Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

T-1560-90
Joachim Pinto (Applicant) v.
Minister of Employment and Immigration and Secretary of State for External Affairs (Respond- ents)
INDEXED AS: PINTO V. CANADA (MINISTER OF EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION) (T.D.)
Trial Division, MacKay J.—Toronto, September 11; Ottawa, November 27, 1990.
Immigration — Admission to Canada under Foreign Domestic Movement (FDM) Program denied despite CEC validation of employment offer — Standards of assessment imposed by visa officer not required by Immigration Regula tions — Assessment relating only to defined classifications failure to assess experience relevant to employment offered — Visa officer guided strictly by Immigration Manual relating to FDM criteria — Reliance upon requirement for formal train ing or full-time employment in relation to each aspect of employment instead of assessing skills relevant to employment offered — Rigid and undue notion of specialization — Error in law — Court not acting as appellate tribunal but reviewing visa officer's decision — Certiorari granted, application to be reconsidered.
Judicial review — Prerogative writs — Certiorari quashing decision by visa officer and refusal by Minister to issue visa with employment authorization, and mandamus ordering application reassessed according to law — Reliance by visa officer on Immigration Manual error of law in so far as it misinterprets law — Visa officer improperly fettering discre tion — Must consider qualifications and experience of appli cant for "employment for which the employment authorization is sought".
This was a section 18 application for certiorari to quash the decision of a visa officer in New Delhi and the Minister's refusal to issue a visa with an employment authorization to the applicant's cousin; the applicant also sought mandamus in order to have the visa application reassessed according to law. Applicant and his wife operate a busy supermarket and gas station at Peterborough, Ontario. Their household includes a child and the wife's elderly parents who have medical problems and speak only Konkani. Having unsuccessfully advertised for domestic help in a Toronto newspaper, the applicant offered his cousin, Ms. Quadros, a citizen of India, employment as a live-in domestic worker under the Foreign Domestic Movement (FDM) Program. Despite validation of the employment offer by the Canada Employment Centre at Peterborough, a visa officer in Madras, India, refused Ms. Quadros' application on the ground that she did not meet the FDM criteria. After three
unsuccessful attempts, the applicant consulted a lawyer who wrote to the Minister, seeking a Minister's permit and to the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi, seeking reconsider ation of its refusal to grant an employment authorization. Both requests were denied.
The applicant submitted that the visa officer erred in law in assessing Ms. Quadros' application to enter Canada as a tem porary worker by imposing standards of assessment not required by the Immigration Regulations and that he improper ly fettered his discretion by relying upon the guidelines con tained in the Immigration Manual, to the exclusion of other relevant considerations. It was also argued that the visa officer failed in his duty of fairness towards Ms. Quadros. The reasons for refusing her application were that she did not meet the criteria for selection, that she did not have relevant experience because her profession was teacher rather than housekeeper or child care worker and that the employment offer was not bona fide, but was rather a means of allowing her to obtain a visa, despite CEC validation of the employment offer.
Held, the application should be allowed.
The visa officer assessing Ms. Quadros' application had the obligation to consider the employment offer as one outlined by the employer and with reference to the unique circumstances set out by the CEC officer at Peterborough. Paragraph 20(3)(b) of the Immigration Regulations requires the visa officer to consider "the qualifications and experience of the applicant for the employment for which the employment authorization is sought". The visa officer took into consider ation various factors that had nothing to do with assessing Ms. Quadros' qualifications for the position offered: the fact that the applicant sought to employ a particular person for some two and a half years; the fact that she did not know the ages of the elderly couple or whether they had any special care needs; the belief that her application was motivated by a desire to settle in Canada to obtain greater opportunities for her daughter and the fact that she had no idea what she might do in Canada three or four years from now if she were no longer required by the employer. All those matters were irrelevant in deciding whether her employment in Canada would adversely affect employment opportunities for Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada.
Rather than recognizing that the qualifications possessed by the applicant, Ms. Quadros, had to be assessed in view of the requirements of the employment offer, the visa officer had been guided strictly by the requirements in the Immigration Manual relating to the FDM criteria. Although a teacher is not a child care worker, to the extent that the skills required of a teacher are similar to those required of a child care worker, some credit must be given for "experience" with these skills. Reliance, by the visa officer, upon the Manual constitutes an error of law in so far as it misinterprets the law. A visa officer may issue an employment authorization when he is satisfied, inter alia, that the applicant is qualified for the employment offered. The visa officer here did improperly fetter his discretion and his conclu-
sion that Ms. Quadros did not possess any significant experi ence related to the qualifications and experience required under paragraph 20(3)(b) of the Regulations was patently unreason able. An unreasonable exercise of a tribunal's discretion consti tutes jurisdictional error: Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038. The other factors referred to in relation to the consideration of the bona fides of the employ ment offered were irrelevant to the decision of the visa officer and to have considered them was an error of law.
