A-744-88
Life Underwriters Association of Canada/L'As-
sociation des Assureurs-Vie du Canada (Appel-
lant)
v.
Provincial Association of Quebec Life Underwrit-
ers/L'Association Provinciale des Assureurs-Vie
du Quebec (Respondent)
INDEXED AS: LIFE UNDERWRITERS ASSN. OF CANADA V. PRO
VINCIAL ASSN. OF QUEBEC LIFE UNDERWRITERS (CA.)
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Marceau and Desjardins
JJ.A.—Ottawa, February 20 and June 15, 1990.
Insurance — Trial Judge finding s. 2(c), (d) and (e) of
appellant's enabling Act ultra vires as powers conferred within
exclusive provincial competence over education and regulation
of professions — On appeal, s. 2(c) and (d), authorizing
appellant to hold examinations on principles and practice of
life insurance and to grant certificates, held intra vires
Federal legislation not unconstitutional solely because author
izes federal company to carry on activities subject to provincial
regulation — S. 2(e), permitting appellant to confer title
"Chartered Life Underwriter", ultra vires as conferring profes
sional title within provincial jurisdiction.
Constitutional law — Distribution, of powers — Federal Act
incorporating appellant permitting it to examine and certify
members — Not outside federal competence solely because
gives appellant power to carry out activity to be regulated by
provinces — Provision enabling appellant to authorize use of
title "Chartered Life Underwriter" ultra vires Parliament as
within provincial jurisdiction over civil rights or regulation of
professions.
Practice — Judgments and orders — Reversal or variation
— R. 1212, authorizing Court to amend judgment on appeal
based on consent of parties not applicable where constitution
ality of legislation at issue — Attorney General of Quebec,
granted intervenor status by Senior Prothonotary, opposing
consent judgment acceptable to parties.
This was an appeal from the trial judgment holding para
graphs 2(c), (d) and (e) of the appellant's enabling Act unconsti
tutional on the ground that the powers conferred by those
paragraphs fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the prov
inces over education and regulation of the professions. Those
paragraphs respectively permit the appellant to hold examina
tions on the principles and practice of life insurance, to grant
certificates of efficiency and to authorize use of the title
"Chartered Life Underwriter" (C.L.U.). Before the appeal was
heard, the parties notified the Court that they had arrived at a
compromise terminating the action. One of the conditions of
that compromise, to which the Attorney General of Quebec, an
intervenor, did not agree, was that the Court would render a
judgment allowing the appeal in part by replacing the finding
of unconstitutionality with a finding that the provisions were
constitutional. The issues were whether the Court, under Rule
1212, could amend a judgment on consent of the parties when
the constitutionality of legislation is challenged and whether
the provisions were unconstitutional.
Held (Marceau J.A. dissenting in part), the appeal should be
allowed in part.
Per Pratte J.A.: The constitutionality of legislation does not
depend upon the wishes of parties or the compromises they may
make. Rule 1212, which allows the Court to amend a judgment
which has been appealed based on the consent of the parties,
does not apply.
The Trial Judge erred in finding paragraphs 2(c) and (d)
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of federal legislation
cannot be challenged solely on the ground that that legislation
gives a company created by it the power to carry on an activity
which is to be regulated by the provinces. However, he correct
ly found paragraph 2(e) to be ultra vires. Except for matters
that are within its jurisdiction, Parliament does not have the
power to legislate to give persons the right to bear or use a title,
whether professional or otherwise. The impugned legislation
does not authorize the appellant to carry on an activity but to
confer the right to use the title "Chartered Life Underwriter of
Canada". Parliament cannot give a corporation the power to
confer a right which it could not itself confer. Any regulation of
this kind is a question of civil rights and within provincial
jurisdiction.
Per Marceau J.A. (dissenting in part): Rule 1212 has no
application where parties to an appeal seek to vary by common
accord a judicial declaration concerning the constitutional
validity of a legislative enactment, even if all the Attorneys
General taking part agreed. The role of the Attorney General
as guardian of the public interest does not supersede the role
exclusively assigned to the courts to decide the limits of the
legislative powers of either order of government.
