T-2396-88
Minister of State (Multiculturalism and Citizen
ship) (Appellant)
v.
Ali Reza Shahkar (Respondent)
INDEXED AS: CANADA (MINISTER OF STATE, MULTICULTUR
ALISM AND CITIZENSHIP) V. SHAHKAR (T. D.)
Trial Division, Addy J.—Vancouver, January 23;
Ottawa, June 6, 1990.
Federal Court jurisdiction — Trial Division — Appeal from
grant of citizenship under Citizenship Act, s. 14(5) allowed
Outside Court's jurisdiction to recommend waiver of residency
requirement to Minister or Governor in Council Citizenship
Act, s. 14(5) limiting Court's jurisdiction to appeal from
"decision" of citizenship judge, not "recommendation" —
Conflict of authorities as to jurisdiction to make administra
tive recommendations should be resolved by legislation or
Court of Appeal.
Constitutional law Fundamental constitutional principles
Separation of powers Appeal from grant of citizenship
allowed Statutory provision requiring Court to make
administrative recommendation would be unconstitutional as
contrary to principle of separation of powers Independent
judiciary necessary to protect public from unjust applications
of state's administrative, political and executive powers.
Judges and courts Federal Court Trial Judge exercising
appellate jurisdiction under Citizenship Act, s. 14(5) not per
sona designata — Limitation of concept of persona designata
by Supreme Court of Canada discussed — Impropriety of
superior court judge being required by statute to participate in
administrative process — Necessity for independent judiciary
to safeguard public from unjust applications of state's
administrative, political and executive powers.
Citizenship — Residency requirements That respondent
visited parents for one month over Christmas break from
studies in U.S.A., leaving some clothes and books with them
weighed against fact other personal effects left in America
Residence in Canada, as required by Citizenship Act, s. 5(1)(c),
not established.
This was an appeal from a grant of citizenship. The Minister
contended that the respondent had not satisfied the residency
requirement set out in paragraph 5(1)(c) of the Citizenship
Act. The respondent, a native of Iran, had visited his parents in
Canada for one month during the 1983 Christmas break from
his studies in California. He left some clothing and books at his
parents' residence, but had left other items in California.
Between 1984 and 1987 he was unable to leave the U.S.A. as
he did not have a passport. In 1987, he stayed at his parents'
house for two months, applying for citizenship in November
1987.
In the event that the appeal should be successful, the
respondent requested, pursuant to section 15, that the Court
consider recommending to the Minister that he or the Governor
in Council waive the residency requirements.
,Held, the appeal should be allowed and jurisdiction to con
sider a recommendation to the Minister declined even if it had
been granted by legislation.
In order to satisfy the first requirement of paragraph 5(1)(c),
the applicant had to satisfy the Court that he had established a
permanent residence in Canada. Therefore, the fact that he left
some personal effects with his parents after his visit during the
1983-1984 Christmas season, was weighed against the fact that
he had also left some personal effects in California. The
objective evidence did not establish that the respondent had
established a permanent residence in Canada.
The Court could not recommend that the Minister waive the
residency requirements as it had not been granted jurisdiction
to do so. Since an appeal is statutory, the jurisdiction is strictly
limited by the text of the section granting appeal rights. The
appeal was instituted under subsection 14(5), which provides
that the decision of the citizenship judge, not his recommenda
tions, is subject to appeal. It is the decision to approve or not
approve the citizenship application which is under appeal and
nothing else. The only provision dealing with a duty to recom
mend to the Minister is found in section 15, which refers to the
citizenship judge's obligation to consider whether a recommen
dation should or should not be made. There is no suggestion
that the Federal Court should make any such recommendation.
It would have been improper for the Trial Division to have
been specifically authorized to make a recommendation to the
Minister. Any provision purporting to oblige a court of superior
jurisdiction to engage in making a merely administrative
recommendation would be unconstitutional as contrary to the
principle of separation of powers, the basis of our constitutional
system. Attempting to impose on a member of the Court,
otherwise than as persona designata, a purely administrative
role would completely distort the Court's judicial character.
