Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

A-490-89
Letraset Canada Limited (Appellant)
v.
W.H. Brady (Respondent)
INDEXED AS: W.H. BRADY Co. v. LETRASET CANADA LTD. (C.A.)
Court of Appeal, Marceau, MacGuigan and Décary JJ.A.—Ottawa, December 12 and 21, 1990.
Practice — Costs — Entitlement to costs based on party's liability to solicitor — Liability of party to solicitor not affected by arrangement third party assume expense of litigation.
Practice — Judgments and orders — Reversal or variation
Judge reviewing prothonotary's taxation — Judge empow ered only to make order prothonotary could make — Pro- thonotary cannot make order inconsistent with Court decision — Nil taxation inconsistent with Trial Judge's award of costs to successful party — Remedy to move under R. 1733 for variation of judgment on ground of matter subsequently discovered.
The appellant was successful in its defense, in the principal action, against a claim for patent infringement. The trial ended with the claim being dismissed, and the counter-claim allowed. The Trial Judge awarded appellant party and party costs. On the taxation, the Prothonotary rejected the respondent's general objection to taxation, and taxed and awarded costs at $64,051.94.
The respondent moved under Rule 346(2) for a review by the Court, not as to the amount, but as to the appellant's entitle ment to costs. Before the Motions Judge, the respondent raised the same objection it had before the Prothonotary, namely that the appellant had incurred no liability for costs towards its own solicitors. This was based on an allegation that the appellant's parent company, Letraset U.K., had directed the conduct of the litigation and paid the solicitors' bills. The Motions Judge set aside the Prothonotary's certificate and ordered that the costs of the appellant be taxed and allowed at nil. This is an appeal from that order.
Held, the appeal should be allowed, and the certificate of the Prothonotary reinstated.
Under Rule 346(2) a judge sitting in review of a taxation can only make an order which the taxing officer could make. Rule 336(1)(b)(i) prevents a prothonotary from making any order inconsistent with an order previously made by the Court or a judge. Here, a taxation of nil is inconsistent with the Trial Judge's order that costs be awarded and taxed. The respond ent's remedy, rather, was under Rule 1733, which provides for
an application to reverse or vary an order on the grounds, inter alia, of new evidence.
A successful party litigant can recover costs from the other party only if it is liable to pay its solicitors. That liability is the legal obligation to pay for the services rendered by the solicitor, which can be enforced by the solicitor against the party. The client's obligation is not affected by the undertaking of a third party, either to the party litigant or to the solicitors, to assume the expense of the suit — any such arrangement is res inter alios acta. Here, the fact that the parent company may have directed the action and paid the bills does not displace the solicitors' legal entitlement to look to the appellant for their fees.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY CONSI DERED
Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, RR. 336(1)(6)(i), 346(2) (as am. by SOR/87-221, s. 3), 1733.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
REVERSED:
W.H. Brady Co. v. Letraset Canada Ltd., [1990] 1 F.C. 51; (1989), 28 C.P.R. (3d) 167; 30 F.T.R. 153 (T.D.) revg W.H. Brady Co. v. Letraset Canada Ltd., [1990] 1 F.C. 46 (T.D.).
DISTINGUISHED:
Simpson v. Local Board of Health of Belleville (1917), 41 O.L.R. 320 (H.C.).
REFERRED TO:
W.H. Brady Co. v. Letraset Canada Ltd. (1985), 7 C.P.R. (3d) 82; 7 C.I.P.R. 1; Adams v. London Improved Motor Coach Builders, [1921] 1 K.B. 495 (C.A.); Armand v. Carr, [1927] S.C.R. 348; Broderick v. Fierro, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 476 (Ont. S.C.).
COUNSEL:
Gordon F. Henderson, Q.C., and Neil R. Bel-
more for appellant.
A. David Morrow for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Gowling, Strathy & Henderson, Ottawa, for
appellant.
Smart & Biggar, Ottawa, for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
MARCEAU J.A.: This appeal is taken against a decision of a judge of the Trial Division [[1990] 1 F.C. 51] who, on a motion for review made pursu ant to Rule 346(2) [Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663 (as am. by SOR/87-221, s. 3)] as it existed in 1989,' set aside a certificate of costs that had been issued by the Prothonotary [[1990] 1 F.C. 46 (T.D.)].