Paragraphs 2(c), (d) and (e), which granted the corporation
certain specific powers, are intra vires. Parliament is competent
to incorporate companies and fix their powers, although the
authority to incorporate does not include authority to regulate
the exercise of powers granted by incorporation. The argument
that the regulation of professions is the exclusive domain of the
provinces, was met by noting that the Act does not purport to
regulate a profession. The designations conferred by paragraph
2(e) neither impose obligations nor create immunities from
provincial laws. Even if seen as creating "civil rights of a novel
character", that in itself is not beyond the competence of
Parliament. The mere conferring of a title would not, under the
Constitution, be reserved exclusively to the legislative power
having authority to regulate the profession. The conferring and
holding of a professional title may be part of the regulation of a
profession in the limited sense of being directly linked to the
exercise of the profession. Otherwise, it is a neutral act uncon-
strained by the division of powers. The words "of Canada" in
the designation controlled by the appellant were sufficient to
distinguish it from the designation referred to in An Act
respecting Insurance of Quebec, section 335. It could not be
said that the title had been made a matter of provincial
regulation by provincial legislation and therefore taken beyond
federal competence.
Per Desjardins J.A.: The Attorney General of Quebec's
refusal to acquiesce in the consent judgment submitted by the
parties prevented the Court from approving that consent,
assuming that the parties' and the intervenor's consent can
resolve a point of constitutional law, as to which no opinion
would be expressed.
Paragraph 2(e) is unconstitutional because it purports to give
the appellant the power to confer a professional title. Parlia
ment cannot give companies created by it power to confer a
professional title as this power is part of the provincial jurisdic
tion over regulation of the professions. The addition of the
words "of Canada" does not give it constitutional legitimacy.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED
An Act respecting Insurance, R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-32, s.
335.
An Act to incorporate The Life Underwriters' Associa
tion of Canada, S.C. 1924, c. 104, s. 2.
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, arts. 95, 98, 99.
Companies Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-38.
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 (U.K.) (as
am. by Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule
to the Constitution Act, 1982, Item 1) [R.S.C., 1985,
Appendix II, No. 5], ss. 91, 92(11).
Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, RR. 5, 1101, 1212.
Trade Marks Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. T-10.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
REVERSED:
Life Underwriters Association of Canada v. Provincial
Association of Quebec Life Underwriters, [1989] 1 F.C.
570; (1988), 33 C.C.L.I. 62; 19 C.I.P.R. 261; 22 C.P.R.
(3d) 1; 20 F.T.R. 274 (T.D.).
CONSIDERED:
Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for
Canada, [1937] A.C. 405 (P.C.).
REFERRED TO:
Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v. Parsons
(1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.); John Deere Plow Com
pany v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330 (P.C.); Great West
Saddlery Co. v. The King, [1921] 2 A.C. 91 (P.C.).
AUTHORS CITED
Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed.
Toronto: The Carswell Company Limited, 1985.
COUNSEL:
Roger T. Hughes, Q.C. and Stephen M. Lane
for appellant.
Hugues G. Richard for respondent.
James M. Mabbutt, Q.C. for Attorney Gener
al of Canada.
Robert Monette for Attorney General of
Quebec.
SOLICITORS:
Sim, Hughes, Dimock, Toronto, for appellant.
Leger, Robic & Richard, Montreal, for
respondent.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
Attorney General of Canada.
Bernard, Roy & Associes, Montreal, for
Attorney General of Quebec.
The following is the English version of the
reasons for judgment rendered by
PRATTE J.A.: The parties to this appeal are two
associations of life insurance agents. The respond
ent is a non-profit corporation created in 1962
under Part III of the Quebec Companies Act' and
is made up of the insurance agents in that pro
vince. The appellant draws its members from all of
Canada; it was incorporated in 1924 by a special
Act of the federal Parliament [An Act to incorpo
rate The Life Underwriters' Association of
Canada] 2 which defined its objects and powers in
section 2 as follows:
2. The objects and powers of the Association shall be to
promote by all lawful means the proper and efficient practice of
the business of life insurance within the Dominion of Canada;
and for the said purpose,—
(a) To publish, distribute and sell pamphlets, periodicals,
journals, books and other literature relating to the busi
ness of life insurance;
R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-38.
