T-1547-92
Inspiration Television Canada Inc., Life
Broadcasting Inc., Saskatoon Family Network
Inc., Medicine Hat Christian Broadcasting Society
and Three in One Communication Society of
Three Hill (Plaintiffs)
v.
Her Majesty the Queen and The Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission
(Defendants)
INDEXED AS.' INSPIRATION TELEVISION CANADA INC. V.
CANADA (T.D.)
Trial Division, Muldoon J.—Winnipeg, June 30;
Ottawa, July 8, 1992.
Federal Court jurisdiction — Trial Division — Application
for interim and permanent mandatory injunction, brought
before Trial Division, requiring CRTC to issue broadcasting
licence to plaintiffs for religious broadcasting, and for return
of seized transmission equipment — Recent amendment to Fed
eral Court Act, s. 28 giving Court of Appeal, not Trial Divi
sion, jurisdiction over applications for judicial review directed
against CRTC, even where proceedings interlocutory.
Judicial review — Practice — Application for judicial
review concerning religious broadcasting based on argument
broadcasting legislation in violation of Charter rights —
Application defective as recent amendment to Federal Court
Act, s. 57 requiring notice be given to Attorney General of
Canada where constitutional validity, applicability or oper-
ability of any Act in question before Court.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Fundamental
freedoms — Freedom of religion —Application for interim and
permanent mandatory injunction requiring CRTC to issue
broadcasting licence to plaintiffs for religious broadcasting
confining message to single denominational viewpoint and for
return of seized transmission equipment — Broadcasting legis
lation said to be in violation of Charter rights — Whole pro
ceeding misbegotten due, mostly, to recent amendments to Fed
eral Court Act: notice to Attorney General, required where
constitutional questions raised, not given; application before
wrong Division of Federal Court; injunction application
wrongly naming CRTC as defendant when Minister of Commu
nications responsible for enforcement of legislation.
Broadcasting - Application for interim and permanent
mandatory injunction requiring CRTC to issue broadcasting
licence to plaintiffs for religious broadcasting and for return of
seized transmission equipment - Broadcasting legislation said
to be in violation of Charter rights - Whole proceeding misbe
gotten due, mostly, to recent amendments to Federal Court
Act: notice to Attorney General, required where constitutional
questions raised, not given: s. 57; application for mandamus,
directed against CRTC, should have been brought before
Appeal Division: s. 28; application for injunction concerning
seizure of equipment should have been directed against Minis
ter of Communications, responsible for administration and
enforcement of Radiocommunication Act, and for seizure of
plaintiffs' equipment, rather than CRTC - Proceeding
adjourned sine die to permit plaintiffs to serve constitutional-
question notices required by s. 57, and to amend application to
Appeal Division and to decide whether to amend or proceed
with two injunction applications in relation to Radiocommuni-
cation Act.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED
Broadcasting Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-9.
Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11, ss. 2, 3, 93.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act
1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II,
No. 44], ss. 1, 2, 15, 24(1).
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Com
mission Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-22.
Federal Court Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 (as am. by S.C.
1990, c. 8), ss. 2, 18, 18.1, 18.2, 18.4(2),
28(1)(c),(2),(3), 57.
Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663 (as am. by SOR/90-
846), RR. 3(1)(6), 358, 469(2).
Radio Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-2 (as am. by S.C. 1989,
c. 17, s. 2).
Radiocommunication Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. R-2 (as am. by
S.C. 1989, c. 17, s. 2), ss. 4(1) (as am. idem, s. 4; 1991,
c. 11, s. 82), 5(1)(j) (as am. by S.C. 1989, c. 17, s. 4),
10 (as enacted idem, s. 6), (1) (as am. by S.C. 1991, c.
11, s. 84), (4),(5).
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
REFERRED TO:
Shuswap Cable Ltd. v. Canada, [1987] 1 F.C. 505;
(1986), 31 D.L.R. (4th) 349; 13 C.P.C. (3d) 128; 5 F.T.R.
