidence and
to present argument in support thereof at trial. Any questions relating to discovery or otherwise to matters of procedure prior to trial should be deter mined either by agreement between the parties or on application to the Motions Judge in the Trial Division. The appeal by Rothmans will therefore be allowed for the limited purpose only of varying the order as aforesaid.
As far as concerns the requested intervention by ICA we are of the view that justice requires that this application be granted as well. The Motions Judge recognized that ICA has an interest in the litigation but seemed to feel that its position and expertise were no different from that of the plain tiff Rothmans. With respect we disagree. The ICA's position in this litigation extends beyond the narrow question of advertising of tobacco products to more general questions relating to commercial free speech. In a section 1 assessment of the justification and reasonableness of limits imposed upon a Charter-guaranteed freedom that position may contribute importantly to the weighing and balancing process. Its appeal will therefore be allowed and leave to intervene granted on the same terms as those indicated above for the CCS.
In our view this is not a case for costs in either Division.
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