2 S.C. 1924, c. 104.
(b) To devote the funds of the Association to promoting the
welfare of its members in such manner as the Associa
tion may decide;
(c) To hold such examinations on the principles and prac
tice of life insurance or general educational attainments,
as may be found expedient;
(d) To grant certificates of efficiency to its members;
(e) To authorize the use by such of its members as it may
designate of the title and description "Chartered Life
Underwriter of Canada."
Since its creation the appellant has organized
training courses for its members to improve their
knowledge in the field of life insurance. To those it
regards as sufficiently competent it issues the titles
of "Chartered Life Underwriter" (abbreviated
"C.L.U.") and "Assureur-vie agree" (abbreviated
"A.V.A."). It has even registered the initials
C.L.U. (registration No. 335 823) and A.V.A.
(registration No. 335 977) as certification marks
pursuant to the Trade Marks Act [R.S.C. 1970, c.
T-10] .
On January 5, 1988 the appellant sued the
respondent, alleging that the latter was about to
organize training courses for its members and
wished to confer on those who successfully com
pleted the courses the right to use the titles
"Chartered Life Underwriter" and "Assureur-vie
agree" and their abbreviations C.L.U. and A.V.A.
In the appellant's submission, these actions were a
source of confusion and infringed its rights. It
accordingly applied for an injunction and other
suitable relief.
In its defence the respondent argued that the
appellant had no right to the titles and designa
tions in question, and by a counterclaim asked the
Court to order that the trade marks registered by
the appellant be struck out and also to find that
the appellant's enabling Act was unconstitutional
and ultra vires the Parliament of Canada.
The Attorney General of Quebec was informed
of the constitutional problem raised by the
respondent and obtained leave from the Trial Divi
sion to intervene in the case.
Finally, the Trial Division dismissed the appel
lant's action [[1989] 1 F.C. 570] with costs and,
ruling on the respondent's counterclaim, ordered
that the appellant's trade marks be struck out and
found paragraphs 2(c), (d), and (e) of the appel-
lant's enabling Act to be unconstitutional on the
ground that the powers conferred by those para
graphs fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
provinces over education and regulation of the
professions.
The appellant appealed from this decision; the
respondent appealed the part of the decision that
dismissed its argument that all of the appellant's
enabling Act should be invalidated.
The appeal was about to be heard when the
appellant and the respondent notified the Registry
that they had arrived at a compromise terminating
the action. One of the conditions of that compro
mise to which the Attorney General of Quebec did
not agree, was that the Court would render a
judgment allowing the appellant's appeal in part
by replacing the finding that paragraphs 2(c), (d)
and (e) of the appellant's enabling Act was uncon
stitutional by a finding that that provision was
constitutional; the trial judgment would be
affirmed in all other respects.
The parties were told that the appeal would still
be heard on the day appointed, because it was not
clear that in these circumstances the Court would
agree to substitute a finding of constitutionality
for the finding of unconstitutionality made by the
Trial Judge.
At the hearing counsel for the appellant first
contented that the Court could rely simply on the
consent by the appellant and the respondent in
making the judgment to which they had agreed.
He then sought to show that, contrary to what the
Trial Judge held, paragraphs 2(c), (d) and (e) of
the appellant's enabling Act were validly enacted.
Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada, who
had taken advantage of Rule 1101 of the Federal
Court Rules, also supported this latter point of
view which counsel for the Attorney General of
Quebec was the only one to contest. Counsel for
the respondent took no part in the argument,
simply stating that he did not intend to proceed
with his cross-appeal.
The appellant's argument that, in view of the
compromise reached between it and the respond
ent, the Court must necessarily render the judg
ment on which they were agreed I think must be
dismissed. It is true that Rule 1212 of the Federal
Court Rules 3 authorizes the Court to amend a
judgment which has been appealed based simply
on the consent of the parties. However, I do not
think that the Court can use this rule as a basis for
making a finding regarding the constitutionality of
a statute. The constitutionality of legislation,
whether public or private, does not depend on the
wishes of parties and compromises they may make.