Due to the rapid growth of administrative tribunals and the
resulting involvement of the courts in controlling their deci
sions, there is great danger in overlooking the fundamental
separation of powers. The independent judicial role of the
courts must be preserved to protect the public against unau
thorized, improper and unjust applications of the administra
tive, political and executive powers of the state.
In exercising the appellate jurisdiction conferred by subsec
tion 14(5) a Judge of the Trial Division of the Federal Court
cannot be considered as exercising an administrative function
as a persona designata, since that jurisdiction is granted "to the
Court". Even if the section had referred to a "judge of the
Court", the Supreme Court of Canada, in the Herman and
Ranville cases has greatly limited the occasions when a judge
may be considered as acting as persona designata.
An applicant may apply directly to either the Minister or the
Governor in Council to exercise his discretion under section 5.
A recommendation from a citizenship judge is not required.
The conflicting case law on the jurisdiction of the Federal
Court—Trial Division to make administrative recommenda
tions should be resolved either by legislation or by the Court of
Appeal. Notwithstanding subsection 14(6), which provides that
the Trial Division has the final say in citizenship appeals, an
appeal on a question of refusal to exercise jurisdiction is still
open either under section 27 of the Federal Court Act or the
supervisory jurisdiction of the Appeal Division over the Trial
Division. A refusal to exercise jurisdiction is not a "decision"
within subsection 14(6), which contemplates a decision on the
merits.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED
Citizenship Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29, ss. 5(1)(c),(3),
(4), 14(5),(6), 15.
Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, s. 27.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
CONSIDERED:
Herman et al. v. Deputy Attorney General (Can.), [1979]
1 S.C.R. 729; (1978), 91 D.L.R. (3d) 3; 5 C.R. (3d) 242;
[1978] CTC 744; 78 DTC 6456; 23 N.R. 235; Minister
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development v. Ranville
et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 518; (1982), 139 D.L.R. (3d) 1;
[1983] I C.N.L.R. 12; 44 N.R. 616; [1983] R.D.J. 16;
Air Canada v. Wardair Canada (1975) Ltd., [1980] 1
F.C. 120; (1979), 106 D.L.R. (3d) 412; 36 N.R. 296
(C.A.); Trust & Loan Co. of Can. v. Lindquist and
Lindquist, [1933] 2 W.W.R. 410 (Sask. K.B.).
REFERRED TO:
Canadian National Ry. Co. v. Lewis et al., [1930] Ex.
C.R. 145; (1930), 4 D.L.R. 537; Re Naber-Sykes, [1986]
3 F.C. 434; (1986), 4 F.T.R. 204 (T.D.); Re Salon
(1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 238 (F.C.T.D.); In re Kleifges
and in re Citizenship Act, [1978] 1 F.C. 734; (1978), 84
D.L.R. (3d) 183 (T.D.); Re Maefs (1980), 110 D.L.R.
(3d) 697 (F.C.T.D.); In re Chute and in re Citizenship
Act, [1982] 1 F.C. 98 (T.D.); Re Kerho (1988), 21
F.T.R. 180 (F.C.T.D.); Re Ngo (1986), 6 F.T.R. 81
(F.C.T.D.); Re Ballhorn (1981), 131 D.L.R. (3d) 505
(F.C.T.D.); Re Aboumalhab (1987), 17 F.T.R. 180
(F.C.T.D.); Re Brown, T-2724-80, Dubé J., judgment
dated 3/11/80, F.C.T.D., not reported; Re Steiner,
T-503-78, Dubé J., judgment dated 2/6/78, F.C.T.D., not
reported; Re Anderson, T-1066-78, Décary J., judgment
dated 11/7/78, F.C.T.D., not reported; Re Johnston,
T-4908-77, Walsh J., judgment dated 8/5/78, F.C.T.D.,
not reported; Re Turcan, T-3202-78, Walsh J., judgment
dated 6/10/78, F.C.T.D., not reported; Re Hoang,
T-727-89, Denault J., judgment dated 4/7/89, F.C.T.D.,
not yet reported; Re Hung-Cho, T-2676-85, Joyal J.,
judgment dated 28/8/86, F.C.T.D., not reported; Re Ying,
T-2677-85, Joyal J., judgment dated 28/8/86, F.C.T.D.,
not reported; Re Mitha, T-4832-78, Cattanach J., judg
ment dated 1/6/79, F.C.T.D., not reported; Re Zakrzew-
ski, T-599-78, Dubé J., judgment dated 2/6/78, F.C.T.D.,
not reported; Re Karroum, T-1622-89, Pinard J., judg
ment dated 2/3/90, F.C.T.D., not yet reported; In re
Akins and in re the Citizenship Act, [1978] 1 F.C. 757;
(1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 93 (T.D.); Re Conroy (1979), 99
D.L.R. (3d) 642 (F.C.T.D.); In re Boutros and in re
Citizenship Act, [1980] 1 F.C. 624; (1980), 109 D.L.R.