The Court herein is not acting as an appellate tribunal, but simply reviewing the decision made by the visa officer; it has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the visa officer. Accordingly, the visa officer's decision should be quashed and the application reconsidered in accordance with the Act and Regulations.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, s. 18.
Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2, ss. 8(1), 9(3), 114(1)(a),(j) (as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 29).
Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172, s. 18(1) (as am. by SOR/89-80, s. 1), s. 20 (as am. by SOR/80- 21, s. 7; SOR/84-849, s. 2).
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
FOLLOWED:
Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038; (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 416; 26 C.C.E.L. 85; 89 CLLC 14,031; 93 N.R. 183.
APPLIED:
Hajariwala v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 79; (1988), 34 Admin. L.R. 206; 23 F.T.R. 241; 6 Imm. L.R. (2d) 222 (T.D.).
DISTINGUISHED:
Fung v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1989), 27 F.T.R. 182 (F.C.T.D.); Wang (L.) v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1988), 23 F.T.R. 257; 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.T.D.); Yu v. Canada (Minis- ter of Employment and Immigration), T-1550-90, F.C.T.D., MacKay J., judgment dated 10/8/90, not reported.
AUTHORS CITED
Canada. Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations. Ottawa: Department of Employment and Immigration, 1971-1977.
COUNSEL:
Barbara L. Jackman for applicant. Claire A. Le Riche for respondents.
SOLICITORS:
Jackman, Silcoff, Zambelli, Toronto, for applicant.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondents.
The following are the reasons for order ren dered in English by
MACKAY J.: This is an application under sec tion 18 of the Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, seeking an order of certiorari to quash a decision by a visa officer at the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi, said to be made June 12 and December 18, both in 1989, and the deci sion of the Minister of Employment and Immigra tion of December 14, 1989, refusing to issue a visa with an employment authorization to Ms. Renny Quadros. Had the visa been issued Ms. Quadros would have been enabled to come to Canada to accept employment offered by the applicant herein, Joachim Pinto, which employment had been approved by authorization of an employment officer of the Canada Employment Centre (CEC) at Peterborough, Ontario. The applicant also seeks mandamus to order that the application be reas sessed according to law.
It is clear from exhibits filed with the affidavit of the applicant Pinto that the visa officer's deci sion giving rise to these proceedings was made in June 1989 and communicated to the CEC at Pet- erborough by telex sent June 18 or 19 and noted as "In 20 June 89" by staff at that CEC. The other "decisions" referred to in the motion by dates in December, of both the visa officer and the Minis ter, are not separate decisions, except in so far as they respectively declined to reconsider the June 1989 decision of the visa officer. They do not, in my opinion, constitute separate decisions subject to judicial review for they each consist of descriptive reviews or explanations related to the June 1989, or earlier, decisions of the visa officer. It is suffi cient for disposition of this application to consider
only the decision of June 1989 as of concern for the relief sought.
Background
Ms. Renny Quadros, a citizen of India and the cousin of the applicant Pinto, had been offered employment as a live-in domestic worker by the applicant, who sought to arrange her admission to Canada on a temporary basis under the "FDM Program" for admission of foreign domestic work ers, arranged under the responsibilities of the respondent Minister of Employment and Immigra tion. In his affidavit, sworn February 8, 1990, Pinto outlines a series of events leading to this application to the court.
The applicant owns and operates, with much assistance from his wife, a supermarket and gas station in Peterborough. The businesses are suc cessful, employing more than 30 staff, and they require substantial commitment of time and effort by both the applicant and his wife. Their household includes three others, their eleven-year- old daughter, and the wife's parents who are elder ly, with medical conditions requiring care and attention, and who speak only Konkani, their mother tongue.
In light of their business and domestic respon sibilities, the applicant and his wife decided in 1986 that they would seek domestic help. They travelled to India in the fall of that year and following that visit they decided to offer employ ment to Ms. Quadros, after seeing her at a large family gathering. The evidence, particularly Pin to's affidavit, a letter he wrote to the visa officer in November 1987, and subsequent correspondence of Pinto's, are contradictory as to whether Ms. Quadros met with or was interviewed by Pinto or any of his family during their trip to India. After later denial by Ms. Quadros that they had then met, Pinto confirmed that she was correct, though he and his wife had "observed her" at a family gathering. Surprisingly his representations, one of which was clearly wrong, were apparently taken later by the visa officer in New Delhi as a basis for questioning Ms. Quadros' credibility. Upon return-
ing to Canada, and after advertising unsuccessful ly in a Toronto newspaper for domestic help, the applicant secured a validation of employment offer from the Canada Employment Centre in Peterbor- ough to offer employment to Ms. Quadros as a live-in domestic worker.