The Court must accordingly consider the consti
tutionality of paragraphs 2(c), (d) and (e), which
the Trial Judge found to be invalid. The text of
this provision, I repeat, is as follows:
2. The objects and powers of the Association shall be to
promote by all lawful means the proper and efficient practice of
the business of life insurance within the Dominion of Canada;
and for the said prupose,—
(c) . .
to hold such examinations on the principles and practice
of life insurance or general educational attainments as
may be found expedient;
(d) to grant certificates of efficiency to its members;
(e) to authorize the use by such of its members as it may
designate of the title and description "Chartered Life
Underwriter of Canada".
It is now well established that while, under
subsection 92(11) of the Constitution Act, 1867
[30 & 30 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.) (as am. by Canada Act
1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), Schedule to the Consti
tution Act, 1982, Item 1) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix
II, No. 5]], the provinces have the exclusive power
to create "companies with provincial objects", the
federal Parliament may nevertheless create com
panies that carry on their activities in more than
one province (and which because of that are not
created for "provincial objects"), even though
those activities are such that regulation of them is
3 Rule 1212. A respondent may consent to the reversal or
variation of the judgment appealed against by giving to the
appellant a notice stating that he consents to the reversal or
variation of the judgment in the manner therein indicated, and
thereupon the Court shall, upon the application of the appel
lant, pronounce judgment in accordance with the notice as a
matter of course if the resultant judgment is one that would
have been given on consent.
exclusively a matter for the provinces. 4 It therefore
follows that the constitutionality of legislation
adopted by the federal Parliament cannot be chal
lenged solely on the ground that that legislation
gives a company created by it the power to carry
on an activity which is to be regulated by the
provinces.
It seems clear from reading section 2 of the
appellant's enabling Act in light of these rules that
the Trial Judge was wrong to find that paragraphs
2(c) and (d) were unconstitutional. The only objec
tion that can be made to these two paragraphs is
that they authorize the apppellant to carry on
activities the regulation of which is exclusively a
matter for the provinces. As I have just said, that
is not a ground of unconstitutionality.
However, the same is not true for paragraph
2(e), which gives the appellant the power
(e) To authorize the use by such of its members as it may
designate of the title and description "Chartered Life
Underwriter of Canada."
This provision does not authorize the appellant to
carry on an activity; it gives it the power to confer
on certain of its members the right to use the title
"Chartered Life Underwriter of Canada". I think
it is clear that Parliament cannot give a company
the power to confer on its members a right which
it could not confer on them itself. Except in mat
ters that are within its jurisdiction,' Parliament
does not have the power to legislate to give persons
the right to bear or use a title, whether profession
al or otherwise. Any regulation of this matter is
within the field of civil rights; it is, because of that,
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces.
The federal Parliament therefore cannot confer on
the appellant the power to give its members the
4 See as to this Citizens Insurance Company of Canada v.
Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.) at p. 116; John Deere
Plow Company v. Wharton, [1915] A.C. 330 (P.C.), at p. 340;
Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King, [1921] 2 A.C. 91 (P.C.)
at p. 115.
See also Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed., at
pp. 511 et seq.
5 For example, it can certainly give the companies it creates
names and may legislate in this regard.
right to use the title of Chartered Life Underwriter
because it could not itself give them that right.
The Trial Judge was therefore right in finding
that paragraph 2(e) was unconstitutional, and it
thus seems impossible to give effect to the compro
mise reached between the parties in full. I would
accordingly allow the respondent's appeal in part
only and would vary the judgment of the Trial
Division by replacing paragraphs 3 and 4 with the
following paragraph:
The Court finds that s. 2(e) of the Act to incorporate The
Life Underwriters' Association of Canada (14-15 George V, c.
104) is unconstitutional and ultra vires the Parliament of
Canada.
I would further order the appellant to pay all
the respondent's costs, both at trial and on appeal,
and in accordance with the agreement by the
parties I would set the amount of these costs at
$75,000.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
MARCEAU J.A. (dissenting in part): I readily
agree with my colleague, Mr. Justice Pratte, on
the preliminary issue of the declaration by consent,
but unfortunately I am unable to accept his point
of view on the substantive question of constitution
ality.