The parties had been involved in a long litiga tion involving a patent. The appellant, Letraset Canada Limited, had successfully defended the infringement action brought against it and, by counterclaim, succeeded in invalidating the respondent's patent. In the judgment [(1985), 7 C.P.R. (3d) 82 (F.C.T.D.)], the appellant had been awarded party and party costs.
At the taxation hearing before the Prothonotary, the respondent, through its counsel, raised a gener al objection to the taxation of costs, an objection said to be based on information gathered in the cross-examination of the deponent on the affidavit filed in support of counsel for the appellant's bill of costs. It was submitted that, even though the appellant had been awarded costs in the action, no costs should be forthcoming since it was not the appellant itself but rather its parent company, Letraset U.K., which had in fact directed the conduct of the litigation and paid all of the expenses generated by it. The objection was reject ed by the Prothonotary who proceeded to tax the appellant's costs in the amount of $64,051.94. The respondent asked for a review of the taxation, not as to the actual amount awarded, which it did not dispute, but as to the denial of its general objec tion. The Motions Judge agreed with the respond
' When it read:
Rule 346... .
(2) Costs shall be taxed by
(a) a prothonotary, each of whom is a taxing officer, or
(b) an officer of the Registry designated by order of the Court as a taxing officer,
subject to review by the Court on application, within 14 days after a taxation, of any party dissatisfied with the taxation.
ent's contention and, setting aside the Prothono- tary's certificate, declared [at page 63] that the "costs recoverable by the defendant from the plaintiff [were] to be taxed and allowed at nil." This is the decision here under appeal.
There is a preliminary question not raised. by either counsel but which the Court cannot avoid addressing, it being of a jurisdictional nature: was the Prothonotary empowered to give effect to this contention that the appellant was not entitled to costs because it was its parent company which had directed the proceedings and paid the solicitors' bills? The question here is vital because, in allow ing the motion for review, the judge could only give the decision that the Prothonotary could him self render. I will simply say here that it appears to me difficult to give the question a positive answer in view of the provisions of Rule 336(1) of the Rules of the Court and of the Directions issued pursuant to it. It is in these provisions that the powers of the prothonotaries are defined, and they read in part as follows:
Rule 336. (1) Notwithstanding Rule 326(1), a prothonotary shall have power
(a) to do anything that he is by these Rules authorized to do,
(b) if he is satisfied that all parties affected have consented thereto, to make any order that the Trial Division may make other than
(i) an order that is inconsistent with an order previously made by the Court or a judge, or
(g) to dispose of any interlocutory application assigned to him specially or to any prothonotary, by special or general direction of the Chief Justice or of the Associate Chief Justice, [Emphasis added.]
General Direction under Rule 336(1)(g)
Under Rule 336(1)(g) the Senior Prothonotary and the Associate Senior Prothonotary are empowered to hear and dispose of any interlocutory application in the Trial Division other than the following, that is to say:
5. any application to vary or discharge an order of a Judge of the Court. [Emphasis added.]
It is clear to me that the contention of the respondent, as it attacked the very entitlement of the appellant to any costs, was seeking a decision which was inconsistent with an order previously
made by the Court, namely the judgment in the action, and as such was beyond the powers of the Prothonotary. The respondent argues that the facts giving rise to the objection only became known to it after judgment had been rendered in the action, but that, of course, could not be a source of authority for the Prothonotary. And, in any event, there is a special Rule which allows a party to seek a variation of a judgment upon the ground of matter subsequently discovered, Rule 1733, which provides:
Rule 1733. A party entitled to maintain an action for the reversal or variation of a judgment or order upon the ground of matter arising subsequent to the making thereof or subsequent ly discovered, or to impeach a judgment or order on the ground of fraud, may make an application in the action or other proceeding in which such judgment or order was delivered or made for the relief claimed.
The respondent also argues that the judge who was assigned to hear the motion to review and who made the impugned order was the one who had presided over the trial and had signed the judg ment. Here again there is a short answer: the coincidence could not extend the judge's options on such a motion to review. Besides, it would be wrong to see the difficulty as limited to a question of procedure in the narrow sense of the word: on a motion to reconsider under Rule 1733, a new hearing is ordered and evidence is adduced before the judge in the normal manner and by all the parties concerned; whereas on a simple motion to review, like the one here involved, the only ma terial that can be relied on is that which was before the Prothonotary, in this case the affidavit filed in support of the bill of costs and the tran script of the cross-examination of the deponent thereon, quite tenuous as a source of evidence.