114 (T.D.); C.LA.C. v. The Queen, [1984] 2 F.C. 866;
(1984), 7 Admin. L.R. 157; [1995] R.D.J. 16 (C.A.);
Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec) v. R., [1982] 1
F.C. 599; (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 574; 41 N.R. 257
(C.A.); leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused [1982] 1
S.C.R. viii; (1982), 41 N.R. 354; Reed v. Canada, [1989]
3 F.C. 259; (1989), 41 C.R.R. 371; [1989] 2 C.T.C. 192;
89 DTC 5230; 27 F.T.R. 173 (T.D.); affd (1990), 2 C.R.R.
(2d) 192 (F.C.A.); leave to appeal to the S.C.C. refused
[1990] 2 S.C.R. x; (1990), 4 C.R.R. (2d) 192; 127 N.R.
236; O'Sullivan v. M.N.R., [1992] 1 F.C. 522; [1991] 2
C.T.C. 117; (1991), 91 DTC 5491 (T.D.); Attorney Gen
eral of Canada v. Gould, [1984] 1 F.C. 1133; (1984), 13
D.L.R. (4th) 485; 42 C.R. (3d) 88; 54 N.R. 232 (C.A.);
O'Grady v. Whyte, [1983] 1 F.C. 719; (1982), 138 D.L.R.
(3d) 167; 42 N.R. 608 (C.A.).
APPLICATION for interim and permanent
mandatory injunction requiring the return of trans
mitting equipment and the issue of a broadcasting
licence for broadcasting of a religious nature confin
ing its message to a single denominational viewpoint,
on the ground that the broadcasting legislation and
policy is in violation of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Proceeding adjourned sine die.
COUNSEL:
Gavin M. Wood and Janet L. Jeffrey for plain
tiffs.
Harry Glinter for defendants.
SOLICITORS:
Wolch, Pinx, Tapper, Scutfield, Winnipeg, for
plaintiffs.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for defend
ants.
The following are the reasons for order rendered in
English by
MULDOON J.: The plaintiffs move the Court for the
following relief:
(1) An interim and permanent mandatory injunction
requiring the defendants to return to the plaintiffs the
transmitting equipment (specified only in a copy of
the search-and-seizure warrant) seized by them;
(2) An interim and permanent injunction preventing
the defendants from further seizing the transmitting
equipment of the plaintiffs, or otherwise preventing
the plaintiffs from broadcasting in the Province of
Manitoba;
(3) An interim and permanent mandatory injunction
requiring the defendants to issue a broadcasting
licence to the plaintiffs;
(4) Short leave for the hearing of this motion; and
(5) Costs on a solicitor and own client basis.
The grounds alleged in support of the plaintiffs'
motion are:
(a) Sections 1, 2, 15 and 24(1) of the Canadian Char
ter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Con
stitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982,
1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No.
44];
(b) The powers of regulation, licensing, and seizure
contained in the Radio Act, [sic] R.S.C., 1985, c. R-2
[as am. by S.C. 1989, c. 17, s. 2], the Broadcasting
Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-9 and the Canadian Radio-
television and Telecommunications Commission Act,
R.S.C., 1985, c. C-22; and
(c) Public Notice Number 1983-112.
The motion, supported by the affidavit of Ken Groen-
ing, is made in the context of the plaintiffs' statement
of claim in this action.
This motion, if not the statement of claim too, is
misbegotten, a plight which might be somewhat
attributed to the newness of recent amendments to the
Federal Court Act [R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 (as am. by
S.C. 1990, c. 8)], and Rules [Federal Court Rules,
C.R.C., c. 663 (as am. by SOR/90-846)]. In so far as
this motion is concerned, the plaintiffs would be
probably better off to withdraw it and start over
again, for which the Court accords them leave. This
Judge is not unsympathetic to the plaintiffs' view
point, but notes that those like the plaintiffs, who
plead equality ought cheerfully to be prepared to
abide by the law's forms, norms and imperatives as
all others are required to do. The Court is not to be
called upon to be giving advice and counsel to any
party's solicitors, but in view of this being a case of
early, if not first, impression, the Court may mention
jurisprudence already in the public domain which
accords insights into this type of case: Shuswap
Cable Ltd. v. Canada, [1987] 1 F.C. 505 (T.D.); and
earlier: C.I.A. C. v. The Queen, [ 1984] 2 F.C. 866
(C.A.), and Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec)
v. R., [1982] 1 F.C. 599 (C.A.), leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court refused [1982] 1 S.C.R. viii.