1. My position on the preliminary issue is
straightforward and can be quickly put. There is
no doubt of the principle, in our adversary system
of justice, that the litigants themselves are in a
large measure masters of the course of action they
pursue, and in matters where common ground can
be achieved between them, the courts stand ready
to give effect to their consent. However, this prin
ciple, in my view, does not go so far as allowing the
parties to an appeal to vary or reverse, by common
accord, a judicial declaration concerning the con
stitutional validity of a legislative enactment, any
more than such a declaration could issue at first
instance, were it supported by no more than the
consent of the litigants. Rule 1212 of the Rules of
the Court has no application. 6
I add that I would hold the same view even if
the order proposed by the parties, disposing of the
constitutional issue, had the blessing of all the
Attorneys General who had chosen to take part in
the dispute. Although an Attorney General enjoys
a special status as guardian of the public interest,
that status does obviously not supersede the role
exclusively assigned to courts to decide, in binding
terms, what are the limits of the legislative powers
of either order of government.
2. The constitutional issue is more complex, but
I think I can explain my dissent from the position
adopted by my colleague without extensive de
velopments, since our views in fact concur to a
fairly good extent.
The federal competence to incorporate compa
nies and fix their powers has long been established
and I know of no leading authorities supporting a
restriction to that competence based on the objects
of the company being incorporated. It is clear,
however, that such an authority to incorporate
does not include authority to regulate the exercise
of powers granted by incorporation. Bearing in
mind these two basic propositions, I fail to see how
any of the provisions contained in paragraphs (c),
(d) or (e) of section 2 of this Act incorporating The
Life Underwriters Association of Canada, S.C.
1924, c. 104, 7 which provisions granted the corpo
ration certain specific powers, could be said to
have been ultra vires Parliament.
6 I reproduce the rule for convenience:
Rule 1212. A respondent may consent to the reversal or
variation of the judgment appealed against by giving to the
appellant a notice stating that he consents to the reversal or
variation of the judgment in the manner therein indicated,
and thereupon the Court shall, upon the application of the
appellant, pronounce judgment in accordance with the notice
as a matter of course if the resultant judgment is one that
would have been given on consent.
For convenience, I reproduce again section 2 of this Act:
2. The objects and powers of the Association shall be to
promote by all lawful means the proper and efficient practice
of the business of life insurance within the Dominion of
Canada; and for the said purpose,—
(Continued on next page)
It is argued against the validity of paragraph
2(e) that the regulation of professions is the exclu
sive domain of the provinces. But the Act does not
purport to regulate a profession. The designations
conferred through paragraph 2(e) impose no obli
gations nor do they create any immunities from
provincial laws. If anything, they might be seen as
creating "civil rights of a novel character", the
right to a title, comparable to the rights created by
a national trade mark established by an Act of
Parliament to be applied to a commodity so as to
attest the conformity of that commodity to a cer
tain standard defined by the Act. But the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in Attorney-
General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for
Canada, [1937] A.C. 405, has determined that
that is not in itself beyond the competence of
Parliament.
I do not see why the mere conferring of a title
would, under the Constitution, be reserved exclu
sively to the legislative power having authority to
regulate the profession to which the title could be
somehow related. To be called professional, it
seems to me, a title, like a certificate, must be
directly linked to the exercise of the profession; it
must have consequences as to the right and ability
of its holder to practice the profession. The confer
ring and holding of a professional title in that
sense may, of course, be part of the regulation of
the profession, but otherwise the conferring and
holding of a title is a neutral act, it seems to me,
unconstrained by the division of powers. Any
goodwill or economic influence generated by such
conferral would accrue solely through the efforts
of the Association and its members and would, in
no way, be attributed to the state of the legislation.
(Continued from previous page)
(a) To publish, distribute and sell pamphlets, periodicals,
journals, books and other literature relating to the
business of life insurance;
(b) To devote the funds of the Association to promoting
the welfare of its members in such manner as the
Association may decide;
(c) To hold such examinations on the principles and
practice of life insurance or general educational
attainments, as may be found expedient;
(d) To grant certificates of efficiency to its members;
(e) To authorize the use by such of its members as it may
designate of the title and description "Chartered Life
Underwriter of Canada."