The validation authorized employment for twelve months, and it was forwarded to the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi. A visa officer interviewed Ms. Quadros on May 21, 1987 in Madras, India. Her application was refused. By telex dated 28 May 87 the decision was com municated to CEC Peterborough, as follows:
SUBJ INTERVIEWED 21MAY87 IN MADRAS FOR EMPLOY AUTH UNDER FDM AND REFUSED. SUBJ HAS NO/NO INDEPENDENT WORK EXPERIENCE AS A DOMESTIC, AND HAS NEVER/NEVER WORKED OUTSIDE HER OWN HOME. SUBJ HAS NO/NO TEACH ING EXPERIENCE. SHE HAS LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF HER EMPLOYMENT OR WORKING CONDITIONS IN CANADA. SUBJ REFUSED AS NOT/NOT MEETING FDM CRITERIA.
At Pinto's request a CEC officer in Peterbor- ough sought clarification of the reasons for refusal, indicating Ms. Quadros was a qualified teacher, currently engaged in teaching, who had run her own household for 20 years, and asking what might be done to reassess her application. The High Commission in New Delhi responded, expanding reasons given in its first telex but con cluding there was no ground warranting favour able reconsideration.
The applicant persisted in his efforts to employ Ms. Quadros. In September 1987 he wrote to the "Canadian Embassy" in New Delhi outlining his continuing interest in employing her and her anticipated duties, and explaining that her earlier response about her teaching qualifications and experience had been the result of fear on her part that if her government employers learned of her interest in other employment she might lose her
current job, and her livelihood if the prospective job with Pinto did not materialize. He enclosed a letter from the family physician of the elderly couple which expressed support for employment in the home of a person from India who could speak Konkani and provide many hours of home care each day.
At about the same time, the applicant obtained from CEC Peterborough a second authorization validating his offer of employment to Ms. Quad- ros, again for a period of 12 months as a tempo rary worker, a live-in housekeeper. Officials in the Immigration Section in New Delhi sought to dis courage her from seeking a second interview but one was arranged at her request after a further letter addressed to the High Commission in New Delhi by the applicant Pinto. Following that inter view Ms. Quadros' application was again refused and she was advised by letter that she did not meet the requirements of the Canadian Immigration Act [R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2] and regulations. That decision was explained in a telex of March 2, 1988 to CEC Peterborough, as follows:
(QUADROS) RENNY DOB 28AUG47
INTERVIEWED SUBJ 22FEB IN BMBAY. SUBJ NOW PROVIDED EVIDENCE THAT SHE HAS BEEN A PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER FOR THE PAST 16 YRS. STATES, SHE DID NOT/NOT TELL US THIS THE FIRST TIME OWING TO FEAR OF LOSING POSITION. SHE IS A WIDOW WITH A 17 YR OLD DTR LIVING IN SAME HOUSEHOLD WITH BROTHER, SISTER AND MOTHER. SHE IS A COUSIN OF ER. SHE HAS HAD NO/NO OUTSIDE EXPERIENCE AS A DOMESTIC, NANNY OR SENIOR CITIZENS CARE WORKERS. SHE DID NOT/NOT KNOW THE AGES OF ERS IN-LAWS OR IF THEY HAVE ANY SPECIAL CARE NEEDS. SHE CLEARLY DENIED MTG THEM IN INDIA SAYING SHE ONLY SAW THEM IN 1971 AT ERS WEDDING. THIS IS IN CONTRADICTION OF ERS ASSER TION THAT THE IN-LAWS INTERVIEWED HER IN OCT86. WHEN ASKED WHAT SHE MIGHT DO IN CDA THREE OR FOUR YRS FROM NOW IF NO/NO LONGER REQUIRED BY ER, SHE HAD NO/NO IDEA WHAT SHE WOULD DO. SUBJ LACKS RELEVANT EXPERIENCE IN EITHER CHILD OR ELDERLY PERSONS CARE. WITHIN HER OWN HOUSEHOLD, SISTER AND MOTHER HAVE MAINTAINED HOME DURING THE DAY WHILE SHE CARRIED ON HER TEACHING CAREER. BELIEVE APPLN MOTIVATED BY EVENTUAL DESIRE TO SETTLE HERSELF ANDDTR IN CDA FOR GREATER OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE LATER WHOM SHE REITE RATED DURING THE INTERVIEW IS)A-VERY HLLIANT STU DENT. SUBJ FAILS CURRENT CRITERIA AS SET OUT IN IS 15.61(3). AS SHE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE MOTIVATION, RESOURCEFULNESS OR INITIATIVE ABOUT ANY FUTURE ABIL-
ITY TO SETTLE SUCCESSFULLY IN CDA, SHE ALSO DOES NOT/ NOT MEET EARLIER FDM CRITERIA. THIS DECISION IS FINAL.