(3d) 680 (T.D.); In re Aaron and in re Citizenship Act,
[1982] 2 F.C. 348 (T.D.); Re Anquist, [1985] 1 W.W.R.
562; (1984), 34 Alta. L.R. (2d) 241 (F.C.T.D.); Lakha
(In re) and in re Citizenship Act, [1981] 1 F.C. 746
(T.D.) (Cattanach J.) In re Albers, T-75-78, Addy J.,
judgment dated 11/5/78, F.C.T.D., not reported; Re
Zakowski, T-2054-85, Addy J., order dated 28/2/86,
F.C.T.D., not reported; Re Amendola, T-177-82,
Cattanach J., judgment dated 7/4/82, F.C.T.D., not
reported.
COUNSEL:
Mitchell Taylor for appellant.
Jeffrey Ray for respondent.
C. C. Godwin as amicus curiae.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
appellant.
Smith, Milburn & Co., New Westminster,
British Columbia, for respondent.
Bull, Housser & Tupper, Vancouver, amicus
curiae.
The following are the reasons for order ren
dered in English by
ADDY J.: The Minister is appealing the grant of
citizenship to the respondent on the grounds of
insufficiency of residence required by paragraph
5(1)(c) of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C., 1985, c.
C-29.
The respondent, who is 26 years of age, was
born in and lived in Teheran for fourteen years.
He then went to school in France. In 1981, he
went to California to further his studies. Mean
while, his parents moved to Canada.
In 1982, he came to Canada for two weeks to
visit his parents. He returned to Canada for a
further visit of one month over the Christmas
season on December 17, 1983. At that time he
brought some items of clothing and books to
Canada which he left in his parents' residence. He
had meanwhile left other items in California
during his stay with his parents.
While in California, he lived in students' quar
ters from 1981 to 1984 and subsequently lived in
an apartment with a friend. He opened a bank
account in Canada by correspondence in 1986 and
deposited approximately $200 there. In 1984,
three months before his Iranian passport was due
to expire, he mailed it for renewal to the Algerian
Embassy in the United States which was at that
time acting for Iran during the ongoing disputes
between that country and the United States. The
Algerian Embassy, for some reason, retained the
passport and for over three years he was unable to
obtain a renewal. It was returned to him in May
1987. Meanwhile, he did not leave the United
States because of a fear of not being allowed to
reenter without a passport.
In September 1987, he came to Canada to his
parents' house where he stayed for two months. He
stated that as he was unable to find work, he
returned to California for two years where he had
been offered some temporary employment. He
returned to Canada at the beginning of this year.
Meanwhile, in October 1988, he had come to
Canada for a short visit.
The relevant time to consider his residence in
Canada is during the four years immediately
preceding his application for citizenship on
November 10, 1987.
It is evident on reading paragraph 5(1)(c) of the
Act, that there are two distinct residence require
ments. The applicant must first of all satisfy the
Court that he did establish a permanent residence
in Canada and secondly, that during the four years
immediately preceding his application, he
accumulated at least three years of residence cal
culated in accordance with the formula prescribed
in that section. All of the reported cases which
have dealt with that subject have held that the
three years of residence do not necessarily mean
three years of actual physical presence in Canada.