But could it not be said that a title may be made
a matter of professional regulation by provincial
legislation, and thereby taken beyond the control
and even reach of any federal institution? It would
not be correct, I think, to say that this is what
happened here, the words "of Canada" in the
designation controlled by the national association
being sufficient to distinguish it from the designa
tion referred to in section 335 of An Act respecting
Insurance of Quebec.' But, in any event, even if it
could be possible to attach to the provincial legisla
tion the effect of prohibiting within the province
the use of the title while practising the profession,
the corporate integrity of the federal institution
with all its powers, and the constitutional validity
of its incorporating statute, would remain intact.
In my view, the declaration in the judgment of
first instance that paragraphs 2(c), (d) and (e) of
An Act to incorporate The Life Underwriters'
Association of Canada are ultra vires Parliament
is ill-founded and ought to be quashed.
* * *
The following is the English version of the
reasons for judgment rendered by
DESJARDINS J.A.: The Senior Prothonotary
granted the Attorney General of Quebec the right
to intervene before the Trial Judge and make
subsmissions regarding constitutionality at the
hearing of the above case, pursuant to section 5 of
the Federal Court Rules and articles 95, 98 and
99 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure: the
intervention procedure, determined by analogy
8 Section 335 of An Act respecting Insurance, R.S.Q. 1977, c.
A-32, reads thus:
335. Whoever has the right to the title of insurance agent
may also, where such is the case, have the right to the
following titles:
(a) life insurer;
(b) chartered life insurer (C.L.U.) or "assureur-vie agree"
(A.V.A.), with the approval of the Provincial Life Insurers
Association of Quebec and in accordance with the rules of
that Association;
(c) life insurance broker, if he represents more than one
life insurance company;
(d) insurance broker, if he represents more than one
damage insurance company;
(e) any title to which he is authorized under the insurance
Brokers Act (chapter C-74).
with Rule 1010 of the Federal Court Rules, was
that the intervener should limit himself "solely to
legal arguments at the close of the hearing, subject
to his rights in connection with facts that may be
disclosed and that may concern the Attorney Gen
eral or the Minister".
Though this does not make the Attorney Gener
al of Quebec's status equivalent to that of a party,
he remains guardian of the public interest. His
refusal to acquiesce in the consent judgment sub
mitted by the parties, because of the constitutional
position taken by them, prevents this Court from
approving that consent—assuming that the parties'
and the intervenor's consent can resolve a point of
constitutional law, as to which I express no opin
ion. On this first point, I agree with my colleagues.
On the second point, I concur in the result with
Pratte J.A. Paragraph 2(e) of the Act to incorpo
rate The Life Underwriters' Association of
Canada 9 gives the appellant the right to authorize
"the use by such of its members .. . of the title and
description Chartered Life Underwriter of Cana-
da" ("a porter le titre et a avoir la qualite d'as-
sureur licencie en assurance-vie du Canada").
The appellant in fact awards the titles "assureur-
vie agree" (A.V.A.) and "Chartered Life Under
9 S.C. 1924, c. 104. The complete section 2 reads as follows:
2. The objects and powers of the Association shall be to
promote by all lawful means the proper and efficient practice
of the business of life insurance within the Dominion of
Canada; and for the said purpose,—
(a) To publish, distribute and sell pamphlets, periodicals,
journals, books and other literature relating to the busi
ness of life insurance;
(b) To devote the funds of the Association to promoting the
welfare of its members in such manner as the Asssocia-
tion may decide;
(c) To hold such examinations on the principles and practice
of life insurance or general educational attainments, as
may be found expedient;
(d) To grant certificates of efficiency to its members;
(e) To authorize the use by such of its members as it may
designate of the title and description "Chartered Life
Underwriter of Canada."
writer" (C.L.U.).'° The title is thus a professional
one which complements the certificate of compe
tence. The addition of the words "of Canada"
("au Canada") does not alter the classification of
this legislation in any way and cannot give it
constitutional legitimacy.
Federal jurisdiction over the powers Parliament
can confer on the companies created by it stops
where the field of provincial jurisdiction begins.
The Canadian Parliament may incorporate compa
nies having purposes other than "provincial"
ones," but it cannot give them the power to confer
a professional title, as this power is part of the
provincial jurisdiction over regulation of the
professions.
I would dispose of the appeal in the manner
suggested by Pratte J.A.
1 ° Appeal case, p. 2217. See also p. 2249.
II Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 5,
subsection 92(11) and section 91, preamble.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.