The grounds for this motion are too coyly stated by
merely citing various provisions of the Constitution
and other statutes without saying how they operate to
afford the relief which the plaintiffs allege is their
due. This Court itself has already generated a consid
erable jurisprudence about freedom of religion and
the necessary secularity of the Canadian State, for
example: Reed v. Canada, [ 1989] 3 F.C. 259 (T.D.);
appeal dismissed with costs and without reasons
(1990), 2 C.R.R. (2d) 192 (F.C.A.); leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court of Canada refused with costs
[1990] 2 S.C.R. x; also O'Sullivan v. M.N.R., [1992]
1 F.C. 522 (T.D.). Canada's population today evinces
such numbers of major and minor religions and their
numerous splinters, that everyone's security resides
in the State's resolute secularity, with its guaranty of
freedom of religion and freedom of speech and
expression. The plethora of "kinds" of Christians,
Jews, and Muslims et al., exacts the cautious
approach of the majority of the Appeal Division in
Attorney General of Canada v. Gould, [1984] 1 F.C.
1133.
As noted above the inadequate expression of
grounds in the notice of motion drives one to Mr.
Groening's affidavit in support, and even to the
plaintiffs' statement of claim. The defendants' coun
sel notes that the plaintiffs here, as in the Gould case
are not seeking a stay pending the determination of
some constitutional point on the validity of federal
legislation, but rather moving the Court, in effect, to
declare the Broadcasting Act and the Radiocommuni-
cation Act [S.C. 1989, c. 17] unconstitutional and
inoperable pending determination of their suit for a
declaration to that effect. The plaintiffs here, com
plains the defendants' counsel, are seeking the very
relief which they seek in the principal action. (Curi-
ously, the plaintiffs seek only an interim, and not an
interlocutory, injunction.) Defence counsel notes that
such an ambitious scope surely requires compliance
with the preliminary requirements of the new section
57 of the Federal Court Act [as am. by S.C. 1990, c.
8, s. 19], whose pertinent passages run, thus:
57. (1) Where the constitutional validity, applicability or
operability of an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of any
province, or of regulations thereunder, is in question before the
Court or a federal board, commission or other tribunal, other
than a service tribunal within the meaning of the National
Defence Act, the Act or regulation shall not be adjudged to be
invalid, inapplicable or inoperable unless notice has been
served on the Attorney General of Canada and the attorney
general of each province in accordance with subsection (2).
(3) The Attorney General of Canada and the attorney gen
eral of each province are entitled to notice of any appeal or
application for judicial review made in respect of the constitu
tional question described in subsection (1).
(4) The Attorney General of Canada and the attorney gen
eral of each province are entitled to adduce evidence and make
submissions to the Court ... in respect of the constitutional
question described in subsection (1).
(5) Where the Attorney General of Canada or the attorney
general of a province makes submissions under subsection (4),
that attorney general shall be deemed to be a party to the pro
ceedings for the purposes of any appeal in respect of the con
stitutional question described in subsection (1).
Given the dearth of grounds for this motion, the
affidavit of Ken Groening and even the statement of
claim must be perused. Here are pertinent passages
from the affidavit:
27. THAT it is the position of the Plaintiffs that the Defendants
are restricting religious broadcasting and preventing any
broadcasting of a religious nature in Canada from a station that
confines its message to a single denominational viewpoint.
28. THAT it is also the position of the Plaintiffs that the
Defendants exceeded their jurisdiction by setting and imple
menting the policy contained in The Broadcasting Act, [sic]
R.S.C. 1985, c. B-9, [sic] The Radio Act, [sic] R.S.C. 1985, c.
R-2, and The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunica
tions Commission Act, [sic] R.S.C. 1985, c. C-22.