The applicant persisted. He contacted his Member of Parliament, who wrote a letter on his behalf to the Minister of State for Immigration. A copy of the response of the Minister of Employ ment and Immigration to that Member, filed with applicant's affidavit, includes the following para graphs:
Visa officials in New Delhi advise me that they interviewed Mrs. Quadros on February 22, 1988, and that she did provide evidence that she has been a teacher for the past sixteen years. She did not tell visa officials of this experience the first time because she was fearful of losing her position. Notwithstanding this experience, Mrs. Quadros has no outside experience as a domestic, a nanny or a senior citizen care worker. She did not know the ages of Mr. Pinto's parents-in-law nor if they had any special care needs. When asked about meeting these people, she clearly denied meeting them in October 1986, although your constituents state that she was interviewed by the parents-in- law at that time. The only time Mrs. Quadros met them was at your constituents' wedding in 1971.
According to visa officials, Mrs. Quadros is a widow with a seventeen-year-old daughter. When questioned about her future plans in Canada, if your constituents no longer needed her, she could not demonstrate any motivation, resourcefulness or initia tive nor any future ability to settle successfully in Canada. For these reasons, coupled with the fact that Mrs. Quadros failed to meet the criteria of the Foreign Domestic Movement program at an earlier interview, I find that I must concur with the visa officials' decision to refuse Mrs. Quadros' application.
Thereafter, Pinto obtained a third validation of employment offer. This validation was forwarded to the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi. The Canada Employment Centre officer also sent a covering letter, stating, in part, that the employ er has a "unique circumstance in relation to the need for a foreign domestic worker". He then itemized the nature of the "unique circumstance", essentially that Ms. Quadros was known and trust ed by the wife's parents and spoke their language; she had qualifications as a teacher enabling her to
assist the daughter with homework and to enforce the customs of her Indian heritage; and she was trusted by the family, an important factor with money from the businesses kept in the home from time to time. Ms. Quadros was again interviewed, and her application was again refused. This time a telex to CEC Peterborough, sent June 18 or 19, 1989, set out the reasons for the decision, as follows:
SUBJ IS 1102 APP AS FDM DESTINED TO ER (PINTO) JOACHIM. THIS IS THIRD TIME SINCE DEC86 SUBJ HAS BEEN ASSESSED AS FDM. EACH TIME SHE HAS BEEN REFUSED. REASONS FOR REFUSAL CLEARLY OUTLINED IN OURTEL TO YOU NBR WBIM79O8 OF 02MAR88. NOTHING HAS CHANGED THIS END OTHER THAN SUBJ HAS COMPLETED ONE MONTH COURSE IN BEAUTY, HEALTH AND COOKING. ER HAS BEEN TRYING TO HAVE SUBJ FOR OVER 2' YEARS. IF NEED FOR DOMESTIC AS CRITICAL AS THEY WISH US TO BELIEVE DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND WHY THEY PERSIST IN SPONSORING SUBJ RATHER THAN SOMEONE QUALIFIED AS DOMESTIC/HISTORY IN APP OF MISINFORMATION PROVIDED BY BOTH ER AND SUBJ. BELIEVE AS STATED IN EARLIER TEL OFFER OF DOMES TIC POSITION SIMPLY INTENDED TO FACILITATE ENTRY OF SUBJ AND CHILD TO CDA. DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE APP MEETS FDM REQUIREMENTS-NO/NO FULL TIME DOMESTIC EXPERI ENCE, LIMITED QUALI IN ENGLISH. HAVE ONCE AGAIN REFUSED.
The applicant then obtained legal counsel. His solicitor wrote to the Minister of Employment and Immigration, seeking a minister's permit, and wrote to the Canadian High Commission in New Delhi, seeking a reconsideration of its refusal to grant an employment authorization. As noted ear lier, neither request was granted; by letters from both in December 1989 the refusal to grant a visa was merely reviewed.
The Law and Policy Applicable
The law applicable in this matter is found in the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2 and the Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172, as
amended. Relevant provisions of the Act include the following [sections 8(1), 9(3), 114(1)(a), (j) (as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (4th Supp.), c. 28, s. 29)]:
8. (1) Where a person seeks to come into Canada, the burden of proving that that person has a right to come into Canada or that his admission would not be contrary to this Act or the regulations rests on that person.
9....
(3) Every person shall answer truthfully all questions put to that person by a visa officer and shall produce such documenta tion as may be required by the visa officer for the purpose of establishing that his admission would not be contrary to this Act or the regulations.
114. (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations
(a) providing for the establishment and application of ,selec- tion standards based on such factors as family relationships, education, language, skill, occupational experience and other personal attributes and attainments, together with demo graphic considerations and labour market conditions in Canada, for the purpose of determining whether or not an immigrant will be able to become successfully established in Canada;
(j) prohibiting persons or classes of persons, other than Canadian citizens and permanent residents, from engaging or continuing in employment in Canada without authorization, prescribing the types of terms and conditions that may be imposed in connection with such authorization and exempt ing any person or class of persons from the requirement to obtain such an authorization.