The time during which the applicant's [respond-
ent's] Iranian passport was withheld from him by
the Algerian authorities, thus preventing him from
obtaining a renewal of his passport and a visa
which would have permitted him to return to the
United States to complete his studies, cannot be
held against him since he had no choice in the
matter. He apparently could have obtained a visi
tor's visa to come to Canada but there was great
doubt as to whether he would have been able to
return to the United States. The real question to
be determined, however, is whether he fulfilled the
first condition and more specifically, in his par
ticular case, whether during the time he visited his
parents for the 30 days between December 17,
1983 and January 17, 1984, presumably during a
break in his studies, he became a resident of
Canada. The fact of his subsequent absences in the
United States, of his visits to Canada, and the
other evidence relating to his personal effects,
bank account, etc., are only to be taken into
account if he had already established a permanent
residence here.
At the time when his parents had entered
Canada to establish a permanent home here, he
had not accompanied them but, on the contrary,
he had, some time previously, gone directly to
California from Europe. After his first two-week
visit to his parents' home in Toronto in 1982 his
next entry into Canada was at the time of the
above-mentioned 30-day visit during the 1983-
1984 Christmas season. He fully intended to
return to his residence in California and did indeed
do so. He stated however that, at the time, his
ultimate intention was to eventually return to
Canada permanently and to become a Canadian
citizen. I accept this evidence. But the question is
whether, by his visit to Canada, he had in fact
established a permanent residence here.
The mere fact that he left some personal effects
with them on his departure, such as books, and
possibly some articles of clothing, must be weighed
against the fact that he had left in California
personal effects, books and clothing, which were
there at his residence on his return. I fail to see
how, because of his 30-day visit to his parent's
home in Canada at Christmas time in 1983, it can
be said that by that act and in those circum
stances, he established a permanent residence for
himself here. The objective evidence falls short of
establishing permanent residence of the respondent
in Canada at that time.
Since the appeal is being allowed and therefore
the approval of the application for citizenship
granted by the Citizenship Court is being disal
lowed, counsel for the respondent has requested
that, pursuant to the provisions of section 15 of the
Act, I should consider recommending to the Minis
ter, that he, pursuant to subsection 5(3), or that
the Governor in Council, pursuant to subsection
5(4), waive the residence requirements in the
present case.
This is a request that often occurs on appeals
before this Court and, unfortunately, conflicting
decisions have been reached by the Trial Division
which, because of subsection 14(6) has the final
say in citizenship appeals. Subsection 14(6) reads
as follows:
14....
(6) A decision of the Court pursuant to an appeal made
under subsection (5) is, subject to section 20, final and, not
withstanding any other Act of Parliament, no appeal lies
therefrom.
[Note: Section 20 is not applicable to the case at bar.]
The only provision dealing with a duty to recom
mend to the Minister is to be found in the follow
ing provision of section 15:
15. (1) Where a citizenship judge is unable to approve an
application under subsection 14(2), the judge shall, before
deciding not to approve it, consider whether or not to recom
mend an exercise of discretion under subsection 5(3) or (4) or
subsection 9(2) as the circumstances may require.
(2) Where a citizenship judge makes a recommendation for
an exercise of discretion under subsection (1), the judge shall
(b) transmit the recommendation to the Minister with the
reasons therefor; . .
The appeal before this Court has been instituted
under the provisions of subsection 14(5) which
reads in part as follows:
14... .
(5) The Minister or the applicant may appeal to the Court
from the decision of the citizenship judge under subsection (2)
by filing a notice of appeal in the Registry of the Court ....
It is trite law that a right of appeal must be
provided for by statute, failing which no right
exists. It is equally trite law that since an appeal is
statutory, the jurisdiction is strictly limited by the
text of the section granting the appeal rights. Also
any provision conferring jurisdiction on a tribunal
of limited statutory origin must be strictly con
strued (Canadian National Ry. Co. v. Lewis et al.
[1930] Ex.C.R. 145).