29. THAT it is also the position of the Plaintiffs that this
restriction on broadcasting and the deliberate seizure of the
Plaintiffs' transmitting equipment infringes upon its rights to
freedom of expression and religion and the right to equality
under the law which is guaranteed under The Canadian Charter
or Rights and Freedoms [sic].
It is noticed that the plaintiffs, having named only
two defendants, do not discriminate between the two
in regard to the activities alleged.
Here are pertinent passages from the statement of
claim:
21. The Plaintiffs further state that the C.R.T.C. presently
requires a Canadian content level in all broadcasting which
effectively prevents the broadcasting of the Trinity Broadcast
ing Network in that all such programming is substantially
American in origin.
22. The Plaintiffs state, that by the said Canadian content
requirements the C.R.T.C. by its policies, regulations, rules
and governing statutes is violating the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and, in particular, the freedom of religion
guaranteed therein. As such the said Canadian content require
ments are unconstitutional.
23. The Plaintiffs therefore claim as against all [sic (not yet)]
Defendants:
(a) A Declaration that The Broadcasting Act, [sic] R.S.C. 1985,
c. B-9, The Radio Act, [sic] R.S.C. 1985, c. R-2, and the
religious broadcast policy set out in Public Notice Number
1983-112 are unconstitutional;
(e) A Declaration that the Canadian content requirements
referred to in paragraph 21 herein are unconstitutional;
The statute which accords power and authority to
the CRTC is the Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c. 11
which came into force, pursuant to its section 93, on
June 4, 1991.
Is section 57 of the Federal Court Act to be
invoked here, as the defendants' counsel protests?
Yes. It is clear from the pleadings as well as the
nature of injunctive relief sought by the plaintiffs that
they will necessarily be making an issue of the con
stitutional validity, applicability or operability of the
Broadcasting Act, and the Radiocommunication Act,
at least. In question will be section 3 and Part II of
the former, and the enforcement provisions of the lat
ter. That being so, and so long as it remains so, sec
tion 57 is invoked, and it behooves the plaintiffs to
comply with it.
There is yet a further defect in these proceedings,
which was not initially raised by the defendants'
counsel. It is the question of the jurisdiction of the
respective divisions of this Court. The ghosts of the
earlier provisions of sections 18 and 28 may still be
roaming about clanking their complex chains. The
new paragraph 28(1)(c) [as am. by S.C. 1990, c. 8, s.
8] provides that:
28. (1) The Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and
determine applications for judicial review made in respect of
any of the following federal boards, commissions or other
tribunals:
(c) the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications
Commission established by the Canadian Radio-television
and Telecommunications Commission Act;
With few exceptions, it is trite law in this Court
that jurisdiction in judicial review cannot be acquired
or conferred by consent, negligence or convenience.
The Court therefore ex mero motu invoked Rule 358,
by referring this matter to the Honourable the Chief
Justice. Rule 358 empowers the Chief Justice, or a
judge designated by him, to order that a matter com
menced in one Division be transferred to the other
Division, and he or she may give incidental direc
tions for the further conduct of the matter. On June
30, 1992, Chief Justice Isaac issued his designation in
this matter, as follows:
Pursuant to Rule 358 of the Federal Court Rules I hereby
designate the Honourable Mr. Justice Francis C. Muldoon, a
Judge of this Court, for the purpose of making any order that
appears to him to be just having due regard to the interests of
all the parties in respect of the application commenced by the
Applicant[s] [plaintiffs] in the Trial Division of this Court.
In making such order the Honourable Mr. Justice Muldoon
may give incidental directions for the further conduct of the
application.
It appears that the third (earlier above recited) item
in the plaintiffs' notice of motion, described as a
mandatory injunction, amounts to that which is akin
to a motion for mandamus compelling the CRTC to
issue a broadcasting licence to the plaintiffs. There
has been, of course, no interim mandamus, until the
enactment of section 18.2 [as enacted idem, s. 5], but
why the plaintiffs want only a 10-day interim injunc
tion (Rule 469(2)) is most unclear. However whether
the plaintiffs seek a mandatory injunction of some
duration, or whether what they seek is mandamus, be
it interim, interlocutory, or ultimately permanent,
they would have to prove that the CRTC is legally
obliged to issue a broadcasting licence: O'Grady v.