The regulations relevant here are subsection 18(1) [as am. by SOR/89-80, s. 1] and section 20 [as am. by'SOR/80-21, s. 7; SOR/84-849, s. 2], which provide, in part:
18. (1) Subject to subsections 19(1) to (2.2), no person, other than a Canadian citizen or permanent resident, shall engage or continue in employment in Canada without a valid and subsisting employment authorization.
20. (1) An immigration officer shall not issue an employ ment authorization to a person if,
(a) in his opinion, employment of the person in Canada will adversely affect employment opportunities for Canadian citi zens or permanent residents in Canada.....
(3) In order to form an opinion for the purposes of para graph (1)(a), an immigration officer shall consider
(a) whether the prospective employer has made reasonable efforts to hire or train Canadian citizens or permanent
residents for the employment with respect to which an employment authorization is sought;
(b) the qualifications and experience of the applicant for the employment for which the employment authorization is sought; and
(c) whether the wages and working conditions offered are sufficient to attract and retain in employment Canadian citizens or permanent residents.
(4) Where an immigration officer considers the questions set out in paragraphs (3)(a) and (c), he shall take into consider ation the opinion of an officer of the office of the National Employment Service serving the area in which the person seeking an employment authorization wishes to engage in employment.
The onus of satisfying the visa officer that she met criteria for admission to Canada was here on Ms. Quadros (subsection 8(1)) and she had an obligation to provide truthful answers and infor mation to questions asked of her in the process (subsection 9(3)). There is no doubt that the Gov ernor in Council acting under paragraphs 114(1)(a) and (j) could have provided by regula tion specific arrangements for admission of foreign domestic workers. Yet that was not done. The only regulations directly applicable in this case are the sections noted above and by these Ms. Quadros was required to have a valid employment authori zation if she was to work in Canada and she was only entitled to that employment authorization on the conditions set out in section 20 of which the key element here was the assessment of the qualifi cations and experience of Ms. Quadros "for the employment for which the employment authoriza tion is sought" under paragraph 20(3)(b).
Though there are no regulations dealing specifi cally with arrangements for admission to Canada of foreign domestic workers, policy guidelines of the respondent Minister of Employment and Immigration, contained in an Immigration Manual, provide for a Foreign Domestic Move ment (FDM) Program in considerable detail. Among the provisions relating to the FDM Pro gram, sections 15.26 and 15.61 of the Manual outline the underlying philosophy and arrange ments concerning occupations recognized under the Program and selection criteria for applicants. The Program is described as designed for the professional domestic or nanny able to assume management of a household and for care of chil-
dren or the duties specified within designated occupational classifications, and who are expected to be live-in household domestic workers. The designated occupational classifications include those of housekeeper, companion, servant-domes tic, baby-sitter, children's nurse, and parent's helper, as defined in the Canadian Classification and Dictionary of Occupations (CCDO), a publi cation of Employment and Immigration Canada which serves as an aid to immigration and employ ment officers. In order to qualify under the occu pational classifications, a prospective immigrant or foreign temporary worker is expected to meet the requirements set out in relation to the relevant classifications. For example, one of the require ments that must be met is "specific vocational preparation". For the occupations here included that preparation varies: anything from a short demonstration up to 30 days for a companion, a baby-sitter and a parent's helper; over 30 days up to 3 months for a servant-domestic; over 3 months up to 6 months for a children's nurse; and over 6 months up to a year for a housekeeper.
The Foreign Domestic Worker Program guide lines establish criteria for assessment in subsection 15.61(3), which provides:
a) The applicant must show evidence of either formal training in the domestic and/or child care field or sufficient experience (minimum of one year satisfactorily-rated, full-time paid employment as a domestic to compensate for a lack of formal training). Training or experience must have occurred within the preceding five-year period.
b) For clarity, formal training means successful completion of a recognized program of study at a state or private institution in the occupation to be followed under the FDM. Successful completion is demonstrated by the applicant having been awarded a diploma, certificate or its equivalent.
c) The level of education should be sufficient to enable the applicant to successfully perform the duties in the job offer. For example, a housekeeper may not require the same level of education as would the nanny responsible for the care and nurturing of children.
d) The applicant must be able to communicate orally and in writing in either French or English. An applicant's ability to properly react in circumstances of emergency and be able to secure proper assistance for the children in their care would be
severely undermined if they were unable to make themselves properly understood.
e) By its very nature, live-in domestic employment tends to demand certain personal qualities. Applicants will be screened to determine if they are resourceful, mature, stable and possess the initiative required to deal with possible emergencies.
f) The fact that applicants may be married and/or have dependants should be considered in relation to their back ground and work history and the eventual self-sufficiency of the family unit; however, applications should not be refused only on the basis that the applicant has dependants.