Subsection 14(5) provides that the decision of
the citizenship judge is subject to appeal and not
his recommendations. Section 15 refers to the
citizenship judge's obligation to consider whether a
recommendation should or should not be made.
There is not the slightest inkling that the Federal
Court should make any such recommendation. It is
the decision to approve or to not approve the
application for citizenship which is under appeal
and nothing else.
Because the Court has not been granted juris
diction to make any recommendation to the Minis
ter, I must refrain from doing so, but more impor
tantly, however, had the Court Trial Division been
specifically authorized to do so by statute, it would
be improper in my view for me to take part in any
such administrative process. Any provision pur
porting to oblige our Court, as a court of superior
jurisdiction, to engage in making a merely
administrative recommendation would be uncon
stitutional. Our Constitution and indeed our entire
political system which we inherited from England
is based on the strict principle of separation of
powers. To attempt by statute to impose on a court
of superior jurisdiction and indeed on any court of
law, the legal duty of becoming part and parcel of
the administrative process by requiring any such
court to make administrative recommendations to
Ministers, would be to fly in the face of that
principle and indeed to relegate the Court to the
rank of a mere adviser to the Minister. Attempting
to impose on a member of the court, by the
provisions of any Act of Parliament, otherwise
than as persona designata, a purely administrative
role which, in this particular case would not even
involve an administrative decision-making one but
merely a duty to recommend, would completely
distort the judicial character of our Court. Indeed
it appears that by expressing sections 14 and 15 of
the Act as they did our legislators were careful to
avoid that particular pitfall. Also it seems clear to
me that, in exercising the appellate jurisdiction
conferred by subsection 14(5) a judge of the Trial
Division of the Federal Court cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered as exercis
ing an administrative function as a persona desig-
nata since that jurisdiction is granted "to the
Court", which under section 2 is defined as "the
Federal Court—Trial Division".
Even if the section had referred to "a judge of
the Court" rather than to "the Court" this would
not have sufficed. The Supreme Court of Canada
has now greatly limited the occasions when a judge
may be considered as acting as persona designata
by ruling that it must be clearly so stated in the
statute which must be strictly interpreted.
Herman et al. v. Deputy Attorney General
(Can.), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 729, dealt with an attempt
by the Federal Court of Appeal to review a deci
sion of a section 96 judge, by saying that he was
acting as persona designata under subsection
231(4) of the Income Tax Act. This section deals
with the determination of a question of solicitor
and client privilege by either a Federal Court
judge or a section 96 judge. The Supreme Court
held that the judge was acting as a judge of the
court, and was therefore not reviewable under
section 28 of the Federal Court Act. They stated
that whenever a statutory power is conferred on a
judge of the court, it should be deemed to be
exercised as representing the court unless there is
shown a clear contrary intention. The concept of
the persona designata is that of a judge exercising,
pursuant to statute, an unusual function unrelated
to his normal functions as a judge.
The concept was again reviewed by the Supreme
Court in Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development v. Ranville et al., [ 1982] 2 S.C.R.
518, where they decided that it was too confusing
and should be "jettisoned". Confirming the
Herman decision, the Court held that where a
statutory power is conferred on a section 96 judge
or an officer of the Court, it should be deemed to
be exercised in an official capacity as representing
the court unless there is an express provision to the
contrary.
In Air Canada v. Wardair Canada (1975) Ltd.,
[1980] 1 F.C. 120, the Federal Court of Appeal
stated, (in the context of an issue which had
become academic), that it is not the function of
courts of appeal to render judgments which in
effect are opinions or advisory in nature. The older
case of Trust & Loan Co. of Can. v. Lindquist and
Lindquist, [1933] 2 W.W.R. 410 (Sask. K.B.)
held that the powers conferred on the Debt
Adjustment Board by its governing Act [The Debt
Adjustment Act] (S.S. 1933, c. 82) to act on
compassionate grounds were not possessed by the
courts. For the courts to act on such grounds
would be to assume a power and jurisdiction they
do not possess.