The jurisdiction of the Prothonotary, and there fore of the judge, to give effect to the objection by rendering the decision here under attack appears to me extremely doubtful. I hesitate, however, to dispose of the appeal on that basis: on the one hand, this jurisdictional issue may have been incompletely canvassed, counsel having become aware of it only at the hearing, and no prior cases, even those where a similar objection as to entitle-
ment had been made only before the taxing officer, having even alluded to it; on the other hand, the most sensitive aspect is, as I just said, in relation to the evidence, and I happen to believe that the disposition of the substantive issue in this case does not depend on the weight of the evidence adduced as much as it could in other cases. So, I will deal with the substantive issue.
The objection of the respondent, as upheld by the Motions Judge, is based on a reasoning made up of two propositions. Counsel first repeats the well established jurisprudential rule that a success ful party litigant can recover costs from the other party in a particular case only if he is liable to pay them to his solicitors, and, like the Motions Judge in his judgment, he refers as authority for that first general proposition to the old case of Simpson v. Local Board of Health of Belleville (1917), 41 O.L.R. 320 (H.C.). Counsel then looks to the particular facts of the present case and argues that the appellant here was not liable for costs, the evidence having established that it was its parent company which had, in fact, taken direction of the proceedings and assumed payment of the solici tors' fees. For counsel, the conclusion that the appellant is not entitled to costs follows irresist ibly.
It will readily be seen that there is a very basic condition for the conclusion to follow, as suggested by counsel: the liability referred to must be the same in the two propositions. This, in my judg ment, is simply not the case.
The general proposition that, to be entitled to recover costs, a litigant must be liable to pay them to his solicitors is based on the principle that party and party costs are given as an indemnity, as a compensation for the expense to which a successful litigant has been put by reason of the litigation. The payment of costs to a party is not to be a gift. It would be unacceptable to let a party collect
costs which, for the most part, relate to profes sional services — if the solicitor who has rendered the services is not legally in a position to claim them from him. The liability required to satisfy the principle involved is easy to define: it is the legal obligation to pay for the services rendered to him which a litigant assumes towards his solicitor and which can be enforced by the solicitor at any
time. Is this the type of liability that counsel refers to when he claims that the appellant was not here liable for costs? Obviously not.
It is clear that the solicitors here have acted for the appellant in the proceedings. There are equivo cal comments in that respect in the reasons of the Motions Judge, but counsel for the respondent has readily acknowledged that they should be over looked. One would wonder what the solicitors were doing if they were not representing the defendant in the action, and no one has suggested that they could have become so involved without the knowl edge and the assent of the defendant. On the other hand, it is equally clear that there has never been any agreement between the appellant and its solicitors which could have the effect of limiting the right of the latter to claim their normal due from the former. The statement of the Motions Judge on this point is quite unequivocal (at page 60):
The plaintiff would be hard pressed to find an agreement between Gowling & Henderson and the defendant company, that Gowling & Henderson would not look to the defendant
company for its costs because I'm satisfied that none exists.
It is therefore undeniable that the solicitors have acquired a right to be paid by the appellant for their professional services and can enforce that right at any time by an action in court which could never be defeated by whatever agreement the appellant — or the solicitors themselves for that matter — may have entered into with a third party (res inter alios acta). The liability of the appellant towards its solicitors within the meaning of the principle certainly exists.
When counsel claims that the appellant was not liable for costs, he means that the appellant was not supposed to finally assume the expense in practice, because it could count on another party to pay the debt or it had the right to recover from or be indemnified by that other party if it was forced to pay it itself. Liability in that sense is not the liability within the meaning of the principle; its absence, in my view, cannot disentitle a successful party from its right to party and party costs (see Adams v. London Improved Motor Coach Build-
ers, [1921] 1 K.B. 495 (C.A.); Armand v. Carr, [1927] S.C.R. 348, at page 350; Broderick v. Fierro, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 476 (Ont. S.C.)). The fact that the U.K. company here actually called the shots and paid the bills is, as I see it, totally irrelevant.
The objection of the respondent, in my judg ment, was based on a misconception of the liability required to entitle a party to its costs. It was clearly not founded. The appeal should therefore be granted, the impugned order of the Trial Divi sion set aside and the certificate of the Prothono- tary dated August 1, 1989 reinstated.
MACGUIGAN J.A.: I concur. DÉCARY J.A.: I concur.
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