(While there is some uncertainty about the rele vance of the assessment criterion in paragraph (e), relating to motivation or initiative, which was said not to have been applied by the visa officer making a decision in respect of this final application, it was a factor in earlier refusals, is referred to in expla nation of the second, and is incorporated by refer ence as a factor in the third decision by the visa officer's telex of June 1989.)
Issues and Argument
The applicant submits that "the visa officer erred in law in assessing Ms. Quadros' application to enter Canada as a temporary worker by impos ing standards of assessment not required by the Immigration Regulations". The standards referred to are some requirements of the Manual, and other factors that were irrelevant to assessing Ms. Quad- ros' qualifications. The applicant also submits that the visa officer improperly fettered his discretion by relying upon the guidelines contained in the Immigration Manual, to the exclusion of other relevant considerations. The guidelines were inter preted, it was submitted, as mandatory require ments, as though they were the law and not as guidelines. Thus, both these arguments are found ed upon an allegation that the standards of assess ment applied did not conform to law. The appli cant also submits that the visa officer failed in his duty of fairness towards Ms. Quadros, in particu lar by not treating the third application as one requiring assessment apart from his earlier con sideration of previous applications.
Consideration of the first two issues raised by the applicant requires an examination of the rea sons for refusal of Ms. Quadros' third application for a visa with employment authorization. Those reasons were contained in a telex from New Delhi to the Canada Employment Centre in Peterbor- ough, dated June 18 or 19, 1989, and, by its reference, the earlier telex in March 1988. Counsel were agreed that the later message, stating the earlier one had clearly outlined the reasons for refusal, incorporated by reference the reasons for the second refusal as reasons for refusing the application a third time. The two messages refer to a number of matters that can be classed within two general reasons for refusal, that Ms. Quadros did not meet the criteria for selection, and that the employment offer was not bona fide, but was rather a means of allowing Ms. Quadros to obtain a visa, despite validation of the offer of employ ment by CEC in Peterborough. Counsel for the parties dealt with the reasons stated in relation to these two general considerations.
Ms. Quadros's employment offer included employment responsibilities that went beyond the bounds of any one of the designated job classifica tions within the CCDO. She was to be a live-in housekeeper with cooking, cleaning and regular household duties, a companion for an elderly couple who would assist with their care, a cook with ability to prepare traditional Indian food, and a tutor for a young girl. She was required to speak the Konkani language for her role with the elderly couple, and was required also to warrant the trust of her employers since money was frequently left in the house. It was incumbent upon the visa officer assessing Ms. Quadros' application to con sider the employment offer as one outlined by the employer and with reference to the unique circum stances set out by the officer of CEC Peterbor- ough. That is required by paragraph 20(3)(b) of the Regulations, that the visa officer consider the qualifications and experience of the applicant for the "employment for which the employment authorization is sought".
In Fung v. Minister of Employment and Immi gration (1989), 27 F.T.R. 182 (F.C.T.D.), at page
185, Jerome A.C.J. stated:
... the duty of a visa officer in this situation is to make an assessment of an applicant's work experience sufficient to evaluate it with respect to that applicant's intended occupation, and any others which the applicant claims are included.
The respondent acknowledges this duty. In his decision, the Associate Chief Justice cited his prior decision, Hajariwala v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 79 (T.D.), which established that a visa officer is required to assess experience relevant to the employment intended to be pursued in Canada. Although these cases concern applications for per manent residence, it is my view that section 20 similarly attracts the principle, stated in Hajariwala, at page 86, that "There is no reason why the actual experience and time spent in each of the various responsibilities in an occupation cannot be broken down to award units of assess ment for experience in intended occupations." What this implies, in my view, is that although in strict definitional terms, a teacher is not a child care worker, to the extent that the skills required of a teacher are similar to those required of a child care worker, then some credit must be given for "experience" with these skills, particularly where the duties of employment are specifically set out. If the employment offered had been strictly in terms of one of the particular CCDO classifica tions, experience as a teacher may well have been irrelevant. However, when the employment offered contains enumerated duties including aspects from several occupational classifications, then an assess ment which relates only to the defined classifica tions constitutes a failure to assess experience rele vant to the employment intended to be pursued.