Due to the extraordinarily rapid growth of
administrative law in the last few years, the great
proliferation of boards and administrative tri
bunals and the resulting involvement of Courts in
controlling their roles and decisions, there is a
great danger for the public in general and even for
the legal profession to overlook the fundamental
principle of separation of powers. Lately we have
been frequently invited by counsel to come to
decisions which are purely administrative in every
sense of the word. Requests of this nature would
have been unthinkable only a few years ago. The
independent judicial role of the courts must be
strictly protected to ensure the independence of the
judiciary and the unimpeded protection of the
public against all unauthorized, improper and
unjust applications of the administrative, political
and executive powers of the state. In order to be
able to do so courts of law must not be involved in
exercising any of these non-judicial functions or
powers.
It is most important, in my view, to note at this
stage that the Minister may exercise his discretion
under subsection 5(3) and the Governor in Council
under subsection 5(4) without any recommenda
tion from a citizenship judge or any other official.
There is nothing to prevent an applicant for citi
zenship from applying either directly or through
any other person or representative to either the
Minister or the Governor General in Council. Sub
section 15 (1) imposes on the citizenship judge the
duty to consider making a recommendation but in
no way limits the general discretionary powers
granted to the Minister and to the Governor in
Council under section 5.
Notwithstanding the strong views which I have
expressed in this and other citizenship appeal cases
on the subject of the jurisdiction of our court to
make administrative recommendations, it appears
that several of my brother judges have taken a
different view. Attached hereto as an appendix is a
list of cases where it was apparently considered
proper to exercise a jurisdiction in that area and of
other cases where a jurisdiction was refused. This
is not necessarily comprehensive but illustrates the
extent of diametrically opposed views as to the
effect of subsection 14(5).
On reading the decisions shown in the appendix
however, it appears that, in the majority of cases,
the question of jurisdiction was neither raised nor
considered. Over half of the cases which I myself
heard where the applicant for a citizenship was not
successful, no comments were offered by the
amicus curiae regarding a request by counsel for
the applicant that I consider making a recommen
dation should the applicant not be successful. This
lack of consideration of the question is quite
understandable since the appeals are not truly
adversary in nature, as the Minister has no counsel
or representative to argue the appeal and the amici
curiae usually only respond when questions are
raised by the Court.
Be that as it may, the conflicting jurisprudence
should be resolved either by legislation or by the
Court of Appeal. With regard to the latter
remedy, it appears that an appeal on a question of
refusal to exercise jurisdiction is still open in citi
zenship appeal cases notwithstanding the provi
sions of subsection 14(6) previously quoted above.
Section 27 of the Federal Court Act [R.S.C.,
1985, c. F-7] provides that an appeal lies to the
Federal Court of Appeal from any final judgment,
judgment on a question of law, or interlocutory
judgment of the Trial Division. Subsection 14(6)
of the Citizenship Act prevents any decision of the
Trial Division from being appealed. I have in the
present case, refused to accept jurisdiction and
refused to decide or even consider the question of a
possible recommendation to the Minister. Such a
refusal to exercise jurisdiction granted to me by
the Citizenship Act, if in fact it has been so
granted, does not constitute a "decision" as con
templated in subsection 14(6). The decision there
in contemplated is one on the merits of the
application. After hearing the evidence, had I
rejected jurisdiction and categorically refused to
decide the question of sufficiency of residence
which was in issue before me, surely one or other
of the parties involved would have the right to
apply to the Court of Appeal for relief. Similarly,
if, pursuant to subsection 14(5), jurisdiction does
exist for the Court to consider making an adminis
trative recommendation to the Minister, my refus
al to comply constitutes in effect a refusal to
perform a duty imposed on me by the statute in
which event the Court of Appeal surely would
have jurisdiction pursuant to section 27 of the
Federal Court Act or, failing that, the necessary
supervisory jurisdiction over its Trial Division to
order me to act. Otherwise, the clear intention of
the legislators that the questions raised in the Act
be determined would be totally defeated.
A decision of the Court of Appeal on this issue
would fully resolve it once and for all. To save
further confusion and future wrangling over what
is essentially a simple issue, an appeal against my
decision would be most desirable. Since the
administration of justice in general and the effi
cient disposal of citizenship appeals in particular
would undoubtedly benefit greatly from a decision
of the Court of Appeal, it is possible that the
Minister might consider paying all legal costs of
the appellant regardless of the ultimate disposition
of the case.