Whyte, [1983] 1 F.C. 719 (C.A.). On the other hand it
does not appear that the CRTC has actually formally
rejected any application by them for a licence.
Whatever the remedy is called, it is to be obtained by
means of judicial review as may be seen in sections
18 and 18.1 [as enacted idem] of the Federal Court
Act, and would be so pursued were it not for the new
paragraph 28(1)(c) whereby such judicial review is
confided to the Court of Appeal.
To say "such judicial review" is quite correct for
the judicial review is the very same sort of judicial
review contemplated in section 18.1, as enacted and
explained in subsections 28(2) and (3) of the Federal
Court Act which provide:
28.
(2) Sections 18 to 18.5, except subsection 18.4(2), apply,
with such modifications as the circumstances require, in
respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeal under subsection (1) and, where they so apply, a refer
ence to the Trial Division shall be read as a reference to the
Court of Appeal.
(3) Where the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction to hear and
determine any matter, the Trial Division has no jurisdiction to
entertain any proceeding in respect of the same matter.
So, whether or not counsel adverted to the question
of jurisdiction, the Court itself is obliged to avoid
exceeding its jurisdiction or incorrectly arrogating
jurisdiction.
The issuing of broadcasting licences is, according
to the definition of "licence" in section 2 of the
Broadcasting Act, committed to the CRTC. There
fore, because the plaintiffs seek a remedy to be
obtained through judicial review their motion shall be
transferred to the Appeal Division. The plaintiffs are
entitled to withdraw the motion for an "interim
mandatory injunction" and to start all over again, if
so advised, not omitting service on the appropriate
defendant(s), in the Appeal Division. One fact is cer
tain. The plaintiffs shall not proceed with or re-insti
tute their proceedings, in which they seek to compel
the CRTC to grant them a broadcasting licence, in the
Trial Division which has no jurisdiction to entertain
their application for judicial review in regard to the
CRTC. Indeed subsection 18(1) [as am. idem, s. 4] is
"[s]ubject to section 28" thus diluting the Trial Divi
sion's exclusive original jurisdiction to issue an
injunction when paragraph 28(1)(c) overrides it.
The defendants, or the appropriate one of them,
may file counter-affidavits if so advised, and in any
event within the proper time limits, and the parties
may effect cross-examinations of opposing depo-
nents. Of course the parties may take advantage of
Rule 3(1)(b), because this transfer order will be made
in the long vacation.
The plaintiffs will have to take such measures or
make such application as they deem necessary or
appropriate in regard to the time limitation provisions
of subsection 18.1(2). They filed their notice of
motion on June 25, 1992, and if they elect to with
draw their motion, tidy up their procedure and start
all over again, the Court now directs that their appli
cation shall still be deemed to have been made on
June 25, 1992; and in such event, the Court fixes and
allows them time to bring such new application dur
ing the long vacation, but as soon as reasonably pos
sible, as if the more effective proceedings had been
commenced on June 25, 1992. The defendants' coun
sel intimated that they will alternatively attempt to
justify the provisions of section 3 of the Act and the
Canadian-content rules pursuant to section 1 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and he
intimated that they would file many and voluminous
affidavits. This might be reason enough to invoke the
provisions of subsection 18.4(2) [as enacted idem, s.
5] by directing that this proceeding be treated and
proceeded with as an action, but, of course there
already is an action afoot herein, in which this appar
ently interlocutory matter will be definitively adjudi
cated.
Does paragraph 28(1)(c) truly contemplate that the
Appeal Division should be engaged in interlocutory
proceedings? It appears to do so, for its expression
contemplates "judicial review ... in respect of ...
the [CRTC] established by [its constitutive] Act".