It is clear that although the visa officer in each of the three assessments may have recognized that there were numerous job-related tasks required in the offer of employment, there is no recognition that the qualifications possessed by the applicant,
Ms. Quadros, must be assessed in view of the requirements of the employment offer. Instead, it would seem that the visa officer was guided strict ly by the requirements in the Immigration Manual relating to the FDM criteria. See, for instance, the telex sent February 3, 1988 from New Delhi to the Canada Employment Centre in Peterborough stat ing that "employer must understand that subjectss [sic] fate is indeed governed by criteria for domes tic workers. For further reference he should be informed of criteria in Imm. Manual, IS 15.61 3)a)b)c)d) and e) which clearly state criteria". While, as pointed out by counsel for the respond ent, there is some indication that related experi ence was considered in the reasons for refusal of the second application, as revealed by the state ment that "within her own household, sister and mother have maintained home during the day while she carried on her teaching career", I cannot accept the respondent's contention that there was no evidence that the visa officer regarded the formal training or specified experience equivalent as an absolute requirement. The preponderance of material filed indicates that in considering "qualifications and experience", the visa officer considered the criteria contained in subsection 15.61(3) of the Manual, particularly paragraph (a) of that section, quoted above, which required, in lieu of formal training, a "minimum of one year satisfactorily-rated, full-time paid employment as a domestic". I note that this requirement exceeds the requirements for "specific vocational prepara tion" for the designated job classifications falling within the FDM Program, as set out in the CCDO, which are set out above.
The argument of the respondent at the hearing proceeded upon the assumption that Ms. Quadros must have the required qualifications or experience in each of the aspects of employment set out in the offer of employment. Counsel for the respondent admitted that Ms. Quadros' teaching experience was relevant to the aspect of employment relating to instruction of the daughter, but maintained that
the visa officer's decision was correct because she was not qualified in the other aspects of employ ment set out in the offer of employment. That is, she had neither training nor experience in aspects of the offer of employment including the following: the care of an eight (or eleven, at the time of the third application) year old child; the care of a senior couple, the cooking, cleaning and regular household duties, the ability to cook Indian food, and the ability to work with the senior couple who speak only Konkani. To conclude that a widow who spoke Konkani, who was a single parent with a teenaged daughter, and who had taught primary school for 16 years, had no training or experience with respect to these aspects of the offered employ ment shows reliance upon the requirement for formal training or full-time employment in rela tion to each of these specific aspects, rather than a willingness to assess the skills possessed by the applicant as these were relevant for the employ ment offered.
In my view, this reliance upon the Manual constitutes an error of law by the visa officer making the decision at issue in so far as it misin terprets the law. It must be understood that the primary purpose of the criteria is not to decide the fate of an applicant for employment authorization. Instead, it is to guide the exercise of the visa officer's discretion in assessing the application for employment authorization in light of the require ments of the Regulations. To restate the regulato ry requirements, a visa officer may issue such an authorization when he or she is satisfied, inter alia, that the applicant is qualified for the employ ment offered. Further, under subsection 20(1), the applicant's qualifications are to be assessed for the limited purpose of determining whether a grant of an employment authorization would have an adverse impact upon the employment of Canadian citizens or permanent residents. Assessing the applicant without regard to the valid purposes for which the policy guidelines have been adopted may result in an invalid exercise of the decision-making authority of the visa officer. That is what has occurred in this case.
In my view, in the circumstances here, the visa officer, did improperly fetter his discretion. More over, to conclude, as the visa officer did, that Ms. Quadros did not possess any significant related experience related to the qualifications and experi ence required under paragraph 20(3)(b) of the Regulations, was a patently unreasonable conclu sion. To conclude that she did not have "experi- ence" in those aspects of the employment offered because she was a teacher and because her sister and mother maintained the home during the day does not recognize the experience and skills required of either a primary teacher or a single mother. To conclude that she did not have relevant experience because her profession was "teacher" rather than "housekeeper" or "child care worker" imports a rigid, and in my view undue, notion of specialization. I refer to the "specific vocational preparation" requirements in the CCDO to sup port my holding. Most of those classifications rele vant for the aspects of employment required to be performed by Ms. Quadros require considerably less than one year of specific vocational prepara tion. When one takes into account the aspects of employment not covered by the assessment criteria in the guidelines, specifically that the prospective employee have the ability to speak Konkani, to prepare traditional Indian food and to warrant trust of the employer's family, then the argument becomes untenable that Ms. Quadros has not met the qualifications for the employment offered essentially because she has not had experience in full-time employment in these respects.
In reaching this alternative conclusion, I should make it clear that I have considered the argument by the respondent that the Court has no power to interfere with the "opinion" of the visa officer, and that the Court in this case is not acting as an appellate tribunal, but simply reviewing the deci sion made by the visa officer. I have no authority to substitute my decision for that of the visa officer, and I do not purport to do so. However, this case is not similar to Wang (L.) v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (1988), 23 F.T.R. 257 (F.C.T.D.) or Fung v. Minister of Employ ment and Immigration, supra, in which the visa officer carried out the assessment and reached an adverse conclusion on the issue of experience. Nor
is it comparable to Yu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (unreported, August 10, 1990, Court file no. T-1550-90) where there was no evidence of the visa officer's unwill ingness to assess any evidence of equivalence for specific vocational preparation.