APPENDIX A
PRO:
Re Naber-Sykes, [1986] 3 F.C. 434; (1986), 4 F.T.R. 204
(T.D.) (Walsh J.)
Re Salon (1978), 88 D.L.R. (3d) 238 (F.C.T.D.) (Thurlow
A.C.J.)
In re Kleifges and in re Citizenship Act, [1978] 1 F.C. 734;
(1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 183 (T.D.) (Walsh J.)
Re Maefs (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 697 (F.C.T.D.) (Grant
D.J.)
In re Chute and in re Citizenship Act, [1982] 1 F.C. 98 (T.D.)
(Walsh J.) (note that he does not exercise this power in the
circumstances)
Re Kerho (1988), 21 F.T.R. 180 (F.C.T.D.) (Teitelbaum J.)
Re Ngo (1986), 6 F.T.R. 81 (F.C.T.D.) (Denault J.—(no
discussion)
Re Ballhorn (1981), 131 D.L.R. (3d) 505 (F.C.T.D.)
(Mahoney J.)
Re Aboumalhab (1987), 17 F.T.R. 180 (F.C.T.D.) (Pinard
J.)—adopts Re Salon
Re Brown (T-2724-80, Dubé J., judgment dated 3/11/80,
F.C.T.D., not reported)—(does not exercise the power)
Re Steiner (T-503-78, Dubé J., judgment dated 2/6/78,
F.C.T.D., not reported)
Re Anderson (T-1066-78, Décary J., judgment dated 11/7/78,
F.C.T.D., not reported)
Re Johnston (T-4908-77, Walsh J., judgment dated 8/5/78,
F.C.T.D., not reported)
Re Turcan (T-3202-78, Walsh J., judgment dated 6/10/78,
F.C.T.D., not reported)
Re Hoang (T-727-89, Denault J., judgment dated 4/7/89,
F.C.T.D., not yet reported)
Re Hung-Cho (T-2676-85, Joyal J., judgment dated 28/8/86,
F.C.T.D., not reported)—(no discussion)
Re Ying (T-2677-85, Joyal J., judgment dated 28/8/86,
F.C.T.D., not reported)—(no discussion)
Re Mitha (T-4832-78, Cattanach J., judgment dated 1/6/79,
F.C.T.D., not reported)—(exercises power even though he
thinks it is improper.) (Refer subsequent decision in Amendola,
infra.)
Re Zakrzewski (T-599-78, Dubé J., judgment dated 2/6/78,
F.C.T.D., not reported)
Re Karroum (T-1622-89, Pinard J., judgment dated 2/3/90,
F.C.T.D., not yet reported)
CON:
In re Akins and in re the Citizenship Act, [1978] 1 F.C. 757;
(1978), 87 D.L.R. (3d) 93 (T.D.) (Addy J.)
Re Conroy (1979), 99 D.L.R. (3d) 642 (F.C.T.D.) (Cattanach
J.)
In re Boutros and in re Citizenship Act, [1980] 1 F.C. 624;
(1980), 109 D.L.R. (3d) 680 (T.D.) (Addy J.)
In re Aaron and in re Citizenship Act, [1982] 2 F.C. 348
(T.D.) (Addy J.)
Re Anquist, [1985] 1 W.W.R. 562; (1984), 34 Alta. L.R. (2d)
241 (F.C.T.D.) (Muldoon J.)
Lakha (In re) and in re Citizenship Act, [1981] 1 F.C. 746
(T.D.) (Cattanach J.)
In re Albers (T-75-78, Addy J., judgment dated 11/5/78,
F.C.T.D., not reported)—(no discussion)
Re Zakowski (T-2054-85, Addy J., order dated 28/2/86,
F.C.T.D., not reported)
Re Amendola (T-177-82, Cattanach J., judgment dated 7/4/82,
F.C.T.D., not reported)—(adopts Re Akins)
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.