There is no requirement for the proceedings to be
final or conclusive. The jurisdiction conferred is
surely ratione personae as it inevitably is in Federal
Court judicial review, instead of ratione materiae. In
any event, section 28 expresses in full the words
defined in section 2 [as am. idem, s. 1] designating
only federal boards, commissions and other tribunals
over which the Court exercises judicial review, as is
made abundantly clear regarding the remedies pro
vided in section 18, also. Subsection 28(1) lists only
those boards, commissions and tribunals "in respect
of' which the Court of Appeal is accorded jurisdic
tion to hear and determine applications for judicial
review, that is for injunctions, inter alia. It does not
found jurisdiction on subject matter, but on the legal
establishment of the potential respondents under the
laws of Canada mentioned therein. Any federal
board, commission or other tribunal not listed in sub
section 28(1) comes within the Trial Division's juris
diction, again ratione personae.
What is to be done about the plaintiffs' first two
applications for injunctive relief in regard to seized
transmitting equipment? They seek to enjoin "the
defendants", but one cannot enjoin the sovereign, and
it is not sure that the remaining defendant, CRTC is
responsible at all for the seizure of the plaintiffs'
transmitting equipment.
The warrant for search and seizure (a photocopy)
is exhibited, as an attachment, "C", to Mr. Groen-
ing's affidavit. It is addressed by name to three radio
inspectors appointed pursuant to paragraph 5(1)(j) [as
am. by S.C. 1989, c. 17, s. 4] of the Radiocommuni-
cation Act. It recites the information on oath of one
of them, Sidney William Barrie Dear of Selkirk,
Manitoba, "a member of the Department of Commu
nications", who swears "that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the following offence has
been committed: ... contravention of subsection 4(1)
[as am. idem; 1991, c. 11, s. 82] of the Radiocom-
munication Act [as specified] ... and that goods to
wit UHF (Ultra High Frequency) ... apparatus ...,
are in the possession of and under the operation of
[the plaintiffs] Life ..., Inspiration ..., and/or Ken
Groening which will provide evidence of and relating
to the said offence are concealed in the premises [par-
ticularized closely] ... in ... Winnipeg". The war
rant could be executed "by day or by night", and it
expired on May 27, 1992.
The Minister of Communications and inspectors
appointed by him are responsible for the administra
tion and enforcement of the Radiocommunication
Act, and not "the defendants" as the plaintiffs allege.
The CRTC, one of "the defendants" is not charged
with the administration of this Act. The plaintiffs cer
tainly cannot inflict their injunction proceedings
upon the Appeal Division simply by erroneously
naming the CRTC as one of the two "defendants" in
such injunction proceedings relating to the inspec
tors' warranted seizure of the plaintiffs' broadcasting
apparatus. The first two applications for injunctions
regarding the apparatus will not be transferred to the
Appeal Division because, despite the erroneous nam
ing of the CRTC, it does not appear that these appli
cations are made "in respect of' the CRTC at all.
What becomes of these applications is up to the
plaintiffs. They may pursue them as they stand, or
they may pursue them as they might be thoughtfully
amended. The plaintiffs must bring them on for hear
ing at the earliest opportunity consistent with the
defendants' right to respond, or abandon them, or risk
their being summarily and peremptorily dismissed.
The defendants' counsel believes the plaintiffs'
attack on the warrant ought not to be levied in this
Court, despite the warrant's having been employed to
enforce the Radiocommunication Act, and despite this
Court's injunctive jurisdiction for purposes of such
enforcement of subsection 10(1) [as enacted idem, s.
6; 1991, c. 11, s. 84] including section 4, pursuant to
subsections 10(4) [as enacted idem] and (5) [as
enacted idem] of the Act. However, since the parties
are respectively represented by solicitors they may
pursue such course as they are advised.
As discussed between the Court and the respective
counsel at the hearing on June 30, 1992, the whole of
this misbegotten proceeding will be adjourned sine
die to permit the plaintiffs to serve the constitutional-
question notices required by section 57, and to revise
and amend their application to the Appeal Division as
they wish, or not, and to decide whether to amend or
continue, or not, their two injunction applications in
relation to the Radiocommunication Act.
The Court's indulgence in these regards is not to
be taken as a precedent. It is bestowed principally, if
not exclusively, because of the newness of the recent
amendments to the Act and the Rules. The Court's
order will be formulated in accordance with these
reasons.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.