There is, as I have held, an error of law in the interpretation of the governing regulations, result ing in a failure to carry out the duty of the visa officer as set out in Hajariwala, supra. With respect to my finding that the conclusion regarding experience is untenable, I adopt the reasoning of Lamer J. (as he then was) in Slaight Communica tions Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, at page 1076, that an unreasonable exercise of a tribunal's discretion constitutes jurisdictional error: "Whether it is the interpretation of legisla tion that is unreasonable or the order made in my view matters no more than the question of whether the error is one of law or of fact. An administrative tribunal exercising discretion can never do so unreasonably."
I am supported in my view by consideration of the stated goals of the FDM Program, i.e. that "The FDM program is designed for the profession al domestic or nanny". If the process of assessment followed here were applied, even a "professional domestic or nanny" would not have been qualified for the employment offered unless she also met the additional special requirements of the applicant's offer of employment by training or experience in relation to each of those aspects.
Turning now to the applicant's argument that other factors underlying the decision to refuse to grant an employment authorization to Ms. Quad- ros are irrelevant considerations in the decision- making process, and that they demonstrate that the visa officer erred in law in refusing to grant the employment authorization, it is my view that this
argument is successful. These factors all come under the general heading of the visa officer's questioning the bona fides of the employment offer. They include a number of separate, but related, reasons for refusal. Thus, the fact that the applicant Pinto sought to employ a particular person for some two and a half years, the inference drawn from this that his need was not critical, the suggestion that he seek someone other than Ms. Quadros for the employment offered (by advertis ing in India for a qualified person, suggested coun sel for the respondents), the fact that she did not know the ages of the elderly couple or if they have any special care needs, the belief that her applica tion was motivated by eventual desire to settle herself and her daughter in Canada for greater opportunities for the daughter, the fact that she had no idea what she might do in Canada three or four years from now if she were no longer required by the employer; all these are matters beyond the Regulations. In my view, they clearly have nothing to do with assessing Ms. Quadros' qualifications for the position offered, for the purpose of deciding whether her employment in Canada will adversely affect employment opportunities for Canadian citi zens or permanent residents in Canada.
Each of these factors might be discussed in detail, as many of them were dealt with by counsel at the hearing of this matter. I propose to deal only with one. The persistence of Pinto in specifically requesting the particular applicant, Ms. Quadros, for the position of the employment offered, was viewed as a decisive factor in the decision to refuse the grant of employment authorization to Ms. Quadros. This is apparent in the telex quoted above, and in the letter of December 18, 1989 to counsel for the applicant from the Counsellor- Immigration in New Delhi, which deals with the reasons for rejection. In that letter, he states, "We may find the arrangement to be contrived specifi cally to obtain the services of a specific person (qualified or not) and not to obtain the services of a person who is qualified for the position". Although he states that Ms. Quadros was found not to be qualified, it appears that that decision was made, at least in part, on the basis of the belief by the visa officer that the employment offer was not bona fide. That belief, despite validation
of the offer of employment by CEC Peterborough, is said to be based on the additional evidence provided by the personal interview with the appli cant for the employment authorization. That pro cess purports to assess whether the applicant is qualified in part through a determination of the bona fides of the offer of employment. If the bona fides of the offer is suspect, as it apparently is if the employment offer is considered "contrived" to obtain the services of a specific individual, then the applicant is found to be not qualified and despite the validation of the need for an employee by CEC, the applicant is refused. While purporting to ensure that the person meets requirements, there is ultimately no assessment of the applicant for employment authorization. Rather, the visa officer following this process of reasoning is simply making an assessment of the employment offer. In my view, that is not consistent with his respon sibilities under the Regulations, nor as I read them is it consistent with his responsibilities under the FDM policy guidelines.
The other factors referred to in relation to the consideration of the bona fides of the employment offered are, in my view, irrelevant for the decision of the visa officer. Yet, as I read the telex mes sages here in issue, and the explanations for them, they were factors in the decision to refuse Ms. Quadros' application. They are not factors to be considered within the authority vested in the visa officer by the Regulations, and to have considered them is an error of law.
It is unnecessary for disposition of this matter to consider the final ground urged by the applicant for the relief here sought. Thus, I make no com ment on the alleged breach of duty of fairness by the visa officer in the circumstances of this case.
Conclusion
For the reasons outlined, I conclude that the visa officer concerned in deciding in June 1989 upon the application of Ms. Renny Quadros for a visa with an employment authorization erred in law by fettering his discretion, by failing to consid-
er experience of Ms. Quadros relevant for the tasks outlined in the validated offer of employ ment, and by taking into account for that decision factors which are irrelevant to considering her qualifications and experience for the employment for which the employment authorization was sought.
This application is allowed. An order goes quashing the decision of the visa officer made in June 1989 in respect of Ms. Quadros' third application and further ordering that the respond ents reconsider that application in accordance with the Immigration Act and Regulations as provided in these reasons.
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